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S U M M A RY O F T H E S I S
This thesis examines the implications of financial frictions on macroe-
conomic outcomes and their impact on the transmission mechanisms
of economic policy. Chapters 3 and 4 study the theoretical implica-
tions of significant non-linearities in financial constraints, chapter 5
examines the role of financial frictions on cross-border lending in a
currency union.
Macroeconomic time-series suggest that occasional financial crises
generate sharp increases in the interest spread, and deep downturns
in output and investment. Standard models of financial frictions are
unable to explain this phenomena as the implied borrowing con-
straints are always binding. In chapter 3, a model is proposed in
which the financial constraints are only occasionally binding. This
generates simulated time series that capture these crisis episodes, and,
as a result, replicate observed positive skewness in the interest spread,
and negative skewness in output and investment.
The majority of models of financial frictions, including that proposed
in chapter 3, focus on a time-varying investment wedge between the
risky return to capital and the risk-free rate. The empirical evidence,
however, suggests that this wedge does not play an important role in
driving business cycles, but rather supports financial frictions that af-
fect either the efficient allocation of the factors of production (efficiency
wedge), or the labour market (labour wedge). In chapter 4 I propose a
model where a credit friction emerges as both an efficiency and invest-
ment wedges. This is able to generate occasional, large crisis episodes
and replicate the observed negative skewness in simulated time series
of output and investment.
Contrary to empirical evidence, cross-border financial flows in struc-
tural models usually dampen the adverse effects of shocks. In chapter
5, I examine frictions in the cross-border interbank market in a cur-
rency union that enhance these effects. Two recently applied uncon-
ventional policies are implemented and analysed.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
This thesis examines the implications of financial frictions on macroe-
conomic outcomes and the role of economic policy. Since the work
of Irving Fisher and John Maynard Keynes1 during the Great Depres-
sion, credit frictions have been thought to bear an important share
of responsibility for driving economic fluctuations. Despite this, it
is only since the global financial crisis that financial frictions have be-
come a central focus in macroeconomic modelling and analysis. Three
models are proposed in this thesis; the first is a model of banks that
face occasionally binding borrowing constraints; the second of an ad-
verse selection problem in bank lending; and the third a model of
financial frictions in the cross interbank market in a monetary union.
The impact on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy of
each of the proposed financial frictions is discussed, and for the third
model, additional stabilisation policies analysed. These are two un-
conventional policies that have recently been applied by central banks
due to the constraints of the zero lower bound on nominal interest
rates; long-term refinance operations, and large scale asset purchases.
In the second and third models, heterogeneity plays a key role in the
model dynamics: in the first, hidden information about the borrower
type is the source of the financial frictions; whilst in the third, it is the
presence of multiple countries, and idiosyncratic loan return shocks
that play an important role.
The thesis begins with an introduction and literature review giving
a short history of macroeconomic research and a general discussion
of the literature to which the thesis contributes. The second chapter
is dedicated to a detailed discussion of the methodologies employed
and the data used. The remaining chapters then contain the main
body of research.
1 See Fisher (1933) and Keynes (1936)
1
2 introduction
1.1 background literature
The study of macroeconomics poses a number of challenges. In par-
ticular is the limited availability of data and the lack of natural exper-
iments. There exist quarterly time series U.S. data of some key eco-
nomic indicators such as GDP, employment and investment since the
end of the Second World War, and the number of available datasets
continues to grow, but the number of variables with long-time se-
ries is small. If you consider that the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) identify 11 business cycles during this period, to
understand the determinates of these fluctuations with any certainty
using only data is not possible. Secondly, the absence of macroeco-
nomic policy experiments mean that counterfactuals can only be spec-
ulated upon in policy analysis. Indeed, Lucas (1976) highlighted an
important drawback in using econometric techniques to evaluate pol-
icy choices; because empirical analysis is restricted to the historical
behaviour of economic agents, and because the choices of consump-
tion and saving, and investment and employment can be heavily in-
fluenced by the actions of the policy maker, studying historical em-
pirical relationships is insufficient to evaluate the impact of new pol-
icy as the policy might cause these relationships to break down. For
these reasons, macroeconomic analysis has lent on theory to a very
high degree. It is likely that as more data becomes available and fur-
ther natural experiments emerge, empirical work will increase in its
role in policy analysis but theory of the sort presented in this paper
remains central to developing understanding of the macroeconomy.
The work of Lucas led quickly to the real business cycle (RBC) anal-
ysis proposed by Kydland & Prescott (1982) that explicitly incorpo-
rates the optimization problems of infinitely lived individual agents
in an economy; commonly referred to as having micro-foundations2.
This thesis proposes theoretical models of financial frictions to eval-
uate the transmission of policy and so this is the broad literature to
which these chapters belong. To provide the context, we give a short
history of macroeconomics leading up to Lucas (1976) and since.
2 This embedded the Permanent Income Hypothesis of Friedman (1957) in explaining
the consumption savings decisions of households at the centre pf macroeconomic
research.
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1.1.1 An Evolution of Theory and Methodology
Prior to Lucas, macroeconomic research relied upon historical rela-
tionships between employment, prices and output, and the analy-
sis of simple aggregate supply and demand curves. This approach
finds its beginnings during the Great Depression, as policy makers at-
tempted to deal with the widespread economic devastation. In Keynes
(1936), the study of business cycles was brought together with mon-
etary theory to propose a general theory of the macroeconomy (cp.
Blanchard 2000). The former was a collection of explanations for eco-
nomic expansions, crises and recoveries, whilst the latter was sum-
marised in the Quantity Theory of Money relating changes in money
supply to output and prices (cp. Fisher 1922). Keynes highlighted the
connection between these two fields and gave an important role to the
policy maker of managing aggregate demand in the economy using
both monetary and fiscal policy. The theory proposed by Keynes was
implemented into the first macroeconomic model by Hicks (1937) and
further developed in Hansen (1953). The resulting IS-LM model sum-
marizing the goods, financial and labour markets as simple aggregate
supply and demand curves, dominated macroeconomic analysis un-
til Lucas (1976) and the real business cycle theory that followed. The
backdrop for this shift was a period of high inflation, high unemploy-
ment and low growth during the 1970s, breaking down the Phillips
curve (cp. Phillips 1958) that related prices and employment. This
relationship highlighted a trade-off between low inflation and un-
employment; the policy maker could target high employment but at
the expense of high inflation. As shown in Sargent & Wallace (1975),
such an ad-hoc relationship as that proposed by Phillips is only a
short-run phenomena that cannot be exploited for long as agents in
the economy will learn to anticipate the policy and the reaction of
the other agents; in the context of a model, this implies agents will
have ‘rational’ expectations consistent with the model conditions (cp.
Muth 1961).
Two key early results in the real business cycle (RBC) literature are
captured firstly by the policy ineffectiveness proposition in Sargent &
Wallace (1975) – that monetary policy will be ineffective at managing
aggregate outcomes under rational expectations; and secondly, that
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business cycles are real phenomena that can be explained by house-
holds substituting leisure between periods of high productivity to pe-
riods of low productivity (see Kydland & Prescott 1982). That is to say,
economic fluctuations are optimal given the exogenous state of the
world. In response, a number of authors restored the Keynesian ideas
to this new paradigm by introducing different types of nominal rigidi-
ties, such as sticky information (e.g. Fischer 1977), and sticky wages
(e.g. Taylor 1979) and prices (e.g. Calvo 1983). In this so called New
Keynesian (NK) literature, such frictions restored a role for monetary
policy in the short-run in a micro-founded model. From within the
agents first-order conditions emerged a new expectations-augmented
Phillips curve relating inflation and output. The RBC and NK liter-
atures, which we can collectively refer to as the dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) literature, had significant impact on the
role of applied macroeconomic work. Since Frisch (1933), it had been
understood that the relationship between economic time series could
be modelled as linear difference equations and that these relationship
differ across frequencies. The DSGE research moved to focus only on
business cycle fluctuations; that is the cyclical component of time se-
ries within the frequency range of about 1 to 8 years. This meant ex-
tracting fluctuations in time-series within this frequency domain and
rejecting all other information (see Hodrick & Prescott 1997). This the-
sis follows this approach as an analysis of business cycle fluctuations,
and policy to stabilize the economy.
Another significant shift was away from financial factors in deter-
mining business cycles. The earlier researchers in macroeconomics
such as Irving Fisher and John Maynard Keynes placed significant
responsible for economic fluctuations on credit market imperfections
but, with few exceptions (see e.g. Diamond & Dybvig 1983, Stiglitz
& Weiss 1992, Minsky 1994, Kiyotaki & Moore 1997, Carlstrom &
Fuerst 1997, Bernanke & Gertler 1989), this has been largely miss-
ing from macroeconomic research. Indeed, prior to the financial cri-
sis of 2007–2008, the general consensus was that financial frictions
played a limited role in generating, or enhancing the business cycle.
This suggests that the development of financial technologies, such as
credit default swaps and high frequency trading, were felt to dilute
systemic risk to an irrelevance. The former via increased diversifica-
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tion, and the latter by increased efficiency of information propaga-
tion. This changed drastically following the global financial crisis,
and the DSGE framework experienced a crisis of confidence. The
response made financial frictions a subject of a renewed research
agenda. Policy makers now consider credit frictions to play an im-
portant role in shaping the transmission mechanism of policy and
the majority of policy models include financial frictions as standard
(see e.g. Christiano, Motto & Rostagno 2010). The study of financial
frictions form a central focus of this thesis, which seeks to contribute
to this important research area. Before focusing in greater detail on
specific research areas that provide background to the research of this
thesis, we will discuss in some more detail the DSGE research agenda
picking up on issues relevant to this thesis.
1.1.2 Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Literature
The DSGE literature typically proposes representative agent models
of the macroeconomy in order to propose theories on the determi-
nants of the business cycle, to test the empirical validity of these
theories, and to analyse the transmission mechanisms of policy. The
models draw focus on the behaviour of a number of agents which
usually include households and firms, a policy maker, and increas-
ingly banks. The key factors that determine the actions of these sec-
tors and the prices that emerge from their interaction are household
preferences, production technology and the market structure, and
in the case of models to analyse policy, a policy maker objective.
As firms and banks are usually owned by households, the driving
force at the heart of these models are household preferences over
the inter-temporal allocation of consumption and leisure. The prices
that emerge in equilibrium are determined by how these preferences
interact with the objective of the policy maker, with the production
technology and market structure within which firms and banks op-
erate, as well as the information sets of each agent in the economy,
and any frictions imposed on agents’ actions or interaction. At the
simplest, the text-book real business cycle model (e.g. King, Plosser &
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Rebelo 1988) assumes perfect competition; full information3; perfect
goods, financial, labour and capital markets; and so with no other
frictions, a price irrelevance. This leads to an irrelevance of mone-
tary policy as discussed above, but fiscal policy is also ineffective
as a tool to manage aggregate demand if the households yield no
utility from government consumption4 (see Barro 1974). Much of the
DSGE literature has attempted to analyse the various market imper-
fections, information asymmetries or other frictions that will cause
such features to break down, and to generate model simulations that
better match the observed macroeconomic time-series. For instance,
the New Keynesian literature began by introducing nominal rigidities
into real business cycle to explain the impact of monetary and fiscal
policy. It is now common to incorporate rigidity in the setting of con-
sumption good prices using monopolistic competition and either the
mechanism proposed in Calvo (1983) in which only a proportion of
firms are allowed to set prices, or that proposed in Rotemberg (1982)
in which firms face price adjustment costs. I rely solely on the Calvo
(1983) method in this thesis.
Other strands of the DSGE literature include introducing sources
of heterogeneity in households and firms. Mankiw (2000), for in-
stance, argues that treating some households as having restricted ac-
cess to credit markets is necessary to analyse fiscal policy. Iacoviello
(2005) introduces heterogeneity in discounting so that some house-
holds emerge as savers and others as borrowers. In models such as
these, it firstly becomes possible to consider distributional issues, and
secondly to analyse how the presence of such heterogeneity might
have an impact on policy transmission mechanisms. In chapter 5, I in-
troduce borrowers and savers using heterogeneity in time preferences,
and also allow for heterogeneity in the structural parameters of whole
economies. Other authors focus on heterogeneity in the firm sector al-
though it is common in the DSGE literature to make assumptions that
allow for aggregation and representative agent characterisation. For
3 In fact, an information problem was important in driving economic fluctuations in
the first RBC model stemming from the time taken to build capital (see Kydland &
Prescott 1982).
4 Baxter & King (1993) include household utility of government purchases in a real
business cycle which causes government consumption and investment to have im-
portant effects on economic outcomes.
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example, Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist (1999) introduce idiosyncratic
productivity which leads to a firm-size distribution that depends on
the history of idiosyncratic shocks. By assuming risk neutrality and
perfect capital and labour markets, the size of an individual firms is
irrelevant for aggregate outcomes, only requiring a single state vari-
able, the aggregate net worth of the sector; the default rate only de-
pends on the known distribution of the shock, not on the unknown
distribution of firm size. In chapter 5 we rely on such a mechanism to
introduce risk in the interbank market. In chapter 4, I assume hetero-
geneity in the risk of firm output but, by limiting to two types, can
use representative agent methods to characterise the equilibrium.
In an RBC or NK model, the capital stock can jump unrealistically
sharply in response to shocks whilst the data indicates the capital
stock evolves smoothly. To deal with this, investment or capital adjust-
ment costs have become a typical feature in the DSGE literature. The
recent literature builds on Tobin’s (1969) q-theory of investment; the
theory proposes that if the market value of installed capital is greater
than the cost of replacing the capital, the firm should invest. It also
builds on previous firm theory literature which examined the microe-
conomic factors behind investment decisions and the costs involved
(see e.g. Gould 1968). The two most common methods in the DSGE
literature are the approach of Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans (2005)
in which investment is made subject to quadratic costs of adjusting
the level of investment, and the approach proposed in Ireland (2003)
in which investment is subject to quadratic costs of adjusting the cap-
ital stock. Both approaches are consistent with Tobin’s q-theory, and
choose a functional form which is homogeneous of degree one so that
the firm-size is irrelevant, and to ensure the costs disappear in steady
state.
As well as persistence to the capital stock, it has become common
to add persistence to consumption with the introduction of habits
in consumption (e.g. Christiano et al. 2005). The inclusion of habits
generates fluctuations in equity premiums that are observed in the
data, but difficult to explain in models without habit formation. As
discussed in Cochrane & Campbell (1999), not only do habits in con-
sumption imply bigger fluctuations in the stochastic discount factor
for a given change in consumption, they also cause the risk pre-
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mium to increase as consumption falls adding further volatility in
asset prices. The habits are specified as either internal in which house-
hold utility depends on their consumption relative to their own con-
sumption from the previous period (see Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe
2006), or external which treats the utility from consumption as akin to
‘keeping up with the Joneses’, or perhaps rather, as Abel (1990) de-
scribes, ‘catching up with the Joneses’. Internal habits really is habit
formation as a household will account for the effect of their current
consumption choice on their future utility. This introduces an ineffi-
ciency in steady state, whilst with external habit, households do not
internalise this effect and so the steady state is unchanged. Dennis
(2009) shows that the degree to which a model can fit empirical busi-
ness cycle dynamics is not affected by the choice of habit type, and
so we rely solely on external habits in this thesis.
1.1.2.1 Model Validation, Calibration and Estimation
The approaches taken to assess the validity of models differ along
important lines in the real business cycle and New Keynesian litera-
tures. As Chari, Kehoe & Mcgrattan (2007) discuss, real business cycle
models are typically kept intentionally simple and the number of pa-
rameters low in order to interpret the impact of one type of friction.
These models are naturally restricted in how well the simulated time-
series fit empirical data, and so formal estimation procedures are rare;
it is far more common to calibrate key parameters to match simula-
tions to certain moments or steady state values to empirical ergodic
means.
The New Keynesian literature (e.g. Christiano et al. 2005, Smets &
Wouters 2007) usually places higher import on fitting the aggregate
macroeconomic time series and, by incorporating a combination of
the features mentioned above, are often able to do so. The modellers
are then in a position to estimate key parameters in the model, and
perform historical variance decompositions that give a measure of the
importance of each shock in generating the business cycle. If accurate,
metrics of this type will clearly by of large interest to policy makers.
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1.1.2.2 Fluctuations, Shocks and the Balanced Growth Path
One of the key lines by which the RBC and NK literatures differ
is in the assessment of which shocks are important, and what im-
pact they have on the macroeconomy. In general, the real business
cycle literature places a greater level of importance on real, supply-
side shocks such as a stochastic technological progress, or preference
shocks on the demand-side. The New Keynesian literature, on the
other hand, puts greater emphasis on demand-side shocks and mon-
etary shocks. A key issue is the implied correlations generated by
different types of shock; the empirical business cycle implies positive
correlations between output, productivity, hours worked, consump-
tion and investment. In a real business cycle model without imper-
fections, a productivity shock delivers this correlation whilst other
shocks typically do not5. In a New Keynesian model, labour will typ-
ically fall following a productivity shock but a demand side shock
such as to monetary policy can induce the empirical correlations (see
e.g. Christiano et al. 2005). Providing support for the NK literature,
Gali (1999) found that hours tends to initially fall following a pro-
ductivity shock in VAR, whilst Cantore, Leo´n-Ledesma, McAdam &
Willman (2014) show how changing the functional form of the pro-
duction function can allow either sign response of hours in both an
RBC and NK model. The implication of the latter paper is that chang-
ing assumptions about preferences or technology, or introducing new
frictions, might well cause the correlations to change. This perhaps
explains why there remains no clear consensus regarding the role
assigned to different types of shock. An example of this issue is dis-
cussed in chapter 3 which analyses the response to a capital quality
shock; under standard preferences (such as those proposed in King
et al. 1988), investment will move in opposite directions to output and
consumption, but co-movement can be achieved with preferences pro-
posed in Greenwood, Hercowitz & Huffman (1988), which removes
the wealth effect on labour supply.
One way to analyse the empirical business cycle and assess theoretical
business cycle models is using the ‘business cycle accounting’ method
5 An exception being a preference shock to the utility share of labour, or a ‘laziness’
shock.
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suggested in Chari et al. (2007). The authors find that business cycle
fluctuations can be represented by wedges, the most important in
the U.S business cycle6 being the efficiency wedge caused by the in-
efficient allocation of factor inputs. That this wedge will often show
up as aggregate technology shocks may provide a valuable explana-
tion for the importance placed on this shock in the macroeconomic
literature. The labour wedge was found to be the second most impor-
tant wedge in U.S. business cycles, which can be represented as a
labour tax causing a wedge between the marginal product of labour
and the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consump-
tion. The authors look at two further wedges; the investment and the
government consumption wedges, finding the former plays a limited
role whilst the latter virtually none. The investment wedge, repre-
sented by a tax on investment, shows up between the risk-free rate
and the expected return on capital. The interesting point here is that
in the majority of models of financial frictions (including Kiyotaki &
Moore 1997, Bernanke et al. 1999), the friction shows up as an invest-
ment wedge; given that Chari et al. (2007) assign this wedge such
a small role, and even a negative role during the Great Depression,
there are perhaps other forms of financial friction due more attention.
In chapter 4, I propose one such model in which the friction emerges
as an efficiency wedge; privately observed project risk leads to an ad-
verse selection problem that can lead to the misallocation of capital.
The final general theme in the DSGE literature to mention is the im-
portance of the balanced-growth path. From its inception, macroeco-
nomics has broadly focused on business cycle and growth theory. The
real business cycle literature was a move away from analysing the
relationship between short and long run macroeconomic outcomes;
with the observed real per capita growth rates relatively constant over
the long term, the focus shifted to fluctuations around a balanced
growth path. As outlined in King et al. (1988), to maintain consis-
tency with the Solow-Swan growth model (Solow 1956, Swan 1956),
the functional forms of technology and preferences in DSGE models
must satisfy some key criteria in order for per capita output, cap-
ital, consumption, investment and the real wage to grow at a con-
6 The authors look at two business cycle episodes, the Great Depression (1929–1939)
and 1982 recession, and then over the period 1959–2004.
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stant rate, and labour supply and interest rates to be stationary. First,
for a constant output-capital ratio, economic growth must originate
from labour-augmenting technological progress. Second, household
preferences must support independence between the inter-temporal
elasticity of substitution and the level of consumption, and for the
substitution and income effects implied by permanent technological
growth to not affect labour supply. A functional form for utility with
constant inter-temporal elasticity of substitution that satisfies such cri-
teria was proposed in King et al. (1988) and has come to be used in
the majority of macroeconomic models. To allow the wealth effect on
labour supply to be changed and analysed, in chapter 3, I also look
at preferences proposed in Jaimovich & Rebelo (2009) that generalise
the Greenwood et al. (1988) preferences mentioned above, which are
not consistent with balanced growth. In all the models proposed in
this thesis, we follow the majority of the DSGE literature and abstract
from the long-run by normalising to zero growth, per capita units
where all shocks are transitory.
This section on the DSGE literature has been purposefully brief so to
give an overview. Some of the themes picked up on will be discussed
in some more detail in the methodology section in the chapter that
follows.
1.1.3 Credit Provision and Financial Frictions
The role of financial frictions on economic fluctuations and the trans-
mission mechanism of monetary policy is a central theme across all
three chapters. In the benchmark real business cycle or New Key-
nesian macroeconomic model7, the implicit assumption is of perfect
credit markets involving full information, full commitment and a zero
profits, free-entry condition on financial institutions. Relaxing any of
these assumptions will introduce financial frictions that can have a
significant impact on model dynamics.
Prior to the financial crisis of 2007–2008, the literature on financial fric-
tions in macroeconomics was relatively limited, and largely focused
7 see e.g. King et al. (1988) for the former and Clarida, Gali & Gertler (1999) for the
latter
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on asymmetric information problems and limited contract enforce-
ability. Asymmetric information would emerge as either financing
inefficiencies or co-ordination failures. For instance, Stiglitz & Weiss
(1981) focus on the former and show how adverse selection in finance
can lead to credit rationing in which some borrowers are excluded
from the credit market at any price, even with profitable projects. Di-
amond & Dybvig (1983) is an example of the latter, highlighting how
maturity mismatch with asymmetric information can lead to bank
runs. The combination of short-term liabilities with only partially liq-
uid long-term assets can generate a two-equilibrium model; a bank
run equilibrium can occur as a self-fulfilling prophecy if households
believe one might occur. In Bernanke & Gertler (1989), entrepreneurs
observe information about their productivity and due to costly state
verification (see Townsend 1979) a wedge between the cost of internal
and external finance that depends on the leverage of the borrower
emerges, and leads to an endogenous default rate in equilibrium.
This approach was extended further in Carlstrom & Fuerst (1997) and
Bernanke et al. (1999). Holmstrom & Tirole (1997, 1998) discuss inef-
ficient outcomes that emerge due to a dual moral hazard problem
resulting from asymmetric information in financing projects. In this
model, it is the responsibility of intermediaries to monitor the en-
trepreneurs, who are able to shirk. If intermediaries can also shirk,
then there is a double moral hazard problem and both entrepreneur
and intermediary will be capital constrained to ensure they both have
sufficient ‘skin in the game’.
Financial frictions emerging from limited commitment can take a
similar form. For instance, collateral constraints arise in Kiyotaki &
Moore (1997) but due to a commitment problem rather than asym-
metric information; borrowers cannot commit to repay debt and so
must hold collateral as a guarantee. This has an important effect on
macroeconomic outcomes as durable goods take on the dual role of
being both factors of production and sources of collateral. This dual
role creates an accelerator mechanism as when the value of capital
falls, firm net worth will also fall, tightening the credit constraint.
The reverse is true as the credit constraint slackens during an up-
turn. Kehoe & Levine (1993) and Cooley, Marimon & Quadrini (2004)
also look at limited contract enforceability and reach similar conclu-
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sions. Iacoviello (2005) adapted the collateral constraints approach
proposed in Kiyotaki & Moore (1997) to relate fluctuations in real es-
tate prices with economic outcomes by assuming that entrepreneurs
must post real estate as collateral for loans, and by treating real estate
as a factor of production. Here the accelerator mechanism of Kiy-
otaki & Moore (1997) worked via the housing market whereby a fall
in house prices would both depress household demand and reduce
investment.
Since the recent financial crisis, the number of papers studying the
importance of financial frictions on macroeconomic outcomes and
policy implications has grown considerably, commonly building on
the mechanisms proposed in the Kiyotaki & Moore (1997) collateral
constraints model, or the Bernanke et al. (1999) costly state verifica-
tion model. The former was extended to study the effects of financial
constraints on the banking sector in Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010) where
the limited commitment problem introduces an agency problem be-
tween depositors and banks; when the value of bank capital declines,
the borrowing constraint tightens and limits the amount of deposits
the bank can raise and subsequently, the level of investment. Another
extension proposed in Gertler & Karadi (2011) uses this approach to
analyse the role of unconventional monetary policy. It is assumed the
central bank can perform financial intermediation at a cost, but when
the borrowing constraint tightens sufficiently, this cost is less than the
inefficiency introduced by the agency problem. The two approaches
have both been applied to the housing market. Impatient households
post housing as collateral to secure mortgage loans in Iacoviello &
Neri (2010) where the mechanism of Iacoviello (2005) is focused on
the demand-side of the economy, and shown to have important ef-
fects on the business cycle. The collateral constraints arise in Forlati
& Lambertini (2011) due to the Bernanke et al. (1999) costly state ver-
ification mechanism which is applied to household credit by assum-
ing households observe a private housing-value shock that can lead
to default when households are insolvent. The authors emphasise in-
creased housing investment risk in highly leveraged economies.
Of the alternative approaches to introduce credit frictions, Gerali,
Neri, Sessa & Signoretti (2010) and Forni, Gerali & Pisani (2010) intro-
duce monopolistic competition into the banking sector with nominal
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interest rate rigidities. Kiyotaki & Moore (2012) and Adrian & Shin
(2009) look at the role of liquidity; the former develop a model of
monetary economy with differences in liquidity across assets, whilst
the latter analyse how balance-sheet quantities of marked-based fi-
nancial intermediaries are important macroeconomic state variables
for the conduct of monetary policy. Curdia & Woodford (2010) anal-
yse the relationship between interest spreads and monetary policy
by assuming that financial intermediation consumes real resources
and that the credit spread depends on the volume of loans. Other pa-
pers including Diamond & Rajan (2001), Angeloni & Faia (2013) and
Gertler & Kiyotaki (2015) have developed the bank-run model of Dia-
mond & Dybvig (1983), the latter incorporating the approaches of the
first two into a DSGE model.
The large influence of the Kiyotaki & Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al.
(1999) approaches to the financial frictions literature might be partly
due to the simplicity of applying the frictions to a representative
agent, rational expectations model, solved using linear approxima-
tion techniques. As discussed in chapter 3, this approach rules out ex
ante the possibility of explaining a number of key stylized facts, such
as the large positive skew in the interest spreads. There have been a
number of papers that do study the non-linear effects of financial fric-
tions, or financial constraints that only occasionally bind which are
much better suited to explain such phenomena. For example, taking
a similar approach to chapter 3 of this thesis, Li (2013) finds a large
increase in the loan spread and drop in bank net worth following a
credit crunch. He finds that allowing a slackening of the financial con-
straint is key to the results, that the constraint is only binding 15 per-
cent of the time. The author uses global approximations methods, the
drawback of which restricts the model to a pure exchange economy
with a single state variable. He & Krishnamurthy (2013) is also closely
related to this paper but the authors propose an occasionally binding
constraint on equity rather than debt. As in our model, when the
constraint binds, interest premia rise sharply and deepen downturns.
Related to He & Krishnamurthy (2013), Brunnermeier & Sannikov
(2013) also constrain equity finance. Intermediaries are more produc-
tive investors than households but following a large negative shock,
intermediaries looking to strengthen their balance sheets might sell
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assets to households. This leads to non-linear dynamics; most fluctua-
tions can be absorbed by the intermediaries balance sheets but larger
negative shocks might lead to unstable, volatile episodes. To provide
explanation for corporate cash hoarding, Mazelis (2014) features a
cash-in-advance constraint; investment cannot exceed a pre-chosen
level of liquidity and so firms hold cash in excess of expected require-
ments as pre-caution. As well as motivating cash hoarding, the con-
straint acts to deepen the impact of a negative shock to capital. Guer-
rieri & Iacoviello (2015a) modify the Iacoviello & Neri (2010) model
by fixing the supply of housing and allowing the collateral constraint
on household debt to be only occasionally binding. They show how
the constraint slackened during the 2001–2006 US housing boom but
tightened during the crisis, exacerbating the recession that followed.
Also related are Paul (2015) and Abo-Zaid (2015). In the former banks
lend long but borrow short and face risk of runs on deposits; banks
gradually become more highly leveraged during booms leaving them
vulnerable to large enough shocks which can cause runs on deposits.
The maturity mismatch leads to severe downturn. The second paper
imposes a collateral constraint on firms to guarantee promised wages
to workers in the style of Kiyotaki & Moore (1997). This exhibits the
general theme of occasional crises but acts as a labour tax which can
be smoothed via monetary policy.
Both chapters 3 and 4 introduce occasionally binding financial con-
straints, the former via a bank borrowing constraint whilst the latter
through positivity constraints on the Lagrange multipliers implied by
an optimal financial contract subject to incentive compatibility con-
straints. Research into the impact of asymmetric information on the
pricing of assets and financial contracts began with the seminal con-
tribution of Akerlof (1970). In a simple model of a market for used
cars in which the quality of the car is a seller’s private information,
Akerlof proved that the market for good cars would disappear; the
buyers being unwilling to pay the reservation price as the probability
of the car being low quality – a lemon – reduces the car’s expected
value. The body of research that followed Akerlof’s lemons paper ex-
amined the effects of private information in a number of contexts.
For example, Mirrlees (1971) gave a formal examination of optimal
labour taxation in the presence of privately observed productivity;
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Mussa & Rosen (1978) and then Maskin & Riley (1984) consider pri-
vately observed preferences in product markets. The optimal pric-
ing implies non-linear pricing strategies whereby buyers can choose
quantity-price pairs. This relied on the formulation of the revelation
principle discussed in Dasgupta, Hammond & Maskin (1979) and My-
erson (1979)8 which proved that any outcome that can be realised in a
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium9 can also be implemented by an incentive
compatible mechanism. The key insight is that a principle can de-
sign a contract10 that is incentive compatible, that is, the agent would
choose the contract designed for them, implying the principle need
only propose one contract for each type of agent. Spence (1973) and
Stiglitz (1975) then introduced the concepts of signalling and screen-
ing respectively. The former in the context of a job-seekers investing
in non-fundamental characteristics that can act as a signal of their pro-
ductivity to hirers, the latter puts the emphasis on the employer using
these types of characteristics, at cost, to screen potential employees.
The tools developed to deal with asymmetric information have been
used in a number of theoretical applications including the labour mar-
ket (e.g. Spence 1973), product markets (e.g. Maskin & Riley 1984), in-
surance markets (e.g. Rothschild & Stiglitz 1976), and credit markets
(e.g. Stiglitz & Weiss 1992). In this thesis, we are concerned with the
latter and, in particular, the presence of adverse selection problems11.
The literature begins with Stiglitz & Weiss (1981), mentioned above,
who discuss the conditions under which credit rationing will occur;
such an outcome, proposed in Jaffee & Modigliani (1969), can occur
when the lender posts a lending rate, but, as in the model proposed in
chapter 4, the borrowers vary in their risk. If the risk of riskier borrow-
ers is too high, the lender could be better off excluding safe borrowers
from the market altogether. The model was developed further to dis-
cuss the macroeconomic implications of credit rationing in Stiglitz &
Weiss (1992). The costly-state-verification model of Townsend (1979)
was proposed at a similar time; in this environment, the borrower’s
8 Building on earlier work in Hurwicz (1972).
9 Referring to equilibria in games with imperfect information, first analysed in
Harsanyi (1967).
10 Or, for example, a seller can design a pricing strategy.
11 As oppose to moral hazard which occurs under hidden action rather than hidden
information.
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private information is not truly private but can be observed at a cost
and leads to a pooling equilibrium (see also Boyd & Smith 1993). My-
ers & Majluf (1984) analyse an informational problem in equity fi-
nance showing that an equity premium will be charged due to the
risk of lower value projects. Stiglitz & Weiss’s (1981) model of credit
rationing was extended in Bester (1985) who allows for collateral con-
straints to be used as a signalling device, finding that credit rationing
need not occur (see also Besanko & Thakor 1987). More recently Mar-
tin (2009) analyses the relationship between entrepreneur wealth and
investment under adverse selection. Martin finds that a pooling (sep-
arating) equilibrium will occur when net wealth is low (high) and
consequently, an increase in net wealth can generate a drop in invest-
ment. Other recent works include Guerrieri, Shimer & Wright (2010)
who examine search equilibria with adverse selection; and Scheuer
(2013) who analyses business tax policy with adverse selection in
credit markets and occupational choice, finding that a less progres-
sive tax regime on profits can be justified as a corrective measure
mitigating occupational misallocation.
Whilst the presence of asymmetric information creates significant dif-
ficulty in evaluating the equilibrium using an Walrasian Auction,12 a
number of papers have attempted to determine the conditions under
which it is possible. The first was Prescott & Townsend (1984) who
apply the tools of competitive general equilibrium analysis to models
with adverse selection, concluding that it is difficult to decentralize
this type of problem with a price system (see also Gale 1992, Rus-
tichini & Siconolfi 2007). Bisin & Gottardi (2006) use a Rothschild-
Stiglitz model of adverse selection in insurance markets to highlight
how, as a market for pollution rights can be used to internalise en-
vironmental externalities, a market for consumption rights can be
used to internalise the consumption externalities introduced due to
adverse selection. Consequently, competitive equilibria exist and in-
centive constrained versions of the first and second welfare theorems
hold.
12 Where the market clearing occurs as if an ‘Auctioneer’ evaluates every agent’s sup-
ply and demand schedules and efficiently allocates all resources. See section 2 for
further discussion.
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There is limited literature on the specific effects that adverse selection
in credit markets have on the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy. One exception is Neyer (2007) who finds that adverse selection
can either reinforce, weaken or overcompensate the effects of the con-
ventional interest rate channel. Which occurs depends on whether
the external finance premium is positive or negative for marginal
entrepreneurs, so concluding that adverse selection does impact the
transmission of monetary policy but the direction of the effect is am-
biguous. Not only is the literature on adverse selection and monetary
policy limited, so too is the empirical literature evaluating its pres-
ence in credit markets. An econometric test to evaluate for the pres-
ence of asymmetric information formulated in Chiappori & Salanie´
(2000) is developed in Crawford, Pavanini & Schivardi (2015) to test
for adverse selection in loan markets. It is proposed that the corre-
lation between the probability of taking a loan and probability of
default is computed; a statistically significant correlation would in-
dicate the presence of adverse selection. Using this test, the authors
find evidence for the presence of adverse selection in Italian lending
markets. They then use a structural model of the lending market to
analyse the interaction between adverse selection and market imper-
fectness, finding the impact of adverse selection on outcomes varies
depending on the market structure. Cressy & Toivanen (2001) define
a structural model with symmetric and asymmetric information, us-
ing the results to state propositions about borrower behaviour, sim-
ilar to those of Chiappori & Salanie´ (2000), which are used to test
for adverse selection using 1987-1990 U.K. bank lending data. The au-
thors conclude that information is symmetric. Tang (2009) provides
evidence of asymmetric information in U.S. credit markets using a
Moody’s credit rating refinement in 1982, and finds that it has signifi-
cant impact on economic outcomes. Away from firm lending markets,
Ausubel (1999) and Dobbie & Skiba (2013) find evidence of adverse
selection in credit card markets and the market for pay-day loans re-
spectively. The former using a randomised field experiment, and the
latter using discontinuities in the relationship between borrower pay
and loan eligibility to estimate a regression discontinuity design.
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1.1.4 Cross-border Financial Frictions
In chapter 5, I study the role of financial frictions in the cross-border
interbank market in a currency union. This chapter relates in part to
the open economy literature, and specifically to research into financial
frictions in currency unions. In some respects, the model proposed in
this chapter is a typical closed economy; there is no ‘rest of world’, so
no imports and exports outside the monetary union and no exchange
rate mechanism, and there is a single policy rule. The central focus of
open economy macroeconomics is the analysis of exchange rates and
monetary policy transmission, so given this central feature is missing
from the chapter, it clearly does not belong to this body of litera-
ture. On the other hand, the chapter borrows from the open economy
literature in how it characterises imports and exports between two
blocs within the union, as well as how international financial flows
are specified.
We start with some comments on relevant issues in open economy
macroeconomic modelling. Obstfeld & Rogoff (2000) identify six puz-
zles in international macroeconomics, one of which, highlighted in
McCallum (1995), is the presence of a significant home-bias in con-
sumption. It has become standard practise to use an Armington ag-
gregator (see Armington 1969, Anderson 1979) that characterises con-
sumption preferences as a constant elasticity of substitution function
between imports and exports. Home-bias can be specified as a param-
eter that emerges as the steady state proportion of domestic goods
in consumption. Another of the puzzles was originally identified by
Backus, Kehoe & Kydland (1992) who find that consumption time-
series was much less correlated across countries than output time-
series. This finding runs contrary to standard economic theory that
predicts in a model in which agents can trade consumption inter-
nationally at no cost, consumption would depend less on domestic
output and so consumption would likely be highly correlated across
borders. As output is more highly correlated than consumption in the
data, the indication is a lack of international risk-sharing. The inclu-
sion of non-tradables, such as services or housing goods, is typically
used to solve this puzzle (see Stockman & Tesar 1995). These two
puzzles are mentioned to provide some motivation for features intro-
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duced in the model proposed in chapter 5 to reflect empirical realities
of the international business cycle. For the remainder of the charac-
terisation of the main features of a two-bloc model of a monetary
union, we follow Christoffel, Coenen & Warne (2008) who specify a
benchmark model of the Euro Area for policy analysis.
A final modelling issue in open-economy macroeconomics to men-
tion is the presence of a unit root. Suppose that an economy experi-
ences a transitory supply shock that causes a current account surplus.
Because the return on assets is determined by an exogenous rate of
return on international assets, the temporary shock has a permanent
positive effect on the wealth of savers which introduces a random
walk into the model. This presents a challenge when using local per-
turbation as the model can move to a region a long way from the
stationary point around which the model is approximated. Schmitt-
Grohe & Uribe (2003) propose several methods to resolve this issue
including: modifying household preference so the time-discounting
adjusts in the level of consumption; having interest rates depend on
the net foreign asset position of an economy; assuming households
face adjustment costs for holding levels of assets different to some
long-run targets; and allowing international asset-market complete-
ness so domestic risk is diversified away. In chapter 5, we choose the
second; having savings rates increasing in the net exposure to foreign
debt. With the example used to highlight the unit root, the savers
would instead face lower savings rates induced by a increase in the
net foreign assets position of the economy. The wealth of these agents
would fall relative to the rest of the world until the model returns the
steady state. The appeal of this method is that it is simple to intro-
duce and can be parametrized so that the spread between domestic
and international rates is small, increasing the persistence of shocks
but restoring the stationary property of the model.
The specific focus of chapter 5 is financial frictions in the cross-border
interbank market. This builds on the general financial friction lit-
erature that focuses on asymmetric information and limited com-
mitment, especially relevant as the interbank market is commonly
over-the-counter, unsecured short-term lending. A number of authors
(see e.g. Flannery 1996, Afonso, Kovner & Schoar 2011) discuss the
importance of a smooth functioning interbank market for national
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economies to cope efficiently with idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and
to ensure a uniform transmission of the common monetary policy.
Freixas & Holthausen (2005) discuss the role of asymmetric informa-
tion in generating segmentation in financial markets. This effect has
been shown to increase during episodes of financial stress, for in-
stance, Abbassi, Bra¨uning, Fecht & Peydro´ (2014) find that for the
same borrower on the same trading day, and after controlling for
lender and borrower fixed effects, cross-border loans were up to 25
basis points more expensive than domestic loans in the first three
months following the collapse of Lehman.
Financial frictions in the Euro Area interbank market appeared to
play a significant role during the recent financial crisis during which
the share of interbank borrowing from non-domestic lenders fell from
over half to just over 25% in 2013 before recovering again to some 40%
in 2014. This was especially important as those banks relying more
heavily on wholesale markets for debt finance had to restrict lend-
ing to the private sector relative to those banks more dependant on
household deposits (see Cornett, McNutt, Strahan & Tehranian 2011).
The implication of this finding is that real shocks may be amplified,
and financial shocks accelerated, by bank exposure to wholesale fi-
nancing. In ’t Veld & van Lelyveld (2014) find empirical support for
a core-periphery structure to the interbank market Euro Area, itself
supporting the method of modelling the currency area as a two-bloc
union.
With respect to modelling the interbank market, in Gertler & Kiyotaki
(2010), discussed above, banks have access to interbank finance but
characterised by the same agency problem as between households
and banks. Dib (2010) and de Walque, Pierrard & Rouabah (2010)
build on Goodhart, Sunirand & Tsomocos (2006), who introduce regu-
latory capital requirements and bank default as an endogenous choice
due to asymmetric information, showing that bank capital can attenu-
ate the real effects of shocks. Hilberg & Hollmayr (2011) and Carrera
& Vega (2012) also incorporate an interbank market into an otherwise
typical DSGE model; the former study the impact of central bank col-
lateral policy on interbank lending rates where the interbank market
emerges as banks perform different functions, ending with assets of
different risks and liquidity on their balance sheets. Carrera & Vega
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(2012) study the relationship between reserve requirements and in-
terbank market activity in a model of two types of banks; those that
provide retail banking services whilst others have access to central
bank liquidity. The authors find that costly monitoring results in a
mechanism whereby reducing reserve requirements acts as a policy
rate cut.
Whilst there are several papers examining the theoretical implications
of an imperfect interbank market in a closed economy, there is lim-
ited research into international interbank market frictions. One ex-
ception is Poutineau & Vermandel (2015) who study the effects of
cross-border business and interbank lending in which there is a con-
vex monitoring cost on the latter. The authors find that the interbank
market amplifies propagation of country-specific shocks. Dra¨ger &
Proan˜o (2015) reach as similar conclusion in a model of cross-border
banking in the absence of an interbank market.
2
M E T H O D O L O G Y A N D D ATA
2.1 building blocks of dsge modelling
As was discussed in the previous chapter, DSGE models are typically
comprised of households and firms, and in many cases, a financial
sector. At the heart of the models are the preferences of infinitely
lived households over their inter-temporal allocation of consumption
and leisure. The following describes the assumptions that underpin
the models in each chapter of this thesis.
The agents make inter-temporal allocations across a sequence of fi-
nite periods under uncertainty. It is assumed that agents know the
probability distribution of exogenous stochastic variables, or shocks,
and despite the possibility of the presence of information asymme-
tries, limited contract enforcement and default, contracts are com-
plete.1. That is, there is no state of the world for which markets do
not price assets. We refer to the assumption that the agents know the
structure of the model and the distribution of shocks, and that the
agents make allocation choices that maximise their defined objective
function given their information sets as rational, or model-consistent,
expectations. We can make some general assumptions about prefer-
ences and technology, and market clearing conditions, and define
some terms that hold for all models across each chapter.
2.1.1 Consumer Choice
We begin by characterising household preferences which allow us to
give a general form to the household problem, we mention produc-
1 The meaning here is that there is no state-of-the-world for which the outcomes are
undefined. As state contingent claims are usually prevented in the presence of fea-
tures such as asymmetric information, markets would be incomplete.
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tion technologies, then discuss market clearing and price determina-
tion.
2.1.1.1 Preferences
Let ct ∈ C = RN+ be a bundle of N goods and u (ct) describe the
agents preference towards these goods. We follow the consumer the-
ory literature with the axioms on which preferences can be defined,
including:
Axiom 1. Transitivity – for any c1, c2, c3 ∈ C, if c1  c2 and c2  c3, then
c1  c3. That is, the agent can express a binary ordering of preferences
Axiom 2. Completeness – for any c1, c2 ∈ C, either c1  c2, c1  c2, or
both. That is, an agent is never agnostic regarding their preferences.
Axiom 3. Continuity – for all bundles c′ ∈ C, the sets {c ∈ C : c  c′}
and {c ∈ C : c′  c} are closed sets.
These axioms imply that there exists a continuous preference function
u : ct 7→ R. We make some further important assumptions about the
functional form of u that ensure a well behaved interior solution:
Assumption 1. Agent preferences are described by a function u : ct 7→ R,
where u′ (ct) > 0, u′′ (ct) < 0, limct(i)→0+ u
′ (ct(i)) = ∞+ where ct(i) is
element i in the bundle ct.
This implies that the utility function is an increasing, strictly concave
function in goods ct(1), ct(2), ..., ct(N). The marginal value of good
ct(i) goes to infinity as the quantity tends to zero; this is the Inada
condition and ensures a positive value for ct(i) is chosen to guarantee
an interior solution.
Assumption 2. Agents choose bundle ct to maximise Et ∑∞s=0 βsu (ct+s),
β ∈ (0, 1) subject to a set of constraints C.
This implies that period utilities u are additive separable; that agents
discount the future, and make choices to maximise their lifetime utility.
The symbol Et is the rational expectations operator, and indicates the
model-consistent expected value of the function at time t. The set of
constraints include at the minimum a feasibility or budget constraint.
This assumption leads to a characterisation of the inter-temporal con-
sumption decision as the consumption Euler equation originating in
Fisher (1930) and Friedman (1957). Every inter-temporal decision in
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every model in this thesis is characterised by such an equation that
defines an asset pricing kernel, or stochastic discount factor. Letting
pt be a vector of prices for bundle ct, the assumption also indicates
the presence of demand schedules that relate quantities ct and prices
pt.
2.1.1.2 Technology
In general, a production function is not necessary to model the macroe-
conomy, as it is possible to characterise income as a stochastic endow-
ment process. However, every model proposed in this thesis does
have a defined production process. The production technology has
similar properties to the utility function taking a vector of factors kt
as inputs
Assumption 3. Agents use a technology m : kt 7→ R+, where m′ (kt) > 0,
m′′ (kt) < 0, limkt(j)→0+ m
′ (kt(j)) = ∞+ where kt(j) is element j in the
vector kt.
The final point is the Inada condition which, as before, ensures an
interior solution. In general, the agents responsible for production,
maximise a profit function subject to a set of constraints that include
the technology. This implies demand schedules for factors kt at prices
rt. The vector of factors kt will be implied by ct, and the prices rt by
pt.
2.1.2 Equilibrium Conditions
Denoting the set of demand functions for goods and factors as Dt,
and the set of feasibility constraints F , we can then define the nature
of a competitive equilibrium
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium is a set of prices pt = RN and
allocations ct that satisfies demand schedules Dt and feasibility constraints
F .
As the allocation and prices satisfy every agents’ demand schedules,
it must be that the agents would not prefer any other allocation at the
given prices. Note that although this definition is a general form of
market clearing, it does not in fact rule out the effects of information
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or search frictions resulting in inefficiencies such as credit rationing
or unemployment. The definition is that the allocations must satisfy
all agents’ first order conditions and feasibility constraint. The latter
could include incentive compatibility constraints, the implication is
that ‘competitive equilibrium’ is used in a general fashion and rather
than implying that all goods and factor markets clear in competi-
tive markets, it allows for ‘an equilibrium degree of disequilibrium’
(Grossman & Stiglitz 1980, p.393). A relaxed version of the first wel-
fare theorem holds under this definition; even if there are allocations
that would be agreed better by all parties, subject to the feasibility con-
straints the allocations are Pareto optimal. The definition of a compet-
itive equilibrium is sufficient for internal consistency, but one could
explain the process by which a market clears to be as if there is a
central auctioneer to whom all demand functions are submitted and
who allocates the goods so to satisfy the demand schedules and feasi-
bility constraints. This is the Walrasian Auctioneer named after Le´on
Walras who used the idea to explain the pricing of goods that satisfies
the definition of a competitive equilibrium when buyers and sellers
act in perfect competition. Alternative methods of pricing include bar-
gaining processes (see e.g. Mortensen & Pissarides 1994), and having
firms set prices in monopolistic competition. Having specified the
first order conditions and feasibility constraints, and defined a com-
petitive equilibrium that abstracts from simple perfect markets, the
explanation of the pricing mechanism is not important to the model
solution.
We can proceed from definition 1 to give a general form of the model
as a dynamic realisation of the competitive equilibrium in the pres-
ence of stochastic disturbances. In general, the equilibrium conditions
can be expressed as a system of first order stochastic difference equa-
tions and so, using the notation of Collard & Juillard (2001)2, the
model can be given by the function
Et [ f (yt+1, yt, xt, xt−1, ut)] = 0 (2.1.1)
where yt is a vector of ny endogenous variables about which agents
form expectations, xt is a vector of nx endogenous variables that are
2 See also Schmitt-Grohe´ & Uribe (2004).
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predetermined or backward looking, and ut is a vector of exogenous
shocks.
2.1.3 Model Approximation
Except for very simple cases, the model in equation (2.1.7) does not
have an analytical solution and so numerical approximation tech-
niques must be employed to evaluate the model dynamics. Due to
the potentially large state space of many DSGE models, and the as-
sumption that the economy spends the majority of time in the vicinity
of the balanced growth path, it has become standard practice to use
local approximation methods around a deterministic steady-state.
Definition 2. The deterministic steady-state is the solution to the competi-
tive equilibrium in the absence of any present and future disturbances, so
E0 [yt] = yt = y¯ (2.1.2)
xt = x¯ (2.1.3)
ut = 0 (2.1.4)
Assumption 4. ut ∼ i.i.d.N (0,Σ), all shocks are normal i.i.d. with zero
mean and variance-covariance matrix Σ.
Following the method described in Collard & Juillard (2001)3, pertur-
bation up to third order is employed to evaluate all models proposed
in this thesis and so the general steps involved are outlined here. The
perturbation begins with an exact solution to the deterministic steady
state found by solving f (y¯, y¯, x¯, x¯, 0). In some cases this is done an-
alytically but for larger models is solved numerically. The model in
equation (2.1.7) suggests the presence of policy functions of the form
yt = g (xt−1, ut) (2.1.5)
xt = h (xt−1, ut) (2.1.6)
which then implies the model can be written
Et [ f (g (h (xt−1, ut) , ut+1) , g (xt−1, ut) , h (xt−1, ut) , xt−1, ut)] = 0
(2.1.7)
3 Itself following that suggested in Judd (1998). See also Schmitt-Grohe´ & Uribe (2004)
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which can be written
F¯ (x, u) = Et
[
F
(
x, u, u′
)]
= 0 (2.1.8)
where x = xt−1, u = ut and u′ = ut+1. The expectation is taken
conditional on the state x and already observed shocks u. A p-order
Taylor approximation F¯p ≈ F¯ around the deterministic steady state
is taken to the order required. This is a standard well documented
procedure4 but particularly notation-heavy and so full derivation is
left here. Following from assumption 4, any terms linear in u′ and
the covariance between u and u′ are zero. This will give nx equations
containing a large number of partial derivatives of g (·) and h (·). We
compute these partial derivatives and take advantage of the following
conditions that hold be definition
y¯ = g (x¯, 0) (2.1.9)
x¯ = h (x¯, 0) (2.1.10)
∂F
∂ix∂jy
= 0, ∀i, j (2.1.11)
This leads to then same number of equations as unknowns. At orders
higher than 1, there will be a positive term in covariance matrix Σ,
which, because the model is approximated around the deterministic
steady state, will violate F¯p (x, 0) = 0 as shocks will be expected to be
zero. To remedy this bias, correction terms are computed and added
to policy functions g and h. The system of equations to solve is a
matrix polynomial equation and a generalized Schur decomposition5
is used to do so (see Sims 2002). At first order, the system is simply
[
∂ f
∂y′
∂ f
∂x′
]  y′ − y¯
x′ − x¯
 = − [ ∂ f
∂y
∂ f
∂x
]  y− y¯
x− x¯
 (2.1.12)
or
Dw′ = Ew (2.1.13)
We can get a generalised Schur decomposition of the form
D = QTZH (2.1.14)
E = QSZH (2.1.15)
4 Outlined in detail in both Judd (1998) and Collard & Juillard (2001)
5 Otherwise known as QZ decomposition.
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where ZZH = ZHZ = QQH = QHQ = I, and S and T are upper tri-
angular matrices. The ratios of the corresponding diagonal elements
of S and T, λi = Sii/Tii, are the generalized eigenvalues that solve
the generalized eigenvalue problem Sv = λTv for a non-zero vector
v. The system can be written with T, S and ZH partitioned as
T11 T12 T13
0 T22 T23
0 T33


ZH1
ZH2
ZH3
w′ =

S11 S12 S13
0 S22 S23
0 S33


ZH1
ZH2
ZH3
w
(2.1.16)
where the generalized eigenvalues of the first block, corresponding
to T11 and S11, are less than 1 in modulus, of the second block are
greater than 1, and the diagonal elements of T33 are null and S33
of full rank. A unique solution only exists provided that this last
condition is satisfied, and that the number of eigenvalues greater than
one equals the number of forward-looking variables (see Blanchard
& Kahn 1980). From equation 2.1.16, it is straightforward to define
a transition function for w, then using some further algebra results
in values for the partial derivatives of g and h. At higher orders, the
process is the same except requiring much larger matrices.
2.1.3.1 Pruning
Approximating the model to higher orders is beneficial both as ef-
fects of risk are introduced into model dynamics, and as the approx-
imation will capture some other non-linear features of the model.
One drawback of using higher order perturbations is that explosive
roots can be introduced into the model. To deal with this, we use
a pruning algorithm that ensures stability and allows for analytical
moments to be calculated (see Kim, Kim, Schaumburg & Sims 2008,
Lan & Meyer-gohde 2013, Andreasen, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde & Rubio-
Ramı´rez 2013). The general approach is to split the higher order ap-
proximation into the linear and non-linear components, using a first
order approximation of the state in the higher order terms. For in-
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stance, suppose ypt = y
p (yt−1, xt) is p-order approximation of vari-
able yt as a function of yt−1 and xt. At second order, we can write
y2t − y¯ = a2 + a2y
(
y2t−1 − y¯
)
+ a2x (xt−1 − x¯) + y˜2
(
y2t−1, xt
)
(2.1.17)
where function y˜2
(
y2t−1, zt
)
includes the second order terms. Rather
than just simulate this as a standard, a first order approximation is
also simulated
y1t − y¯ = a1 + a1y
(
y1t−1 − y¯
)
+ a1x (xt−1 − x¯) , (2.1.18)
with y1t used in the second-order approximation as follows
y2t − y¯ = a2 + a2y
(
y2t−1 − y¯
)
+ a2x (xt−1 − x¯) + y˜2
(
y1t−1, xt
)
.
(2.1.19)
The solution used is y2t unless solving to third-order, in which case,
this second-order pruned approximation to yt, is substituted into
third order terms in the third order approximation above as before.
2.2 occasionally binding constraints in local approx-
imations
In chapters 3 and 4, third-order perturbation methods, as described,
are used to simulate the proposed models. As occasionally binding
constraints play an important role in both models, it is necessary
to use an appropriate method to introduce them otherwise, due to
the nature of local approximation, they will be lost. To do so, we
use the method proposed in Holden (2016a, 2016b) that allows for
the presence of occasionally binding constraints in models solved
using perturbation techniques. This approach treats the constraint
as an endogenous source of news and ensures that where distur-
bances would cause bounds to be violated, anticipated news shocks
return the bounded variable to the constraint. The computational stat-
egy proposed in (Holden 2016a) is discussed in this section; (Holden
2016b) outlines the necessary and sufficient conditions for the exis-
tence and uniqueness of fundamental solutions at the bound which
will not be discussed in detail here. The method builds on an effi-
cient perfect foresight solver that finds a global solution to the bounds
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problem using a pruned perturbation approximation to a non-linear
model. To capture the effects of uncertainty about the bound, we in-
tegrate over future uncertainty upto a finite horizon, following the
Extended-Path method proposed in Fair & Taylor (1983) and adapted
in Adjemian & Juillard (2013).
Note that due to the increasing number of variables, we use different
notation to the previous section.
2.2.1 Perfect Foresight Solver
The method is described using an example of a linear model with a
single constraint, but it generalises to higher order pruned perturba-
tion and multiple bounds. Consider the basic problem in computing
the impulse response function under a perfect-foresight simulation,
we can write the model as(
Aˆ + Bˆ + Cˆ
)
µˆ = Aˆxˆt−1 + Bˆxˆt + CˆEt xˆt+1 + Dˆεt (2.2.1)
where Et−1εt = 0 and εt = 0 for t > 1. xˆt is a vector of model
variables, εt a vector of shocks, and µˆ a vector of constants where the
ith element of µˆ is the steady state value of the ith element of xˆt. xˆ0
is given as an initial condition and we assume a terminal condition
xˆ → µˆ as t→ 0 holds. If we define
xt ≡
 xˆt
εt+1
 , µt ≡
 µˆ
0
 , A ≡
 Aˆ Dˆ
0 0
 ,
B ≡
 Bˆ 0
0 I
 , C ≡
 Cˆ 0
0 0
 (2.2.2)
then the model in (2.2.3) can be written
(A + B + C) µ = Axt−1 + Bxt + Cxt+1 (2.2.3)
where the expectation operator disappears because agents know εt =
0 for t > 1. The problem without a bound is to find a path of
xt ∈ Rn that satisfies (2.2.3). Providing that the generalisation of the
Blanchard-Kahn conditions6 in (Sims 2002) hold, there is a solution
6 As discussed in the previous section; see (Blanchard & Kahn 1980)
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of the form xt = (I − F) µ+ Fxt−1, where F = − (B + CF)−1 A and if
det (A + B + C) 6= 0, the eigenvalues of F are strictly inside the unit
circle.
Suppose there is a zero lower bound on variable x1,t, where the sub-
script indicates it is the first element of vector xt. We extend this nota-
tion and write I1,·, A1,·, B1,·, C1,· for the first row of I, A, B, C, and then
I−1,·, A−1,·, B−1,·, C−1,· for the remaining rows. Using ·, 1 a subscript
denotes the first column of the matrix. Using this notation, we can
write the bounded equation
x1,t = max
{
0, I1,·µ+A1,·(xt−1−µ)+(B1,·+I1,·)(xt−µ)+C1,·(xt+1−µ)
}
(2.2.4)
The problem we want to solve is to find a path for xt to satisfy equa-
tions (2.2.3) and (2.2.4) where x → µ as t → 0.7 As the model re-
turns to steady state asymptotically, there is some horizon T within
which time the constraint will no longer be violated. We will use news
shocks to impose the bound and so can write equation (2.2.4) as
x1,t = I1,·µ+ A1,· (xt−1 − µ) + (B1,· + I1,·) (xt − µ)
+ C1,· (xt+1 − µ) + y1,t−1 (2.2.5)
where yt,0 is a news shock known at period 0, that hits at period t. It
follows that for periods t ≤ T, y1,t−1 = yt,0 whilst for t > T, y1,t−1 = 0.
The problem the algorithm must solve then is to find path for xt ∈ Rn
and yt ∈ RT that satisfies
(A + B + C) µ = Axt−1 + Bxt + Cxt+1 + I·,1y1,t−1 (2.2.6)
which modifies the first row of (2.2.3) to the in (2.2.5), and conditions
on the news shocks
yi,t = yi+1,t−1, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., T − 1} (2.2.7)
yT,t = 0. (2.2.8)
given initial conditions x0. The model is linear and so we find that the
impulse response to two shocks is equal to the sum of the impulse
response to each individual shock. We consider first the path of x1,t
given a vector of news shocks y0 ∈ RT. Let mk ∈ RT be a column
7 This rules out switching to an alternative steady state.
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vector with the impulse response of x1,t to a news shock of size 1 at
period k with x0 = µ, and let
M ≡
[
m1 m2 · · · mT
]
(2.2.9)
horizontally stack these relative impulse response functions. It fol-
lows that the path of x1,t given x0 = µ and an arbitrary vector of
new shocks y0 is given by My0. Let q ∈ RT be the path of x1,t up to
period T that satisfies equation (2.2.3), that is the model without the
constraint, given any x0. We can then give the path of x1,t for any x0
and y0 ∈ RT that satisfies equation (2.2.6) as
q + My0 (2.2.10)
The problem we wish to solve is to find a vector y0 and path for xt
for a given x0 that satisfies equation (2.2.6) and the zero lower bound
on x1,t. The path for x1,t will be given by equation (2.2.10). The news
shocks are only used to impose the bound, so when x1,t > 0, yt = 0;
this implies firstly that the solution must satisfy
y0 ◦ (q + My0) = 0 (2.2.11)
and secondly that the news shocks can only act to push the variable
up to the bound, that is, y0 ≥ 0. Finally, the solution must impose the
bound, so q + My0 ≥ 0.
The news shock problem is then characterised as a linear complemen-
tarity problem LCP(q, M) (see Cottle 2009): for a given q and M, the
LCP(q, M) finds y ∈ RT to satisfy
q + My ≥ 0
y ≥ 0
y ◦ (q + My) = 0
(2.2.12)
The structure of matrix M will contain information on whether a
unique solution exists; the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence and stability of a solution are outlined in detail in Holden
(2016b).
The problem extends to multiple bounds. For n bounds, the vectors
q ∈ RnT and y ∈ RnT stack the impulse responses ignoring the bound
for each bounded variable and the impulse response to the news
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shocks respectively. Matrix M ∈ RnT×nT is a block matrix where block
Mi,j is the response of variable xi to the new shock on variable xj. The
problem is given for a zero lower bound problem when the constraint
it not binding in steady state, but bounds not at zero, upper bounds,
or constraints that bind in steady state can all be generalised into the
required form. Furthermore, the algorithm as described readily ex-
tends to higher order pruned perturbation approximations when the
news shocks are of the form yp, since pruned perturbation approxi-
mations of order p are linear in shocks to the power of p.
2.2.2 Integrating Over Uncertainty
Given that the news shocks satisfy yt ≥ 0∀t, it follows that they will
not be mean zero, and the expected value of yt will depend on the
state. If this is ignored, bias will be introduced in the expectation
of the bounded variable which could be particularly serious if the
constraint is likely to bind frequently. As shown in Holden (2016a),
it is possible to derive a closed-form formula for the covariance of
the expected future path of the bounded variables in the absence of
the bound. Using this, we can take a Gaussian approximation to the
future distribution of the bounded variables in the absence of the
bound, and then integrate over this distribution using Gaussian cu-
bature techniques up to a chosen finite horizon S. This implies we
have to solve the perfect foresight problem a number of times that is
polynomial in the periods of uncertainty, independent of the number
of shocks, in contrast to using the stochastic extended-path method
of (Adjemian & Juillard 2013) under which the order of integration
increases exponentially in the number of periods and shocks.
Rather than assuming the news shock variance goes to zero beyond
the horizon S, a cosine windowing function is used to scale the shock
variance. Specifically, if the covariance matrix is Σ, the covariance ma-
trix used when considering uncertainty at horizon k is given by
Σˆk =
1
2
[
1+ cos
(
pi
min{k− 1, S}
S
)]
Σ (2.2.13)
Letting Ω denote the covariance matrix of the expected future path
of the bounded variables derived using Σˆk, and let wt,t+i be the value
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the bounded variable would take at time t + i if the bound no longer
applied after time t, we assume that
[
wt,t+1 · · · wt,t+S
]′
is nor-
mally distributed, which it will be at first order, and is a close approx-
imate at higher orders. We take a Schur decomposition of Ω to given
Ω = UDU′ where D ≥ 0 is a diagonal matrix. By setting any very
low values of D to zero, we can reduce the cost of integration which
only scales in Sˆ < S where Sˆ is the number of remaining non-zero
elements of D. Using this step and the normal assumption, we arrive
at an approximation of the distribution of
[
wt,t+1 · · · wt,t+S
]′
of
Et
[
wt,t+1 · · · wt,t+S
]′
+Λζ where Λ ≡ U·1
√
D11, with D11 ∈ RSˆ
the matrix block in D that includes the Sˆ non-zero elements and U·1
the corresponding elements of U, and where ζ ∼ N (0, ISˆ). This sim-
plifies the integration problem to one of integrating over Sˆ standard
normals.
In this thesis, we use three different methods to integrate over future
uncertainty: a ‘fast’ degree 3 monomial rule; the Gaussian cubature
rule proposed in Genz & Keister (1996); and the Quasi-Monte Carlo
method. The first is with 2Sˆ + 1 nodes and equal positive weights
which provide a robustness, so that although computational efficient,
gives delivers reasonable accuracy. The second is a degree 2K + 1
monomial rule with O
(
SˆK
)
nodes with K ≤ 25. The rule will feature
negative weights if K > 0 and Sˆ > 1 which might prevent upward
bias that positive weights can introduce by evaluating the integral
far from the steady state. The higher degree is also likely to give
higher accuracy and because the rule is nested, we use an adaptive
integration degree which will improve computation times. The final
method uses a Sobol sequence (Sobol 1967) to generate
(
21+l − 1)
points where l ∈N. This approach should be the most accurate, how-
ever, for well behaved functions will require far more evaluations of
the integrand than the (Genz & Keister 1996) approach for similar
accuracy. The choice of method is specific to each context, typically
made due to time constraints. The rule-of-thumb suggested in Holden
(2016a) is if the bound is highly to either bind or not bind in the fu-
ture, (Genz & Keister 1996) are likely to dominate whilst quasi-Monte
Carlo may be better when the constraint binds with moderate prob-
ability. The result of the integration procedure is an expected value
of the vector y needed to impose the bound; this will have an impact
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on the expected value of xt+1 by shift upward the expectation of the
bounded variable Et [x1,t+1].
2.3 data
Although no estimation was conducted, time-series data was used for
the comparison of moments and to produce plots in chapters 3 and
4. Where specific metrics were used as part of the parametrisation
procedures, for example, the business loan deliquency rate used in
chapter 4, the source is given in a footnote. The data listed here was
subject to calculations made by the author and so specific detail is
given.
Table 2.1 details the sources of non-banking aggregate time-series. Us-
Time-series Source
GDP U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross Domestic Product, https:
//fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDP
FPI US. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Fixed Private Investment, https:
//fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FPI
PCEC US. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Consumption Expendi-
tures, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCEC
GDPDEF US. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross Domestic Product: Implicit
Price Deflator, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPDEF
GPDICTPI US. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross Private Domestic In-
vestment: Chain-type Price Index, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
series/GPDICTPI
BAA10YM Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate
Bond Yield Relative to Yield on 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAA10YM
AAA Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Moody’s
Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield c©, https://fred.stlouisfed.
org/series/AAA
BAA Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Moody’s
Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield c©, https://fred.stlouisfed.
org/series/BAA
CNP16OV US. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Civilian Noninstitutional Population,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CNP16OV
Table 2.1: Non-banking aggregate time-series sources.
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ing 1986Q2 – 2015Q4 data, we make the following calculations for the
time-series used in the chapters:
y = log
(
GDP/GDPDEF
CNP16OV
)
× 100
i = log
(
FPI/GDPDEF
CNP16OV
)
× 100
c = log
(
PCEC/GDPDEF
CNP16OV
)
× 100
q = log
(
GPDICTPI/GDPDEF
CNP16OV
)
× 100
∆1 =
BAA10YM
4
∆2 =
BAA− AAA
4
∆1 is the spread used in chapter 3, whilst ∆2 is that used in chapter
4. The resulting time-series for output y, investment i, consumption
c and the real price of investment goods q are decomposed onto a
trend component and a business cycle component using proposed in
Hodrick & Prescott (1997). The smoothing parameter required by the
Hodrick-Prescott filter was set as 1,600, as recommended by the au-
thors to extract business cycle fluctuations from quarterly time-series.
The resulting cyclical component is denominated in percentage devi-
ations from trend.
The banking data for which moments are computed to compare to
simulated data are dividend payments and equity issuance. Both are
retrieved from CRSP/Compustat Merged Database, ‘Fundementals
Quarterly’. The data are retrieved for 1978Q2 – 2015Q4 searching all
firms that match SIC code 602 ‘Commercial Banks’. For each record,
which are uniquely identified by date and bank j, equity issuance is
calculated as
Ejt =
CSHOQjt − CSHOQjt−1
CSHOQjt−1
ATQjt
∑j ATQ
j
t
(2.3.1)
where ‘common shares outstanding’ CSHOQ and ‘total assets’ ATQ
are the associated fields names on the dataset. For each record, we
compute the proportional change in common shares outstanding weighted
by the relative size of the bank. The time-series for aggregate equity
issuance is then given by
Et =∑
j
= Ejt (2.3.2)
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The plot of equity issuance for the ‘Big Four U.S. banks’ in figure 3.2
uses the same method but just for the four largest U.S. banks by the
size of balance sheet; Citigroup, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and
JP Morgan. We identify the four banks using the Global Company
Keys (GVKEY) 002968, 003243, 007647, and 008007 respectively. The
dividend payment rate is calculated from the same dataset using
Dt =∑
j
DVPQjt
∑j ATQ
j
t −∑j LTQjt
(2.3.3)
where DVPQ is the field name for ‘Dividends - preferred/preference’
and LTQ that for total liabilities. The denominator is total book value
of all banks for the quarter, rather than market value. In chapter 3, it
is possible for the market and book values of bank equity to differ,
but in the model Dt is defined as dividend payment over book value,
so this is the definition we use here. The two plots in figures 3.3 and
3.4, are of the leverage ratio and interbank lending volume respec-
tively. The leverage ratio uses data from the ‘Consolidated Report of
Condition and Income’ – the Call Report – published by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and is calculated using
Levt =∑
j
RCFD2950jt
RCFD2170jt
(2.3.4)
where RCFD is the ‘consolidated data’ data series and 2950 and 2170
are the item numbers for total liabilities and total assets respectively.
Finally, the interbank lending volume is taken from the ‘H.8 Assets
and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the United States’ published
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. This con-
tains weekly estimates of aggregate balance sheet items for all com-
mercial banks. The time-series for the interbank loans is converted to
quarterly using the v21x algorithm in Matlab that takes into account
all dates and data.
3
O C C A S I O N A L LY B I N D I N G F I N A N C I A L
C O N S T R A I N T S A N D M O N E TA RY P O L I C Y
The majority of macroeconomic models of financial frictions are un-
able to explain the observed occasional sharp increases in interest
spreads as financial constraints are assumed to always bind. We pro-
pose a model with occasionally binding financial constraints that bet-
ter matches higher moments of the data. Starting with the banking
model of Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010), we relax key assumptions so that
the financial constraint is only occasionally binding, and allow banks
to issue equity at cost. We also improve upon the derivation of the bor-
rowing constraint by carefully specifying off-equilibrium play and us-
ing U.S. bankruptcy law to characterise the agency problem. We show
that in the vicinity of the non-stochastic steady-state, financial inter-
mediation is efficient, but moderately large shocks drive the model
into a region in which the financial constraint binds, generating en-
dogenous financial crises. During such episodes banks must issue
equity at a cost to raise funds, generating positively skewed interest
rate spreads and counter-cyclical positively skewed equity issuance
as observed in the data. We also highlight a potentially important
signalling role for dividends, showing that dividend payments act to
relax the present and future borrowing constraint, and consequently
banks can simultaneously pay dividends and issue equity. However,
we emphasise that (i) the importance of this type of financial friction
on business cycle dynamics becomes significantly reduced when the
financial constraint is only occasionally binding, and (ii) the finan-
cial accelerator effect on the transmission of monetary policy is only
present during times of financial stress.
The chapter includes research from ongoing joint work with Paul
Levine1 and Tom Holden.2
1 Contact at P.levine@surrey.ac.uk.
2 Contact at T.holden@surrey.ac.uk.
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Figure 3.1: Moody’s BAA Bond Yield to 10 year treasury constant maturity
rate spread 1970–2015. The grey bands represent recessions as
reported by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
3.1 introduction
There are two main approaches to model financial frictions that have
come to dominate macroeconomic policy analysis. The collateral con-
straints model proposed in Kiyotaki & Moore (1997) and applied
to the banking sector in Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010), and the costly
state verification with risky projects model proposed in Bernanke &
Gertler (1989) and further developed in Bernanke et al. (1999). Both
approaches rely on constraints that are assumed to always bind lead-
ing to an ever-present investment wedge3, and yet in the data we find
strong evidence that financial constraints are only occasionally bind-
ing. This chapter proposes a model of financial frictions in which the
bank faces costly equity issuance and an occasionally binding con-
straint on borrowing. The borrowing constraint only binds following
large enough adverse shocks and so the economy is financially effi-
cient for the majority of the time.
Figure 3.1 shows the spread between the 10 year treasury bond yield
and medium risk corporate bond yields, and captures the proposi-
tion that during crisis episodes, the presence of additional financial
factors become more important causing sharp increases in the inter-
est spreads. This chapter examines how these increases can have an
3 Employing the term used in Chari et al. (2007) to represent the spread between the
risk-free interest rate and the return on risky capital.
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important effect on macroeconomic time series. The majority of mod-
els with financial frictions are unable to explain this phenomena as
the friction is usually assumed to always constrain financial interme-
diation. We begin with such a model, that proposed in Gertler & Kiy-
otaki (2010), GK henceforth, and relax key assumptions so to allow
the financial constraint to only be occasionally binding. The friction
arises in GK due to an agency problem; it is assumed that banks
can default on debt repayments and exit the market, with imperfect
enforcement meaning the bank is able to keep a proportion of the
diverted assets. This gives rise to endogenous borrowing constraints
of the sort proposed in Kiyotaki & Moore (1997). In order to prevent
banks outgrowing the financial constraint, the GK model features an
exogenous bank-exit shock which also acts as a fixed dividend rate.
We drop the bank exit shock, allow dividend payments to be deter-
mined endogenously, and allow banks to issue equity at cost. We also
improve upon the derivation of the borrowing constraint by carefully
specifying off-equilibrium play and using U.S. bankruptcy law to im-
plement the amount recoverable by creditors. In this modified set-up,
sufficiently large adverse shocks cause the borrowing constraint to
bind leading to a sharp rise in the investment wedge – the spread
between the risk-free real interest rate and the risky return to capital.
This generates a difference between the level of investment implied
by a model with efficient financial intermediation and that implied by
the financial constraints model. The episodes during which the finan-
cial constraints bind, produce a reduced skewness to the simulated
time series of investment relative to the real business cycle model,
and a strong positive skewness to the spread.
We analyse the borrowing constraints model in comparison to the
standard real business cycle model as a frictionless benchmark case,
and an always-binding borrowing constraints model. For the latter
we use a version of the GK model.4 The model dynamics will be ex-
amined in the presence of different model features including habits in
4 There is an extension discussed in Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010) that introduces equity
issuance by extending the same agency problem in debt finance to equity finance.
In doing so, the set-up generates incorrect dynamics with respect to equity issuance.
We discuss this towards the end of the paper, but as we are focusing on the general
concept of the financial friction proposed in Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010), we use this
for comparison. See also Gertler, Kiyotaki & Queralto (2012), GKQ henceforth.
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consumption, and capital and investment adjustment costs. We also
compare different household preferences including the King-Plosser-
Rebelo5 and Greenwood–Hercowitz–Huffman6 types of utility func-
tions, so to test the potential importance of a short-run wealth effect.
We consider two types of shock: a capital quality shock, and a persis-
tent capital depreciation shock. The former follows Gertler & Kiyotaki
(2010) who suggest that rather than thinking of the shock as physical
destruction of capital, it should be thought to model the economic obso-
lescence of capital in order to introduce an exogenous variation to the
value of capital, and in particular, as an occasional disaster shock. This,
they argue, is of particular usefulness in considering what occurred
following the events of late 2007 in the U.S., when a huge amount of
value was knocked off bank assets resulting in a severe credit crunch.
Choosing the second shock to introduce stochastic volatility in the
capital depreciation rate provides useful comparison in that it has a
direct impact on the banks’ balance sheets, and has been suggested
by some authors to play an important role in generating the business
cycle (see Liu, Waggoner & Zha 2011).
The key insight of the model is that once the modeller allows for the
borrowing constraint to be only occasionally binding, the importance
of the Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010) financial friction on business cycle dy-
namics becomes significantly reduced. The proposed model, however,
does help explain some empirical moments of interest spreads and eq-
uity issuance. The model shows that the borrowing constraint binds
when the demand for funds increases without an equivalent rise in
the value of future discounted dividends. This can occur following an
adverse supply-side shock to capital, which increases the demand for
investment. The shock implies a reduction in the future profit stream
and so an increase in the marginal value of a bank cashing-out, or
diverting assets and defaulting. We also highlight a potentially im-
portant signalling role for dividends; as U.S. bankruptcy law allows
for creditors to reclaim lost funds against past dividend payments,
dividend payments act to relax the present and future borrowing
constraint, and consequently can be paid even if the bank is issuing
equity.
5 See King et al. (1988)
6 See Greenwood et al. (1988)
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In the remainder of this section, we briefly discuss the related lit-
erature on financial frictions and occasionally binding financial con-
straints, highlighting empirical support for the chosen model struc-
ture. We then proceed to describe in detail the derivation of equilib-
rium conditions that characterise the behaviour of the economy, dis-
cuss some key analytical results and outline the numerical solution
strategy. We end with an discussion of the main numerical results
and point to future research.
3.1.1 Financial Frictions and Occasionally Binding Financial Constraints.
Although there has been an influential body of literature emphasising
the role of credit frictions in aggravating economic fluctuations since
the early 20th century macroeconomists, it was not until the recent
global financial crisis and subsequent recessions that incorporating
credit frictions into macroeconomic models used for policy analysis
has become standard practice. This absence was probably in large
part due to the widespread acceptance that under normal circum-
stances, financial frictions did not play a significant role in generating
the business cycle. In the post financial crisis world, understanding
the role of financial frictions has become an important area of re-
search, and they are now included in many benchmark models used
in policy analysis.
The two approaches to modelling financial frictions that have come to
dominate macroeconomic policy analysis have been Bernanke et al.’s
(1999) version of the costly state verification model proposed in Bernanke
& Gertler (1989)7, and Gertler & Kiyotaki’s (2010) banking sector
application of the collateral constraints model of Kiyotaki & Moore
(1997). The former assumes that entrepreneurs seek finance for pri-
vately observed investment opportunities, and that it is costly for
lenders to observe the productivity of the opportunity. This results
in agency costs that depend on the net worth of the borrower – in
aggregate the leverage ratio of entrepreneurs. This leads to an exter-
nal finance premium paid by borrowers that increases in their lever-
age ratio. This mechanism acts as a financial accelerator; if adverse
7 Building on the original work in Townsend (1979).
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shocks to the economy also weaken the balance sheet of borrowers,
the agency costs will increase and as the entrepreneur face worsened
terms of lending, investment will fall further. Rather than an infor-
mation asymmetry, the second approach in Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010)
introduces limited contract enforceability. It is assumed that banks
can default on their debts and exit the market, and as the courts can
only reclaim a proportion of outstanding debts, endogenous borrow-
ing limits arise. Unlike Bernanke et al. (1999), there is no default in
equilibrium, as the households ensure that it is never profitable for
the representative bank to do so. This constraint on debt introduces
a wedge between the capital return and the risk-free rate. In the GK
model, the value of bank assets drive fluctuations in the investment
wedge, whilst it is endogenous agency costs in the costly state verifi-
cation approach.
Brzoza-Brzezina, Kolasa & Makarski (2013) analyse the empirical per-
formance of the two approaches compared to a benchmark New Key-
nesian (NK) model and a vector autoregression, by comparing mo-
ments, impulse response functions, and business cycle accounting.
Whilst Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) restrict analysis to second mo-
ments, in this paper we emphasise higher moments and highlight
the inherent loss of accuracy in assuming that financial constraints
are either always-binding or never-binding. Table 3.1 records correla-
tions with output, and second and third moments computed from US.
time series 1986–2015 together with metrics from second order pertur-
bation simulations using a typical real business cycle (RBC) and the
Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010) model. The choice of models are to provide
baseline comparison with a never-binding financial constraint (RBC),
and an always binding financial constraint (GK) with similar building
blocks to the model proposed in this paper.
The metrics in table 3.1 indicate GK does not give a clear improve-
ment over the RBC model at this parametrisation8, and GK gives the
wrong sign for the correlation of the spread. This results from the pro-
ductivity shock increasing bank demand for finance which, even with
improved outlook, increases leverage and tightens the borrowing con-
straint, pushing up the interest spread. Both the RBC and GK match
8 Typical parametrisation with three exogenous disturbances: productivity, govern-
ment spending, and capital depreciation.
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Correlation with Y Standard Deviation Skewness
Data RBC GK Data RBC GK Data RBC GK
Y 1 1 1 1.015 0.938 0.930 -0.141 0.154 0.155
I 0.869 0.973 0.966 4.240 3.19 3.41 -0.676 0.174 0.172
C 0.871 0.868 0.872 0.927 0.540 0.568 -0.320 0.0274 0.0351
∆ -0.411 – 0.331 0.181 0.000 0.0012 1.640 – -0.214
Table 3.1: Comparison of output correlation, and second and third moments
in selected US. time-series with real business cycle model and
Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010) model 2nd order perturbation simula-
tions. ∆ is the interest spread.
second moments reasonably well but are less successful with third
moments. The signs of the simulated skewness are incorrect across
all listed variables; output, inflation and consumption have a positive
skew, and the spread has a negative skew. This is particularly strik-
ing given the level of skewness in the time-series of the spread. At
second order, the risk premium is constant which implies a constant
spread in the RBC model. It might be expected that the introduc-
tion of a time-varying risk premium to affect the results, although
the first-order leverage effects in GK would certainly be expected to
outweigh these effects. If the skewness in the data is driven by occa-
sional financial crises, in order to match the lower moments across
the simulation of the GK and RBC models, both models will bias up
the variance during normal times and down in crisis times.
Of course, the fact that financial frictions were not considered a crit-
ical component of models used in policy analysis prior to 2008 indi-
cates that financial intermediation was at least close to efficient before
this time. As credit conditions have since moved to the centre of the
macroeconomic research agenda, it seems clear that there must ei-
ther be occasionally binding constraints, or at least highly non-linear
mechanism at play. Whilst recent macroeconomic policy analysis has
emphasised the Bernanke et al. (1999) and GK models, there is a grow-
ing literature looking at this issue. For example, taking a similar ap-
proach to this paper, Li (2013) finds a large increase in the loan spread
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and drop in bank net worth following a credit crunch. He finds that
allowing a slackening of the financial constraint is key to the results,
that the constraint is only binding 15 percent of the time. The au-
thor uses global approximations methods, the drawback of which
restricts the model to a pure exchange economy with a single state
variable. He & Krishnamurthy (2013) is also closely related to this
paper but the authors propose an occasionally binding constraint on
equity rather than debt. As in our model, when the constraint binds
interest premia rise sharply and deepen downturns. Related to He
& Krishnamurthy (2013), Brunnermeier & Sannikov (2013) also con-
strain equity finance. Intermediaries are more productive investors
than households but following a large negative shock, intermediaries
looking to strengthen their balance sheets might sell assets to house-
holds. This leads to non-linear dynamics; most fluctuations can be
absorbed by the intermediaries balance sheets but larger negative
shocks might lead to unstable, volatile episodes. To provide expla-
nation for corporate cash hoarding, Mazelis (2014) features a cash-in-
advance constraint; investment cannot exceed a pre-chosen level of
liquidity and so firms hold cash in excess of expected requirements
as pre-caution. As well as motivating cash hoarding, the constraint
acts to deepen the impact of a negative shock to capital. Guerrieri &
Iacoviello (2015a) modify the Iacoviello & Neri (2010) model by fix-
ing the supply of housing and allowing the collateral constraint on
household debt to be only occasionally binding. They show how the
constraint slackened during the 2001–2006 U.S. housing boom but
tightened during the crisis, exacerbating the recession that followed.
Also related are Paul (2015) and Abo-Zaid (2015). In the former banks
lend long but borrow short and face risk of runs on deposits; banks
gradually become more highly leveraged during booms leaving them
vulnerable to large enough shocks which can cause runs on deposits.
The maturity mismatch leads to severe downturn. The second paper
imposes a collateral constraint on firms to guarantee promised wages
to workers in the style of Kiyotaki & Moore (1997). This exhibits the
general theme of occasional crises but acts as a labour tax which can
be smoothed via monetary policy.
3.1 introduction 47
3.1.1.1 Constraints on Equity and Debt
We argue the most appropriate subject for the occasionally binding
constraint is debt finance, but that under normal circumstances debt
is preferred due to frictions on equity finance. Figure 3.2 shows the
Figure 3.2: Percent change in common shares outstanding: top panel, all
commercial U.S. banks; bottom panel the ‘Big Four’ U.S. banks
(Citigroup, Bank of America, Wells Fargo and JP Morgan). Data
for each bank is weighted by their total asset share of total assets
across all banks. Data from Compustat Monthly Updates - Fun-
damentals Quarterly. Vertical grey bands represent recessions as
reported by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
percent change in shares outstanding for all commercial banks and
for the four biggest U.S. banks by balance sheet, often referred to as
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the ‘Big Four’9. Issuance of new shares is effectively bound below at
zero, in fact, it turns out that the seeming exception shown in figure
3.2 is not a buyback but a reverse stock split by Citigroup in 2011
when every 10 shares was converted into 1 share. This followed the
conversion of federal aid into common stock as the government took
a 36% equity stake in the bank, and largest share sale in U.S. history
when Citigroup sold $21 billion of common shares in 2009. This fig-
ure seems to support the story that equity issuance is costly so under
normal circumstances, banks will raise debt finance, but that occa-
sionally the marginal value of finance is higher than equity issuance
costs, which we propose are largely due to constraints on debt fi-
nance. Figure 3.3 shows the liability-to-asset ratio of the Big Four.
Figure 3.3: Liability-to-asset ratio for the ‘Big Four’ U.S. banks (Citigroup,
Bank of America, Wells Fargo and JP Morgan). Data for each
bank is weighted by their asset share of total assets across all
banks. Data from Federal Reserve Board Call Report. Vertical
grey bands represent recessions as reported by the National Bu-
reau of Economic Research.
This fell sharply during the Great Recession, and continued to fall for
the years following the crisis. Whilst this was partly a response to reg-
ulatory changes to capital requirements, there was a significant shift
from debt to equity finance during this period. Shin (2009) discusses
the financial crisis in the context of a bank run and highlights the
9 The data is from the Compustat Monthly Updates, Fundamentals Quarterly dataset.
‘All commercial banks’ includes all entities with SIC code 602, and the ‘Big Four‘
refers to the four banks with the largest balance sheets in the U.S. and includes
Citigroup, Bank of America, Wells Fargo and JP Morgan.
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increasing importance of sources of debt finance alternative to con-
ventional household deposits such as the money markets. Figure 3.4
shows what happened to one such source over the period of the finan-
Figure 3.4: Interbank lending volume, all U.S. commercial banks 2004–2016.
Data from H.8 Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in
the United States, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System U.S. The grey bands represent recessions as reported by
the National Bureau of Economic Research.
cial crisis; interbank lending volumes fell, continued to fall and have
yet to recover. This data supports the theory that bank finance was
unbounded prior to 2008, but was limited by borrowing constraints
that begun to bind when the crisis occurred. Banks responded by is-
suing equity after this point as shown in figure 3.2 as the marginal
value of finance increased.
The literature highlights two main sources of frictions on the issuance
of equity. Firstly, the explicit costs of organising issuance such as un-
derwriter fees; secondly, implicit costs that are captured in price ad-
justments following the issue. For the former, a number of studies esti-
mate the transaction costs to be between 5% and 7% on average, with
the costs depending on the size of offering. Lee, Lochhead, Ritter &
Zhao (1996) find seasoned equity offerings (SEO) between 1990–1994
incur fees an average of 7.1% of gross proceeds for US. corporations
with a range from over 13% for offerings less than $10 million, down
to 3.15% for offerings over $500 million. Altinkilic & Hansen (2000)
find transaction fees in the range 6.32% for $10-$20 million of pro-
ceeds to 5.83% over $80 million. This range is supported by Hennessy
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& Whited (2007) who use a simulated method of moments to esti-
mate marginal equity flotation costs of 5% for large firms and 10.7%
for small firms.
There are several theoretical and empirical discussions of the implicit
costs. Jensen & Meckling (1976) provide a theory of firm finance that
argues these costs arise from a principle-agent problem in which the
agent can choose non-pecuniary benefits (such as physical appoint-
ments and office space) leading to outcomes suboptimal to the prin-
ciple. As the agents’ share of ownership falls, the share of the cost
of these benefits will also fall, and so spending corporate resources
on these benefits will increase. This totals the implicit cost as the
sum of the suboptimal outcome and the need for costly monitoring,
with costs decreasing in ‘skin-in-the-game’. Asquith & Mullins (1986)
posit that firms face a negative sloping demand function for shares
and emphasise the role of asymmetric information with a seasoned
equity offering (SEO) providing a negative signal to investors; higher
leverage signals a manager confident of positive returns whilst adjust-
ing leverage down suggests the opposite. Miller & Rock (1985) also
discuss asymmetric information and the signalling role of finance de-
cisions, and argue that equity issuance are equivalent to negative div-
idends; this is certainly true in a representative household economy,
and follows through in this paper. In Myers & Majluf (1984), if man-
agers with additional information about opportunities choose not to
issue stock, it might be because the market price is so low the cost
to existing shareholders would outweigh the project return. In this
sense, not issuing stock is good news and so the reverse would be
true.
The implicit costs can be estimated by observing the change in share
price following an offering. Taking into account these implicit costs
discussed, Altinkilic & Hansen (2000) reject the hypothesis of ‘economies-
of-scale’ in equity issuance and find evidence in support of ‘U-shaped’
total implicit and explicit issuance fees; fees initially fall as offering
proceeds increase but reach a threshold after which they increase. In
Altinkilic¸ & Hansen (2003), they estimate the share price discount-
9 If Ej and Aj are the percent change in common shares outstanding and total assets
respectively, with N banks, the weighting is wj = Aj/∑Ni=1 A
i. The time series of
shares issuance is then ∑Ni=1 w
i Ai.
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ing following an equity issuance to be 3.2% on average. Jensen (1986)
estimate the losses to range from 0.4% to 9.9% and Mann & Sicher-
man (1991) to be 2.6% on average. In this chapter, we endogenise the
borrowing constraint following Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler
et al. (2012), and impose an equity issuance cost that increases in ag-
gregate equity issued up to a limit. The choice of cost acts as a conges-
tion charge that can be motivated by increased agency costs following
a large cross-sector equity issuance due, for instance, to costly mon-
itoring and downward pressure on the issuance price as the market
is flooded with new equity. As will be discussed later, there is also
a computational benefit as the choice of issuance cost allows us to
drop an inequality constraint from the model, increasing numerical
simulation speeds.
3.1.2 Model Simulations with Occasionally Binding Constraints
The difficulty in simulating models with occasionally binding con-
straints is that standard perturbation approximation cannot be used
because the bounded equations are non-differentiatable functions. The
majority of papers mentioned above use global methods to compute
simulations which bring significant limitations; usually restricting the
model to a single state variable in a pure exchange economy. Guerrieri
& Iacoviello (2015a) use the piecewise approach proposed in Guerri-
eri & Iacoviello (2015b) that treats the economy as two regimes, one
of which is an absorbing state; under one regime, the constraint is
binding, whilst in the alternative regime, the constraint is slack. The
model conditions are linearised around the deterministic steady state
under each regime. The drawback to this approach is that there are
two decision rules for each regime; agents in the dominating regime
never expect the constraint to bind, and when it does, the agents do
not expect any future shocks so act in a perfect foresight manner until
switching regimes. This approach loses pre-cautionary behaviour key
to many occasionally binding constraints models and so will bias the
results. Dewachter & Wouters (2014) suggest another approach that
allows standard perturbation methods to simulate the model of He &
Krishnamurthy (2013). The authors take linear approximations to all
the unbounded model equations as standard then approximate the
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bounded equation with a continuous function. Whilst this is a conve-
nient approach and allows the computation of larger models with in-
equality constraints, it suffers from approximation errors, particularly
in the area around the constraint. A related method proposed by Den
Haan & De Wind (2012) adds a penalty in the objective function in
place of the bound; on a positivity constraint for instance, the penalty
would tend to infinity as the bounded variable approaches the bound.
Again, whilst this is a conveniant approach, approximation errors are
introduced, particularly in the area of the constraint. Brzoza-brzezina,
Kolasa & Makarski (2015) test a collateral constraints model with a
penalty function up to fourth order concluding the approach is im-
practical due to the errors introduced.
We use the solution algorithm proposed in Holden (2016a), discussed
in section 2.2, that takes advantage of the benefits of perturbation ap-
proximation whilst overcoming the shortcomings of the other meth-
ods mentioned. The remainder of the chapter proceeds with descrip-
tion of the model, a discussion of the theoretical results, and specifics
of the numerical methods employed. This is followed with analysis
of the main numerical results. Analysis of the model proceeds in two
stages. As the model proposed in this paper builds upon the GK
model, which is an extension of a standard frictionless RBC model,
our analysis is conducted in comparison to these two benchmarks.
We then introduce nominal rigidity in the price of final goods into the
RBC model and our borrowing constraints model in order to discuss
the interaction between monetary policy and the financial friction.
3.2 the model
The model shares a household and firm sector common to the real
business cycle literature, the banking sector acting to intermediate
funds between these two sectors. The representative household max-
imises expected lifetime utility
max
Ct+s,Ht+s
Et
∞
∑
s=0
βt+sU (Ct+s, Ht+s) (3.2.1)
subject to the budget constraint
Ct + Bt = WtHt + Rt−1Bt−1 + Dt − Et + pit − Tt (3.2.2)
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where Ct is consumption, Ht the hours worked, Wt is the wage rate,
and Bt deposits with the bank paying interest rate Rt the following pe-
riod. Dt and pit are dividends paid and any other profits respectively,
Et is bank equity purchased, and Tt represents lump sum taxes. This
leads to a Euler consumption equation and labour supply condition
1 = βEt
[
UC,t+1
UC,t
]
Rt (3.2.3)
−UH,t
UC,t
= Wt (3.2.4)
where UC,t and UL,t are the marginal utilities of consumption and
labour. We follow Miller & Rock (1985) and treat equity issuance as
negative dividend payments; the household cares about the stream
of net dividend payments Dt − Et which is delegated to the bank
to maximise. We introduce an agency problem to the banking sector
in which imperfect debt enforcement gives rise to a borrowing con-
straint to be applied to banks. This follows from the models proposed
in Kiyotaki & Moore (1997) then Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010).
For the baseline model, we choose a non-seperable utility function in
the form
U (Ct, Ht)
[
C1−$t (1− Ht)$
]1−σc − 1
1− σc (3.2.5)
where σc > 0 is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution and $ the
utility weight on leisure.
3.2.1 The Banking Sector
It is assumed that the banks are necessary to provide funding to firms
in the model. Following the approach of Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010),
there are a continuum of islands each with a production sector and
representative household. On each island, a proportion of household
members act as workers whilst the remaining members act as bankers.
There is perfect consumption insurance amongst household members
and with the free movement of labour across islands there is a perfect
labour market. The bank can lend to firms on the same island with
no friction, but being prevented from using debt finance from their
own household, must source funding from banks and households on
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other islands. This assumption supports the shareholder maximisa-
tion objective of the banks, whilst characterising their funding with
an agency problem between the representative households and banks.
It is possible for a bank to raise equity financing from the house-
hold, but doing so is costly. The agency problem arises due to imper-
fect contract enforcement; banks are able to declare bankruptcy and
exit with creditors only able to reclaim a proportion of the outstand-
ing debt. This follows the collateral constraints model of Kiyotaki
& Moore (1997), and more closely the extension to the the banking
sector by Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010). The key differences between the
banking model of this paper and that of Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010)
are firstly, banks are able to issue equity;10 secondly, the authors
assume an exogenous bank exit rate which fixes the dividend rate
and ensures the borrowing constraint is always binding, whereas our
model relaxes this assumption so that dividend payments are endoge-
nous and the borrowing constraint is only occasionally binding. The
agency problem between saver and bank results in a wedge emerging
between the expected return on capital and the risk-free rate, beyond
the standard risk premium.
Bank j raises debt finance Bjt promising to repay R
j
tB
j
t the following
period. A government guarantee on these savings mean that banks
actually only need repay
(
Rjt − Gt+1
)
Bjt where Gt+1 is only non-zero
in the face of an extreme adverse shock that would otherwise cause
a systemic banking collapse. The government funds this insurance
via lump-sum taxes on households. The bank will pay dividends Djt
and raise equity Ejt. Whilst making dividend payments is costless, we
assume there are administrative costs involved in issuing equity. To
bank j the cost exogenous and linear in equity issuance κtE
j
t, but we
model κt as an increasing function of aggregate equity issuance. This
captures congestion externalities such as monitoring. Specifically, we
let
κt = κ¯
[
1− exp
(
−ν Et
max {0, Vt}
)]
10 Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010) discuss an extension in which banks can issue outside
equity (see also Gertler et al. 2012); there is a cost that depends on the relative im-
portance of outside equity in bank finance, and the same friction on debt is applied
to equity finance. This results in a banking model with two classes of shareholders
and dynamics of equity finance that does not correspond to the empirical evidence.
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where Vt is the value of the entire banking sector, so Et/Vt is the ag-
gregate rate of equity issuance. κ¯ ∈ (0, 1) and ν is a parameter that
determines the velocity at which κt converges to κ¯. Banks raise debt
and equity finance in order to lend to the production sector. The lend-
ing channel is characterised by perfect monitoring and contractual
enforcement and so banks frictionlessly lend to firms against their fu-
ture profits. Firms then offer banks state-contingent debt and so we
will treat this as equity denoted Sjt. Letting Zt represent the profit
share of output per unit capital, and assuming that capital has real
cost Qt and depreciates at δt, the gross rate of return on capital will
be Zt + (1− δt)Qt. One unit of firm equity finance will fund Qt units
of capital, and so the gross rate of return on firm equity is given by
RKt ≡ [Zt + (1− δt)Qt] 1Qt−1 .
The objective of bank j is to maximise the expected discounted divi-
dend stream paid to the household but in order to correctly charac-
terise the equilibrium conditions and borrowing constraint, we must
outline the timing and information available to each agent, and the
regulation around bankruptcy so to treat carefully the off-equilibrium
play. The book value of bank j at time t is given by
Vˆ jt ≡
[
RKt S
j
t−1 − (Rt−1 − Gt) Bjt−1
] 1
1− κt (3.2.6)
A bank that decides to continue will choose dividend payments, and
finance and investment decisions subject to the budget constraint
Djt + S
j
t + (Rt−1 − Gt) Bjt−1 ≤ Bjt + (1− κt) Ejt + RKt Sjt−1 (3.2.7)
The objective of bank j is to maximise the expected discounted divi-
dend stream paid to the household. The objective function is written
V jt = max
Bjt ,S
j
t,E
j
t ,D
j
t
{
Djt − Ejt + (1− ι)Et
[
Λt,t+1V
j
t+1
]}
(3.2.8)
where Λt,t+1 ≡ βUC,t+1UC,t is the stochastic discount factor of the share-
holders and V jt . The term (1− ι) is equivalent to the exogenous bank
exit rate in Kiyotaki & Moore (1997) and Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010),
but we take this to the limit as ι → 0 so the only impact on prefer-
ences is to introduce an arbitrarily weak preference toward paying
dividends sooner rather than later11.
11 ι > 0 is required by our numerical strategy; we take a perturbation approximation
around the deterministic steady state. Whilst equity and debt carry different risk
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We now consider the default decision and off-equilibrium play. If
bank j fails to repay outstanding debts in period t, the bank must file
for chapter 7 bankruptcy. Following U.S. law (title 11 U.S.C. §548) any
remaining assets are seized and sold at market value. If this is enough
to repay Rt−1B
j
t−1, any remaining assets are paid to shareholders as
a final dividend, otherwise the court will examine the previous two
years of dividend payments. If, when a dividend was paid, the value
of bank liabilities were greater then the value of assets then the div-
idend would be deemed fraudulent. In this model, we assume that
all dividends paid within this two-year window would be considered
fraudulent as the bank was left insolvent at the point of default12.
The court would attempt to recover these dividends plus interest at
the risk-free rate. It is assumed that this is a costly process due, for
instance, to costs associated with tracking down shareholders, and
the court is only able to recover a fraction (1− θ) of that sought. If
the amount recovered is sufficient to cover Rt−1B
j
t−1 then any remain-
ing funds are returned to shareholders, otherwise the creditors take
a haircut.
We first consider the decision whether to exit in period t. If Rt−1B
j
t−1 ≤
(1− θ)∑8i=1
(
∏ik=1 Rt−k
)
Djt−i, then the bank will repay debts before
exit, otherwise they will default only needing to repay
(1− θ)
8
∑
i=1
(
i
∏
k=1
Rt−k
)
Djt−i. (3.2.9)
As the current assets can be seized in full, the exit value is given by
max
{
Vˆ jt ,− (1− θ)
8
∑
i=1
(
i
∏
k=1
Rt−k
)
Djt−i
}
(3.2.10)
The bank will only default in the case that
V jt < − (1− θ)
8
∑
i=1
(
i
∏
k=1
Rt−k
)
Djt−i (3.2.11)
profiles and so would be determined within a stochastic simulation of a 2nd order
approximation or higher, the non-stochastic steady state would be indeterminate in
the absence of risk. This is discussed further in a later section of the paper.
12 This is consistent with legal practice on the issue of ‘unreasonably small capital’
whereby the firm would not need to be technically insolvent at the point of dividend
payment for it to be considered fraudulent, if it later transpired the firm was left
with insufficient capital to repay creditors. See http://www.jonesday.com/in-search-
of-the-meaning-of-unreasonably-small-capital-in-constructively-fraudulent-transfer-
avoidance-litigation-12-02-2014/ for further discussion.
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If this occurs for bank j then, by symmetry, all banks on the equilib-
rium path will default. So to prevent a financial collapse, the govern-
ment will offer free insurance by choosing Gt such that the comple-
mentarity condition holds
min
{
Gt, Vt + (1− θ)
8
∑
i=1
(
i
∏
k=1
Rt−k
)
Dt−i
}
= 0 (3.2.12)
This policy rules out bank default along the equilibrium path, and by
offering insurance to protect against tail events, the banks will under-
price risk relative to the efficient benchmark case. We have introduced
government insurance to prevent default in equilibrium due to severe
adverse shocks to the net worth of banks, but to derive the borrowing
constraint, we must consider a bank choosing off-equilibrium play by
planning to default in the future. The value at time t of preparing to
default in t + 1 is given by
VXt = D
j
t − Ejt − (1− ι)Et [Λt,t+1] (1− θ)
8
∑
i=1
(
i
∏
k=1
Rt+1−k
)
Djt+1−i
(3.2.13)
At this point, it is important to clarify the order of moves to correctly
specify this off-equilibrium play. In particular we assume that house-
holds observe all bank and aggregate variables from t − 1 but only
the period t aggregate shocks before choosing the maximum level of
deposits. The bank then chooses their individual variables subject to
the borrowing constraint. The choice of this ordering is important; if
households could observe bank behaviour in advance of borrowing
decisions, the bank could never choose off-equilibrium behaviour to
prepare for default as households would not lend to them. Suppress-
ing the bank indices for neatness, we postulate that the borrowing
constraint takes the form
Bt ≤ AVˆt +F1,tDt−1 + · · ·+F7,tDt−7 (3.2.14)
The linearity of the borrowing constraint follows from the linearity of
the objective function and the budget constraint in the state variables.
The household will choose the limit on Bt so that the bank weakly
prefers not to deviate from the equilibrium path and plan to default.
Maximising the value of exit subject to the borrowing constraint and
the budget constraint implies that the borrowing constraint will bind,
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the bank will make no further investments so St = 0, and will issue
no equity so Et = 0. Again, because the budget constraint, objective
function, and borrowing constraint are linear in the state and choice
variables, the bank value function must be homogeneous of degree
one in the state. As the bank can sell then re-buy assets for the same
price, the value function must have a linear representation in Vˆt and
{Dt−i}7i=1, so
Vt =MtVˆt +
7
∑
i=1
Ni,tDt−i (3.2.15)
Given that to prevent default, the household will ensure Vt ≥ VXt ; us-
ing the expressions for these terms, we can define At and Ft in terms
of the marginal value of book-value and past dividend paymentsMt,
and {Ni,t}7i=1. The weakest condition preventing default implies
At = Mt1− (1− ι) (1− θ) − (1− κt) (3.2.16)
Fi,t = Ni,t + (1− ι) (1− θ)∏
i
k=1 Rt−k
1− (1− ι) (1− θ) (3.2.17)
The bank maximises objective (3.2.8) subject to the borrowing con-
straint (3.2.14), the budget constraint (3.2.7), and positivity constraints
on Dt and Et, where the value and book-value of the bank are given
by equations (3.2.15) and (3.2.6) respectively. By taking first order con-
ditions and evaluating the terms in the state, we solve the coefficients
to the bank problem leading to
(1− ι)Et
[
Λt,t+1Mt+1 (Rt − Gt+1) 1−κt1−κt+1
]
=Mt
(
1− λBt
(1−κt)[1−(1−ι)(1−θ)]
) (3.2.18)
Ni,t = Zi,t (1− ι) (1− θ)(1− (1− ι) (1− θ))
i
∏
k=1
Rt−k, i = 1, · · · , 7 (3.2.19)
where
Zi,t ≡ λ
B
t
1− κt
Mt
1− λBt
+ (1− ι)Et [Zi+1,t+1] , i = 1, · · · , 6
(3.2.20)
Z7,t ≡ λ
B
t
1− κt
Mt
1− λBt
(3.2.21)
and where λBt is the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint.
The first condition gives the law of motion for the marginal value
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of the bank book-value, the second for the marginal value of past
fraudulent dividends. Defining
Ht ≡ λBt +Mt
(
1− λ
B
t
(1− κt) (1− (1− ι) (1− θ))
)
, (3.2.22)
the first order conditions can be written
λBt = Ht − (1− ι)Et
[
Λt,t+1Mt+1 (Rt − Gt+1) 1− κt1− κt+1
]
≥ 0
(3.2.23)
λDt = (1− ι)Et
[
Λt,t+1
(
Mt+1RKt+1
1− κt
1− κt+1 −N1,t+1 (1− κt)
)]
− (1− κt) ≥ 0
(3.2.24)
λEt = 1− (1− ι)Et
[
Λt,t+1Mt+1RKt+1
1− κt
1− κt+1
]
≥ 0 (3.2.25)
1 = (1− ι)Et
[
Λt,t+1
Mt+1
Ht R
K
t+1
1− κt
1− κt+1
]
(3.2.26)
where λDt and λ
E
t are Langrange multipliers on the positivity con-
straints on dividend payments and equity issuance respectively. The
end equation results from the first order condition with respect to
firm equity; using this, we can define a stochastic discount factor that
is applied by bank owned firms Ξt,t+1 ≡ (1− ι)Et
[
Λt,t+1
Mt+1
Ht
1−κt
1−κt+1
]
and is the pricing kernel of firm equity.
3.2.2 Firms
A representative profit-maximising firm chooses capital and labour
to produce output using the technology
Yt = (AtHt)
1−α Kt−1α (3.2.27)
where At is a stationary stochastic process. At the end of each period,
firms invest in new capital stock subject to capital adjustment costs
using finance from the bank. The following period the capital is used
in production, labour is hired and all surplus is returned to the bank.
Due to the mobility of labour across islands, the marginal product of
labour will equal the market wage rate.
Wt = (1− α) YtHt (3.2.28)
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All remaining surplus goes to the bank which implies the capital re-
turn is given by the marginal product
Zt = α
Yt
Kt−1
. (3.2.29)
As part of our analysis we model both capital and investment adjust-
ment costs for comparison. These are paid by firms but, for conve-
nience, we model as if firm owned capital producers build new cap-
ital goods, and sell to the firms at price Qt. Following Ireland (2003)
we model the capital adjustment costs as a quadratic function of the
relative change, linear in the volume of the new capital stock
ΦK
(
Kt
Kt−1
)
= φK
(
Kt
Kt−1
− 1
)2
. (3.2.30)
We follow Christiano et al. (2005) for the investment adjustment costs
with capital evolving according to
Kt =
[
1−ΦI
(
It
It−1
)]
It + (1− δt)Kt−1, (3.2.31)
where capital depreciation δt also follows a stationary stochastic pro-
cess and where the functional form of ΦI is identical to ΦK. We are in-
terested in the implications of each type of adjustment cost seperately
so if φI > 0, then φK = 0 and visa versa. Maximising capital-producer
profits leads to the following conditions for the real price of capital,
Qt, in the face of capital adjustment costs and investment adjustment
costs respectively
Qt − 2φK
(
Kt
Kt−1
− 1
)
−Et
Ξt,t+1
 (Qt+1 − 1) (1− δt+k)
+φK
(
Kt+1
Kt − 1
) ((
Kt+1
Kt − 1
)
− 2 Kt+1Kt
)
 = 1
(3.2.32)
Qt
(
1− φI
(
It
It−1 − 1
)2 − ( ItIt−1 − 1) 2φI ( ItIt−1)
)
+Et
[
Ξt,t+1Qt+12φI
(
It+1
It − 1
) (
It+1
It
)2]
= 1
(3.2.33)
3.2.3 Government Spending and Resource Constraint
The model has a simple government sector; the government spend a
proportion gt of output which is modelled as a stationary stochastic
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process. This spending is financed via lump sum taxes. The model is
closed with the resource constraint
Yt = Ct + It
(
1−ΦI
(
It
It−1
))
+ Gt. (3.2.34)
3.3 theoretical results
Before performing numerical analysis of the financial constraints model,
we can discuss a few key points that arise from the theoretical results
of the model. We begin focusing on the Lagrange multipliers and
the coefficients found by solving the dynamic programming problem
as these offer some immediate insight into the behaviour and impor-
tance of the financial constraints.
Proposition 1. λEt = 0∀t: that is, the positivity constraint on equity is-
suance never binds
Proof. Substituting the equation (3.2.25) into (3.2.24) gives
λDt = 1− λEt − (1− ι)Et [Λt,t+1N1,t+1 (1− κt)]− (1− κt) (3.3.1)
Suppose that λEt > 0 so that equity issuance is constrained at zero;
then from the definition of κt, the equation becomes
λDt + λ
E
t + (1− ι)Et [Λt,t+1N1,t+1] = 0 (3.3.2)
and so λDt = λ
E
t = (1 − ι)Et [Λt,t+1N1,t+1] = 0 giving a contradic-
tion. This implies the positivity constraint on equity is always slack
in equilibrium so λEt = 0∀t.
This result brings computational benefit as we can drop the inequality
constraint Et ≥ 0 reducing the time to simulate the model. Using this
result, we find Ht = 1, and find the stochastic discount factor applied
to banks becomes
Ξt,t+1 ≡ (1− ι)
[
Λt,t+1Mt+1 1− κt1− κt+1
]
(3.3.3)
From this, it is easy to see that if the marginal value of an additional
unit of funding is equal to one, and if the banks are not expected to
change equity issuance, then at the limit as ι → 0, equation (3.3.3)
will equal the household discount factor; that is to say, financial inter-
mediation would be efficient.
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Proposition 2. λBt = 0 ⇐⇒ Mt = 1 and λBt > 0 ⇐⇒ Mt > 1. That
is, the marginal value of bank finance is greater than one if and only if the
borrowing constraint is binding.
Proof. Using Ht = 1 and substituting equation (3.2.18) into (3.2.23)
leads to
Mt =
(
1− λBt
)
(1− κt) (1− (1− ι) (1− θ))
(1− κt) (1− (1− ι) (1− θ))− λBt
(3.3.4)
Using (1− κt) (1− (1− ι) (1− θ)) < 1 and λBt ≥ 0, it follows that
Mt = 1 when λBt = 0, andMt > 1 when λBt > 0.
It follows that the borrowing constraint is only slack if Mt = 1. We
defineMt as the marginal value of the bank book-value but can also
describe it as the shadow price of bank finance; it is intuitive that this
increases above unity as the bank becomes financially constrained.
Another result following from proposition 1 is that it can be opti-
mal for banks to simultaneously issue equity and make dividend
payments. The intuition is as follows: suppose that the borrowing
constraint binds following a shock, implying λBt > 0. The bank can
raise funds, first by reducing dividends and then, if further funds are
required, by issuing equity. In the absence of the signalling role of
dividend payments, it is at the point that dividends reach the lower
bound that the borrowing constraint binds and banks begin to issue
equity. Note that as λBt > 0 and the marginal value of bank finance
increasesMt > 1, there is clear incentive for the bank to raise equity
finance. Because it is costly for the bank to do so, it must be that the
expected discounted return on firm equity Et
[
Λt,t+1RKt+1
]
is greater
than the discounted risk-free rate Et [Λt,t+1Rt]. One might wonder
why dividends would be paid at this point given the present value of
one dollar of firm equity is greater than one dollar in hand. Because
the dividends can be partly recovered by creditors, they play a role in
subsequent periods of relaxing the borrowing constraint. Recall
λDt = κt − (1− ι)Et [Λt,t+1N1,t+1 (1− κt)] ≥ 0 (3.3.5)
This tells us that if the marginal value of paying a dividend is greater
than marginal cost of issuing equity then λDt = 0 and in such a case it
is optimal to make dividend payments, even simultaneously issuing
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equity to do so. As κ′t (Et) > 0 and κt (0) = 0, it is certainly possible
in some states of the world. Indeed N1,t > 0 if any element of the set
Et {λt, ...,λt+7} is greater than zero, and given that λBt ≥ 0∀t, it must
be the case that all elements are strictly positive even if λBt > 0 with
very low probability, with the possible exception of λBt which is know
with certainty. It follows that there is always a signalling13 value of
making dividend payments, and as such equity will be issued every
period. That said, if κ′t (Et) is sufficiently high in the region of Et = 0,
then the amount of equity issued will be very low and could disap-
pear in the presence of fixed costs of issuance. The functional form of
κt is chosen partly to aid computation and parametrise the function
so that κt converges to the limit κ for relatively small issuances. This
should not detract from the interesting result that signalling effects
of dividend payments lead to the optimality of simultaneous divi-
dend payments and equity issuances as the risk of banks becoming
financially constrained increases. This effect would surely magnify
significantly in the case of heterogeneous banks and asymmetric in-
formation.
To measure the financial friction, we consider the investment wedge
that emerges as the difference between the savings rate and the ex-
pected return on the use of those savings. We are interested in the
component of the spread that emerges from the agency problem rather
than the risk premium alone and find this is captured by the Lagrange
multiplier on the borrowing constraint, λBt . Using the definition of λ
B
t
from equation (3.2.23) and the pricing kernel of firm equity in equa-
tion (3.2.26), we can write
λBt = (1− ι)Et
[
Λt,t+1Mt+1
(
RKt+1 − [Rt − Gt+1]
) 1− κt
1− κt+1
]
(3.3.6)
The size of the spread depends crucially on the cost of issuing equity;
if the cost were zero, there would be no financial friction to emerge
from the agency problem on debt finance as banks would just issue
equity. In the benchmark GK case, equity finance is ruled out entirely,
which sets κt = 1∀t, whilst Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010) also propose
13 Not in the typical sense of an asymmetric information context, but in a direct way
that a bank making dividend payments signals to the household to raise the borrow-
ing limit.
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an extension in which equity finance can be issued but is subject to
the same type of friction as debt finance. Our approach highlights
the role that costly equity issuance plays only when debt finance is
constrained. The marginal value of bank finance, Mt is the value
of one extra dollar of finance on the balance sheet of the bank; if
the bank can raise finance via reductions in dividend payment or
increased borrowing, then this will equal 1 dollar. As equity is issued
and κt increases,Mt rises above unity. An additional dollar of finance
reduces the need to raise costly equity by one dollar today, and by
lowering the leverage of the bank, will relax the borrowing constraint
in this and future periods.
3.3.1 Deterministic Steady State
The premise for a model of occasionally binding financial constraints
is that financial intermediation is efficient in the vicinity of the steady
state but that sufficiently large adverse shocks can cause the financial
constraints to bind. We can show, as ι → 0, that the banks are not
financially constrained but at the edge of the constrained region. It
follows that financial intermediation is efficient at the limit, and in
this region the borrowing constraints model replicates the standard
real business cycle model.
Proposition 3. The borrowing constraint is only slack if ι = 0, and the
banking sector is at the edge of the constrained region at the limit as ι→ 0+.
Proof. Using equation (3.2.18), we can give the steady solution to λB
as
λB = ι (1− κ) (1− (1− ι) (1− θ)) > 0 (3.3.7)
This implies that the borrowing constraint binds with positive ι but
limι→0 λBt = 0. As λB is the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing
constraint, it follows that the borrowing constraint is only slack if
ι = 0 and so is at the edge constrained region as ι→ 0.
Corollary 1. Let R>a = {x ∈ R | x > a}, then M ∈ R>1 ∧ Ni ∈
R>0∀λB ∈ R>0, i ∈ {1, ..., 7}.
Corollary 2. limι→0M = 1∧ limι→0Ni = 0
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Corollaries 1 and 2 follow from proposition 2, that the shadow price
of bank finance is close to but greater than unity. From equation
(3.3.4), we find
M = 1− ι (1− κ) [1− (1− ι) (1− θ)]
1− ι > 1 (3.3.8)
and so at the limit as ι → 0+, we find M → 0+. We show that the
same is true for Ni as
Ni = Zi (1− κ) (1− ι) (1− θ)(1− κ) [1− (1− ι) (1− θ)]− λB R
i, i = 1, · · · , 7
(3.3.9)
where
Zk ≡ λ
B
1− κ + (1− ι)
[
Zk+1 (1− κ) [1− (1− ι) (1− θ)](1− κ) [1− (1− ι) (1− θ)]− λB
]
(3.3.10)
Z7 ≡ λ
B
1− κ (3.3.11)
for k = 1, · · · , 6. So Ni > 0 for i = 1, · · · , 7, but as ι → 0, Zk →
0 and Ni → 0. These results indicate that, at the limit as ι → 0,
the borrowing constraint is slack as λB = 0, the marginal value of
dividend payments up to all horizons i equals zero, Ni = 0, and the
marginal value of bank finance is unity,M = 1. Using the condition
determining value of the bank,
V =MVVˆ +
6
∑
i=0
1
Π1+i
MD,i+1D, (3.3.12)
We further note that bank value is greater than the book value but
limι→0 V = Vˆ; at the limit, the value of the bank is equal to the book-
value. Banks must pay dividends in steady state, else their steady-
state value would be negative, and because the bank would constantly
raise new equity without paying dividends, the bank would have in-
finite book value. This contradicts the fact that value must be weakly
higher than book value and so implies that λD = 0. We can then write
λD = κ − (1− ι) β
Π∗
N1 (1− κ) = 0 (3.3.13)
so
κ =
(1− ι) βΠ∗N 1
1+ (1− ι) βΠ∗N1
> 0. (3.3.14)
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It follows from limι→0N1 = 0, that limι→0 κ = 0 and so there is no
equity issuance at the limit. Finally, we find
R = (1− ι (1− κ) [1− (1− ι) (1− θ)]) RK (3.3.15)
so RK > R but limι→0 RK = R. This completes the proof that steady
state financial intermediation is efficient at the limit as ι → 0. At this
limit, the banks are not financially constrained; banks pay dividends,
issue no equity, and the present value of future dividends equals the
net worth of the bank. This is consistent with the standard real busi-
ness cycle model with efficient financial intermediation.
3.3.2 Further analytical discussion
It is worth noting that, as ι → 0, the model collapses to the real
business cycle model if either κ = 0 or θ = 0 . In the former case, the
first order condition with respect to dividend payments becomes
λDt = −(1− ι)Et [Λt,t+1N1,t+1] (3.3.16)
It follows from the definition of N1,t in equations (3.2.19) to (3.2.21),
and because λBt ≥ 0, that N1,t ≥ 0∀t. We can go stricter than this: if
there is positive probability that N1,t > 0, then Et [Λt,t+1N1,t+1] > 0.
Because λDt ≥ 0, from the amended first order condition with respect
to dividend payments, it must hold that N1,t = 0∀t. It follows from
this, using the same equations (3.2.19) to (3.2.21), that λBt = 0∀t. Using
proposition 2, we can state Mt = 1∀t. Using this in the definitions
of pricing kernels for bank and firm equity, we find Λt,t+1 = Ξt,t+1∀t
and financial intermediation is efficient. The intuition is obvious; the
bank is never financially constrained as they can always raise equity
finance at no cost.
We can also show the financial constraints model converges to the
real business cycle model in the case that θ = 0. Recall the borrowing
constraint is of the form
Bt ≤ AVˆt +F1,tDt−1 + · · ·+F7,tDt−7 (3.3.17)
If θ = 0, then as ι→ 0, it follows from the solutions of the coefficients
in equations (3.2.16) and (3.2.17), that At → ∞ and Fi,t → ∞ for
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i = 1, ..., 7. So at the limit as ι → 0, borrowing becomes unlimited.
As with the previous case, it follows that λBt = 0∀t, Mt = 1∀t and
Λt,t+1 = Ξt,t+1∀t, and so financial intermediation is efficient.
3.3.3 Comparison to Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler, Kiyotaki &
Queralto (2012)
The model proposed in the chapter is inspired by the banking model
of Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010) which we use for comparison. In this
section we are specific about the modified assumptions and condi-
tions and so can draw out the important differences expected in the
numerical results. The authors of GK use second order local approxi-
mation techniques, and rule out ex ante any probability of hitting con-
straints; in our financial constraints model, we solve to third order
and incorporate occasionally binding constraints. We argue that an
approximation order of at least three is necessary for analysis of this
nature. The analysis in GK focuses on a type of shock that is especially
large but occurs infrequently; we too use this disaster shocks idea in
our simulations. Such shocks take the model further from the steady
state than under normal circumstances, and the accuracy will be more
compromised the lower the order of approximation. Secondly, at sec-
ond order, there is a constant risk premium and so, again, following
large shocks the impact on risk premia and precautionary behaviour
will certainly be missed. At third order, the risk premia is linear in
the state and so, although not able to capture all non-linear effects, is
a clear improvement over second order. Ignoring the bounds in GK
forces the authors to parametrise the model to ensure the bounds are
not important. First, bankers exit with a fixed probability of σ = 2.5%
per quarter; GK argue that this is a turnover between workers and
bankers but it might as well be a fixed dividend rate, which at 10%
per annum seems indefensibly high. This high dividend payment rate
ensures debt is always the cheapest source of finance in GK so the
borrowing constraint is always binding.
In an extension discussed in Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010), and more for-
mally analysed in Gertler et al. (2012), banks can also source outside
equity although this too is subject to the same type of constraint that
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borrowing is subject to. The authors differentiate between two types
of shareholder; inside equity is owned by the household on the same
island as the bank whilst outside equity is held by households on
other islands. The banks objective is to maximises inside shareholder
value, and so the whilst outside equity is equity in the sense that it
is state contingent, the banks still have incentive to renege on profit
owed in the same way as with debt repayments. In order to pin down
the financial structure of the bank, GKQ assume that θ is time-varying
and a function of financial structure. Specifically θ is given by the con-
vex function
θ∗ (xt) = θ¯
(
1+ ext +
κ∗
2
xt2
)
. (3.3.18)
The asterisk indicates a GKQ or variant of a variable or parameter,
e and κ∗ are parameters and xt ≡ qtetSt where qtet is outside equity,
and St is total bank assets.14 The idea is that it is easier to divert
funds from outside equity holders, for whom it would be costly to
monitor performance, than for debt holders who receive a fixed rate
payment.15 The authors show that banks’ finance decisions are char-
acterised by a trade-off; on one hand there is hedging value in out-
side equity related to the difference between discount factors Λt,t+1
and Ξ∗t,t+1, whilst on the other, increasing xt further aggravates the
agency problem as θt will increase. This pins down the optimal fi-
nancial structure of the bank. It is clear that the characterisation of
equity finance in GKQ is quite different to that proposed in this pa-
per which is why we choose Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010) as the baseline
comparison.
Another key difference is the derivation of the borrowing constraint.
In GK, the participation constraint ensures the continuation of the
representative bank, and is given as Vt∗ ≥ θt∗Sjt where the value of
the bank is given as the expected terminal net worth of the bank
Vt∗ = Et
[
∑∞s=1 (1− σ) σs−1Λt,t+sVˆt+s
]
(3.3.19)
The bank decides at the end of each period whether to continue, or
exit. If exiting, the bank will liquidate all assets of which only a pro-
portion 1− θ will be returned to the creditors. The remaining assets
14 Note this uses the same notation for bank assets as this chapter; in GKQ, St of this
paper is written Qtst, where in aggregate st = Kt and Qt is Tobin’s q.
15 Whilst the parametrisation implies e < 0, the authors restrict attention to the region
where θ¯ (e+ κ∗xt) > 0.
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will be available as a final dividend the following period. Although a
simple set-up, the authors do not consult the bankruptcy proceedings
as defined in U.S. law, and so miss possible dynamics. With the same
θ, the model derived in this chapter leads to a slackening of the bor-
rowing constraint relative to GK, as the creditors can also recover the
proportion θ of historic dividend payments within two years with in-
terest paid. Of course, θ might be adjusted so the total proportion of
assets that could be recovered on average be equal across models, but
the incentive value of dividend payments in the borrowing constraint
is missed, as to will be the time variability. For example, in the model
in this chapter, a large dividend payment would relax the borrowing
constraint over 2 years, but once this window has passed, the borrow-
ing constraint would tighten. We would argue this channel provides a
particularly relevant and interesting incentive for dividend payments.
3.4 numerical analysis
To evaluate the model numerically, we solve a third-order pruned per-
turbation approximation, and use the algorithm proposed in Holden
(2016a) to implement the occasionally binding constraints. Approxi-
mating at orders higher than one means that certainty equivalence no
longer holds, so precautionary behaviour is introduced and there is
a positive risk premium. At third order, we benefit both from higher
accuracy away from steady-state, and from a time-varying risk pre-
mium that will impact the precautionary behaviour.
Before discussing the specifics relating to the numerical strategy, we
start mentioning the importance of the parameter ι. We take a local
approximation around the non-stochastic steady state at the limit as
ι → 0+, but ι > 0 is necessary in order to pin down a deterministic
steady state. Consider a period in which the borrowing constraint
were slack; a unit increase in dividend payments can be paid for
by a unit increase in deposits now followed by a reduction in divi-
dend payments of Rt in the next period. Given bankers discount at
Et [Λt,t+1] and 1 = RtEt [Λt,t+1], to a first-order approximation, house-
holds are indifferent between the two. At higher orders, risk averse
households are not indifferent about substituting from risky Et [Dt+1]
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to risk-less Bt so there is no indeterminacy. Including ι → 0+ in the
banker discounting pins down the deterministic steady state16.
To impose the positivity constraints on Dt and Et, and the borrowing
limit set by households, we use the method discussed in chapter 2 and
introduce news shocks to the bounded equations that act to ensure
the bound is not violated. To incorporate the effects of uncertainty
coming from the constraints, we integrate over future uncertainty up
to a finite horizon. In order to find the balance between accuracy
and computational speed, different methods are employed for each
exercise, and so specific detail is given below. On the existence and
uniqueness of the solution to the linear complementarity problem17;
analysing matrix M, which contains the relative impulse response
functions to the news shocks, indicates that there is always a solution
to the bounds problem but that there are some states of the world
for which there are multiple. When there are multiple solutions, we
choose the one that firstly solves the bounds problem in as short a
time as possible, secondly minimises the size of news shocks required
to impose the bounds.
3.4.1 Model and Solution Parameters
We compare numerical analysis to two benchmarks. A standard real
business cycle model with efficient financial intermediation, solved
simply by setting Et
[
Λt,t+1RKt+1
]
= Et [Λt,t+1] Rt; and a version of
Gertler et al. (2012) as discussed in section 3.3.3. The two benchmarks
provide an always-binding financial friction case in the GK model,
and a never-binding financial friction case in the RBC model. The
models are parametrised with values shown in table 3.2. These are
chosen to match typical values used in the literature. For GK the
value of σB was chosen so the bankers survive 10 years (40 periods)
on average, and ζ and θ computed to hit an economy wide leverage
ratio of three and to have an average credit spread of 50 basis points
per quarter.
16 ι is set to 10−8 in the numerical analysis.
17 As discussed previously, this computes the size of news shocks necessary to impose
the bounds.
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Parameter Description Value
β Household Discount Rate 0.99
gy Government Spending % of GDP 20%
$ Utility share of labour 0.684
σc Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 2
α Capital share of productivity 0.33
φ Capital adjustment cost 2
δ¯ Steady state capital depreciation 0.025
ρA Productivity shock persistence 0.7
ρδ Depreciation shock persistence 0.7
ρG Government spending shock persistence 0.75
θ Proportion of assets bankers can divert 0.8038
κ¯ Cost of issuing equity (limit) 10%
ξ Probability banker exiting (GK) 0.025
ζ Assets to new bankers (GK) 0.00017
Table 3.2: Model Parametrisations
3.4.2 Impulse Response Functions and Simulations
We compute expected impulse response functions to shocks to pro-
ductivity, government spending, capital depreciation and capital qual-
ity. The pruned perturbation allows closed-form expressions for the
covariance matrix to be calculated and so Monte-Carlo simulation
is not required to compute expected impulse response functions in
the absence of the bound. With occasionally binding constraints, it is
necessary to integrate out the expectations of the future news shocks.
Due to timing constraints, we do not integrate over future uncertainty
to produce the figures of impulse response functions used to analyse
the effects of investment and capital adjustment costs, and habits in
consumption. This implies a compromise of accuracy as the agents
behave as if they did not know the constraints existed until they
bind, and at the point at which they bind and the sequence of news
shocks required to impose the bound computed, they expect that no
change in the news shocks is possible. Impulse response functions
to a capital quality shock in the model with alternative households
preferences, investment adjustment costs and no habits are computed
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using an adaptive degree Gaussian cubature rule with maximum de-
gree 7 = 2K + 1 and O (SˆK) nodes. This integrates out the effects of
future shocks on the expected value of news shocks, but still misses
current uncertainty. This could be solved using Monte-Carlo simu-
lation although suffers from a significant increase in computational
times. As discussed in section 2, Sˆ ≤ S is found by trimming the
smallest eigenvalues of the covariance matrix from which we inte-
grate. In the same model, the impulse response functions to the pro-
ductivity shock are computed using a degree 3 monomial cubature
rule with 2Sˆ + 1 nodes. To perform analysis of simulated moments
of the model, we use a stochastic extended path type approach (see
Adjemian & Juillard 2013); every period we integrate over 16 periods
of future uncertainty to capture the effects of the risk of hitting the
constraints using a degree 3 monomial rule with 2Sˆ + 1 nodes.
3.4.2.1 Shocks to Bank Assets
Following Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010), we analyse the model dynamics
in response to adverse shocks to the bank balance sheet. Whilst these
authors draw focus on capital quality shocks, we extend our analysis
to consider a shock to capital depreciation. This has been highlighted
as a key source of economic fluctuations (see e.g. Liu et al. 2011)
and is comparable to the capital quality shock in the sense that it
adversely effects bank assets. Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010) argue that the
negative capital quality shock should not be considered physical de-
preciation of capital, but rather some form of economic obsolescence
and suggest a possible micro-foundation. The inclusion of a capital
depreciation shock gives a useful point of comparison.
Whilst related, the two shocks have important differences. The cap-
ital quality shock introduces uncertainty in the number of units of
productive capital that one unit of built capital will produce, whilst
the depreciation shock introduces uncertainty into the gross rate of
return on capital. This might seem a somewhat minor difference, but
this has significant effects in the response to shocks, particularly if
the depreciation shock is persistent and the capital quality shock is
not. Following a capital depreciation shock, the expected return to
capital falls over a number of periods leading to reduced demand for
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capital and fall in investment. In contrast, a negative quality shock is
a one-time reduction in the capital stock; this increases the marginal
return on capital and demand for investment.
The introduction of capital or investment adjustment costs also have
a significant effect. The quality shock generates a large increased de-
mand for investment to replace the lost capital. With capital adjust-
ment costs, it is costly to return the stock of capital to pre-shock levels
quickly, and so investment will be lower such that capital can rise suf-
ficiently slowly. Costs to adjusting the level of investment generate
the standard hump shaped investment. The depreciation shock leads
to the reverse phenomena; in the absence of adjustment costs, invest-
ment will fall due to the reduced return to capital, before eventually
rising above normal levels to replace the lost capital. With investment
adjustment costs, it is costly to reduce investment so the initial fall
in investment is much smaller, as is the eventual increase as capital
depreciation returns to normal. Capital adjustment costs can lead to
increased investment so to maintain the level of capital amidst higher
depreciation. Figure 3.5 shows the impulse response functions of out-
put and investment following the two shocks to compare different
choices of adjustment cost.
Let us now consider the role of the borrowing constraint. The finan-
cial constraint tightens when the expected marginal book value of
the bank MVt+1 increases above unity, and this occurs as banks issue
equity and κt increases. Households can lower the borrowing limit
without causing the financial constraint of the bank to bind, as the
bank can initially raise equity finance without cost by reducing divi-
dend payments. Under perfect foresight, once the dividend payments
are at zero, the financial constraint will bind as the bank raises fur-
ther equity finance. With uncertainty, the probability of the financial
constraint binding will increase as the borrowing limit falls, and so
the financial constraint begins to tighten whilst dividend payments
are still positive as dividend payments perform a function of relaxing
the borrowing constraint. Because of the signalling function of divi-
dends, the bank will still make payments as the financial constraint
tightens and the bank begins to issue equity. Once the bank is finan-
cially constrained, the marginal values of past dividend payments up
to the two year horizon become positive, with a significant effect on
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Figure 3.5: Real business cycle model impulse response functions to a neg-
ative capital quality shock (top) and a negative capital depreci-
ation shock (bottom). Investment and capital adjustment costs
with ψ = 2.
the value of the bank and the borrowing limit; the lower the past divi-
dend payments, the tighter the borrowing constraint. This is also true
for the interest rate; the lower the interest rate over the previous two
years, the tighter the constraint.
Consider that the households discount according to Λt,t+1, whilst eq-
uity is priced using Ξt,t+1. The latter augments the former with the
marginal value of bank finance implying that in the unconstrained
case, Λt,t+1 = Ξt,t+1, whilst Λt,t+1 < Ξt,t+1 when there is a positive
probability of financial constraints binding. The augmented stochas-
tic discount factor is asymmetric as Mt ≥ 1, and has higher volatil-
ity than the household stochastic discount factor; if the expected
marginal utility of future consumption increases relative to that of
current consumption, as would be expected following an adverse
shock, especially in the presence of habits in consumption of invest-
ment adjustment costs, then Λt,t+1 would increase. Because the ex-
pected value of Mt,t+1 is also likely to rise, Ξt,t+1 rises further still.
This introduces a hedging value of debt finance that increases as the
financial constraint tightens. Because of this, when a bank experiences
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a balance sheet shock that reduces the value of assets, such as a cap-
ital quality shock, the value of equity falls relative to debt and the
leverage of the bank will increase. This results in a further tightening
of the borrowing constraint. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show the same plots
as the previous two figures but also include the borrowing constraints
model and the GK model.
Figure 3.6: Impulse response functions to a negative capital quality shock
for the baseline, RBC and GK models. (i) Top panel, no adjust-
ment costs; (ii) middle panel, investment adjustment costs; and
(iii) bottom panel, capital adjustment costs.
The borrowing constraint can have a large effect when there is an
expansion in investment during a downturn. Output falls but invest-
ment increases and the financial constraint tightens. If investment
falls, because of falling financing needs, the constraint tightens by less.
It is certainly possible for the constraint to tighten with falling invest-
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Figure 3.7: Impulse response functions to a capital depreciation shock for
the baseline, RBC and GK models. (i) Top panel, no adjustment
costs; (ii) middle panel, investment adjustment costs; and (iii)
bottom panel, capital adjustment costs.
ment provided that the relative demand for debt finance increases
but the reduced demand for investment allows the bank to reduce
borrowing to bring down the leverage without having to issue eq-
uity. In the GK model, the bank is always financially constrained and
following the capital quality shock, the financial constraint tightens
causing a much larger decline in investment. Figure 3.6, particularly,
illustrates the reduced impact that treating more carefully the borrow-
ing constraint can have on the implied model dynamics.
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3.4.2.2 Habits in Consumption
The results indicate that with the King-Plosser-Rebelo preferences,
the financial constraint typically only binds enough to generate a di-
vergence between the two models when there is an increase invest-
ment, with or without the adjustment costs. Another friction that
might have an impact here are habits in consumption. A number
of authors (e.g. Cochrane & Campbell 1999) have discussed the im-
portance of habits in driving fluctuations in asset prices. Not only
do habits in consumption imply bigger fluctuations in the stochastic
discount factor for a given change in consumption, they also cause
the risk premium to increase as consumption falls adding further
volatility in asset prices. As can be seen in figure 3.8, habits can
Figure 3.8: Impulse response functions to a negative capital quality shock,
RBC and borrowing constraints models both with investment
adjustment costs. Comparing models with and without habits
in consumption.
make a significant difference to the impulse response functions to
the two shocks. This can be identified by analysing the interest rate
Rt = (Et [Λt,t+1])
−1, which experiences a much larger fluctuation. We
now find that investment and output fall further when in the pres-
ence of habits, but the relative impact of financial constraint remains
largely unchanged. With capital adjustment costs, we see a clear diver-
gence in the interest rate between the RBC and financial constraints
model, with habits enhancing this divergence. There is a similar re-
sponse following the capital quality shock; investment and output fall
much further in the models with habits than without. In the absence
of habits, investment nearly always increased following the capital
quality shock due to a rise in the marginal product of capital, and
with the bank seeking to replace the lost capital. The exception was
in the case of high capital adjustment costs which could lead to a fall
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in investment, whereas with habits in consumption, investment falls
regardless of the presence of investment or capital adjustment costs.
Following an adverse shock, the only way to fund increased invest-
ment is for households to substitute consumption for savings. When
habits in consumption are introduced, households demand a greater
share of the post-shock reduced output than without, driving a re-
duction in investment, and allowing co-movement in consumption
and investment. Whilst the initial analysis shows that the constraint
could only have an important effect during periods in which invest-
ment increases, figure 3.8 highlights that with habits in consumption,
there can be a tightening of financial constraints even as investment
is reduced. A spread between the rate paid on savings and the return
on capital emerges as the constraint binds, and together with the in-
creased risk premium, as seen in the plot of ∆t from the RBC model
with habits, leads to an even larger rise in the spread implied by the
borrowing constraints model.
3.4.2.3 Household Preferences without the Wealth Effect on Labour Supply
Further to habits, we consider another feature that can generate a
decline in investment following either a capital depreciation or cap-
ital quality shock, namely alternative household preference that can
control the short-run wealth effect on labour supply. Specifically, we
study the generalisation of the Greenwood–Hercowitz–Huffman util-
ity function proposed in Jaimovich & Rebelo (2009)18
Ut =
(
Ct − $Hζt Xt
)1−σc − 1
1− σc (3.4.1)
where Xt ≡ Cγt X1−γt−1 , σc > 0 is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitu-
tion as before, ζ > 1 sets the elasticity of labour supply, and 0 < γ ≤ 1
which ensures consistency with a balanced growth path. Setting γ
positive but close to zero will effectively switch off the wealth effect
on labour supply.
Impulse response functions to a capital quality shock are shown in
18 The Jaimovich-Rebelo preferences nest both the Greenwood–Hercowitz–Huffman
(when γ = 0) and King-Plosser-Rebelo (when when γ = 1) preferences. We focus on
the former in this section.
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figure 3.9. Leisure is a normal good, so a wealth effect implies an ad-
verse shock to household wealth would decrease demand for leisure
and increase labour supply. Turning this channel off introduces co-
movement in investment and consumption, similar to the introduc-
tion of habits and consequently improves empirical fit for business
cycle dynamics driven by capital quality shocks. We again find that
investment falls further during the periods in which the bank is fi-
nancially constrained leading to an increased interest spread. Plots of
a larger selection of variables are shown in this figure and so we take
the opportunity to say more on the response to the shock. If the shock
is sufficiently large enough for the dividends to hit the lower bound,
then the bank must issue equity to raise further funds. As equity is-
suance is costly, there is a drop in investment below the efficient level
and a rise in the interest spread. Note that dividend payments are
not necessarily expected to remain exactly at zero as there is likely
some positive signalling value in dividend payments due to the role
of relaxing the constraint; this role is also responsible for the shape
of the response. In the GK model, bank finance is always constrained
and the drop in the value of bank assets tightens the constraint fur-
ther. This leads to a large decline in investment and a rise in the
spread. The effective dividend rate is fixed as the constant probabil-
ity of banker exit.
A further comment should be made on the non-monotonicity of the
baseline borrowing constraints model. We have focused on large ad-
verse shocks to the bank balance sheet able to cause the constraint
to bind. For smaller shocks, or for shocks with the opposite sign, the
impulse response functions of the borrowing constraints model map
to those of the RBC model; financial intermediation is efficient and, at
least at the limit as ι→ 0, the two models are equivalent. The same is
broadly true of typical total factor productivity or government spend-
ing shocks. As a negative productivity shock decreases the continu-
ation value of the bank, or the value of future profits, the constraint
tightens. As there is also a decline in the value of bank assets, which
acts in the opposite direction, a large shock is required to cause the
borrowing constraint to bind. Similarly, a very large adverse shock
to aggregate demand is required to cause the financial constraints to
tighten. Figures 3.10 and 3.11 show the impulse response functions
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to a positive and negative productivity shock respectively. Firstly, one
can notice that the RBC and GK models have virtually symmetric im-
pulse responses and, even though it is a large shock, the response of
output and investment are close to symmetric. Following the decline
in productivity, investment falls about 0.5% further than it does in
the RBC model and the interest spread increases significantly. The dy-
namics in the spread are clearly asymmetric. The impulse response
functions to a negative government consumption shock share these
features.
3.4.2.4 Simulated Moments
Table 3.3 reports simulated moments and cross correlations for the
three models together with those computed from the data. The mo-
ments are predominately for qualitative comparison and the simula-
tions use the capital quality shock as the main driver of economic
fluctuations, with a transitory productivity shock introducing some
lower frequency volatility. The models are without investment or cap-
ital adjustment costs, or habits in consumption, and use Jaimovich-
Rebelo preferences to get pro-cyclical investment. The occasionally
binding constraints model introduces significant skewness in the in-
terest spread missing from the GK and RBC models. This leads to
skewness of output and investment of the correct sign, contrary to
the comparison models, although of negligible size. The skewness of
equity issuance is strongly positive, as found in the data, as too is
that for dividend payments. All models predict the correct cyclical-
ity of the interest spread, and the borrowing constraints model also
predicts counter-cyclical equity issuance supported by the data.19
19 Contrary to the Gertler et al. (2012) model which predicts a pro-cyclical equity is-
suance as both debt and equity financing constraints tighten together.
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Figure 3.9: Impulse response functions to a negative capital quality shock
in baseline borrowing constraints, RBC and GK models without
adjustment costs or habits. Integration in borrowing constraints
model with adaptive degree Gaussian cubature rule.
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Figure 3.10: Impulse response functions to a positive productivity shock in
baseline borrowing constraints, RBC and GK models without
adjustment costs or habits. Integration in borrowing constraints
model with adaptive degree Gaussian cubature rule.
Figure 3.11: Impulse response functions to a negative productivity shock in
baseline borrowing constraints, RBC and GK models without
adjustment costs or habits. Integration in borrowing constraints
model with adaptive degree Gaussian cubature rule.
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Correlation with Y Standard deviation Skewness
Data OBFC RBC GK Data OBFC RBC GK Data OBFC RBC GK
Y 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -0.141 -0.004 0.010 0.023
I 0.869 0.996 0.995 0.972 4.181 1.16 1.13 1.52 -0.676 -0.051 0.020 -0.043
C 0.871 0.999 0.999 0.993 0.914 1.30 1.31 1.18 -0.320 0.013 0.002 0.036
D -0.455 0.091 – – 0.091 0.481 – 0 0.609 2.17 – –
E -0.086 -0.311 – – 4.47 0.022 – – 2.67 4.84 – –
spread -0.411 -0.305 -0.192 -0.733 0.181 0.155 ≈ 0 0.464 1.640 2.34 0.097 0.313
Table 3.3: Comparison of output correlation, and second and third moments in selected 1986Q1-2015Q4 U.S. time-series with the baseline model and
two benchmarks: the real business cycle model and Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010). σA = 0.0005, σψ = 0.005. D and E are rates. Standard deviation
of Y, I and C in relative to that of Y, D, E and spread in percentage point level deviation. Data is HP filtered to remove trend.
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3.5 monetary policy
We now examine the implications of the proposed borrowing con-
straint on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. To give
monetary policy an effect on real outcomes, we introduce a retail
sector comprising firms that act under monopolistic competition, pur-
chase intermediate output from the existing firms, and produce differ-
entiated final goods. We assume the price rigidity proposed in Calvo
(1983) so that, every period, the retail firms face a fixed probability
of being able to reset prices. We let PI,t be the price level in the in-
termediate good sector, and Pt be the price index of the final goods
used in consumption and investment. The market power stems from
the household preference function for final goods; it is assumed that
households combine the differentiated goods into a bundle using
Ct =
(∫ 1
0
Ct(j)
σ−1
σ dj
) σ
σ−1
(3.5.1)
where σ denotes the elasticity of substitution between the different
varieties. The household purchases good Ct(j) from retailer j ∈ (0, 1)
at price Pt to maximise (3.5.1) subject to total expenditure PtCt =∫ 1
0 Pt(j)Ct(j)dj, with an equivalent problem for investment demand
It. This leads to Dixit & Stiglitz (1977) demand schedules
Ct (j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−σ
Ct (3.5.2)
It (j∗) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−σ
It. (3.5.3)
Summing these demand schedules implies a total demand for good j
given by
Yt (j) =
(
PPt (j)
PPt
)−σ
Yt (3.5.4)
Every period, each firm faces a fixed probability 1− ξ that they will
be able to update their prices. Denoting the optimal price at time t
for good j as P∗t (j), the firms allowed to re-optimize prices maximise
expected discounted profits by solving
max
P∗t (j)
Et
∞
∑
k=0
ξk
Λt,t+k
Pt+k
Yt+k (j) [P∗t (j)− Pw,t+k] . (3.5.5)
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Substituting in the demand schedule, taking first-order conditions
with respect to the new price and rearranging leads to
P∗t =
σ
σ− 1
Et ∑∞k=0 ξ
k Λt,t+k
Pt+k
(Pt+k)
σ Yt+kPw,t+k
Et ∑∞k=0 ξk
Λt,t+k
Pt+k
(Pt+k)
σ Yt+k
(3.5.6)
where the j index is dropped as all firms face the same marginal cost,
so the right-hand side of the equation is independent of firm size or
price history. We denote the real marginal cost as MCt =
Pw,t
Pt , and the
price inflation over the interval [t− 1, t] as Πt−1,t ≡ PtPt−1 , we write the
real optimal price
P∗t
Pt
=
σ
σ− 1
Et ∑∞k=0 ξ
kΛt,t+k (Πt,t+k)
σ Yt+k MCt+k
Et ∑∞k=0 ξkΛt,t+k (Πt,t+k)
σ−1 Yt+k
(3.5.7)
Denoting the numerator and denominator Ω1,t and Ω2,t we can write
these in recursive form
Ω1,t ≡ σ
σ− 1Yt MCt + ξEt
[
Λt,t+1 (Πt,t+1)
σΩ1,t+1
]
(3.5.8)
Ω2,t ≡ Yt +Et
[
ξΛt,t+1 (Πt,t+1)
σ−1 Ω2,t+1
]
. (3.5.9)
Using the aggregate producer price index Pt and the fact that all reset-
ting firms will choose the same price, by the Law of Large Numbers
we can find the evolution of the price index as given by
Pt1−σ = ξPt−11−σ + (1− ξ)Pt1−σ (3.5.10)
which can be written in the form required
1 = ξ (Πt−1,t)σ−1 + (1− ξ)
(
P∗t
Pt
)1−σ
(3.5.11)
where Πt−1,t is the gross inflation in the price of domestically pro-
duced goods between periods [t − 1, t]. Whilst the distribution of
prices is not required to track the evolution of the aggregate price
index, equation 3.5.1 implies a loss of output due to dispersion in
prices. Using the demand schedules, we can write the price disper-
sion that gives the average loss in output as
St =
1
J
J
∑
j−1
(
Pt (j)
Pt
)−σ
(3.5.12)
for non-optimizing firms j = 1, ..., J. It is not possible to track all Pt(j)
but it is known that a proportion 1− ξ of firms will optimise prices in
86 occasionally binding financial constraints and monetary policy
period t, and from the Law of Large Numbers, that the distribution
of non-optimised prices will be the same as in the overall distribution.
Therefore price dispersion can be written as a law of motion
St = ξΠσt−1,tSt−1 + (1− ξ)
(
Ω1,t
Ω2,t
)−σ
. (3.5.13)
Using this, aggregate final output is given as a proportion of the in-
termediate output
Yt = Yw,t
1
St
. (3.5.14)
To determine the path for prices, we introduce a monetary policy
with an inflation target which we assume is credible, such that the
private sector believe the economy will return to the inflation level
in the long-run. The monetary authority sets a nominal policy rate
using the rule
Rpt =
[
R¯P
(
Πt−1,t
Π∗
)ηpi (Yt
Y¯
)ηy]1−ηr (
Rpt−1
)ηr
exp(εM,t), (3.5.15)
where εM,t ∼ N (0, σM) is a monetary policy shock. The central bank
sets the nominal deposit rate paid by banks, Rpt = Rt. For parametri-
sation of the New-Keynesian part of the model, we follow Smets &
Wouters (2007) setting the Calvo parameter to ξ = 0.65, and the inter-
est rate rule parameters ηr = 0.81, ηy = 0.22, and ηpi = 2.04.
Examining the impulse response functions to monetary policy shocks
indicates that the accelerator mechanism implied by the agency prob-
lem is not present except for very large increases in the policy rate.
Impulse response functions of output, investment and the interest
spread to positive and negative monetary policy shocks of 100 basis
points are shown in figures 3.12 and 3.13 respectively. For a shock
even as large as this in the region of the ergodic mean, the responses
are close to symmetrical, but the constraint has just started to bind
with the interest rate increase. For any size cut, the response of the
borrowing constraints and NK model will be the same, but for a
larger rate increase, the financial constraint will lead to a deeper de-
cline in investment. This is shown in figure 3.14.
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Figure 3.12: Impulse response functions to a positive monetary policy shock
of 100 basis points in baseline borrowing constraints model
with nominal rigidities and the NK model without adjustment
costs or habits.
Figure 3.13: Impulse response functions to a negative monetary policy shock
of 100 basis points in baseline borrowing constraints model
with nominal rigidities and the NK model without adjustment
costs or habits.
3.6 conclusion
This paper embeds a banking model into a standard real business cy-
cle model which, unlike standard models of financial frictions such as
Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010), clearly distinguishes between normal and
crisis times. In the vicinity of the deterministic steady state, the model
is analogous to a real business cycle model, financial intermediation
is efficient and the interest rate spread is equal to the standard risk
premium. Crises are precipitated by sufficiently large shocks that ad-
versely effect the present discounted value of future bank profits; this
causes the borrowing constraint to bind as the bank has increased
incentive to divert funds and declare bankruptcy. When debt finance
is constrained, banks can issue equity but, as this is costly, a wedge
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Figure 3.14: Impulse response functions to a positive monetary policy shock
of 300 basis points in baseline borrowing constraints model
with nominal rigidities and the NK model without adjustment
costs or habits.
emerges between the risk-free rate and the risky return to capital
beyond the risk premium. This results in reduced investment and
output.
The main finding of the chapter was that the agency problem pro-
posed in Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010)20 does not seem to produce the
much heralded financial accelerator mechanism once a number of
key assumptions are relaxed. When the borrowing constraint is only
occasionally binding, and if the banks can choose the optimal level of
dividend payments, the business cycle dynamics become equivalent
to those of the efficient RBC case around the steady state. Allowing
the banks to issue equity, even if very costly at a 10% transactional fee,
also limits the adverse effects of severe disaster shocks. We have shown
that this finding is robust to the choice of investment and capital ad-
justment costs, habits in consumption, and household preferences.
The second contribution is a far more careful treatment of the agency
problem proposed by Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010). By modelling the
U.S. law relating to bankruptcy, we give dividend payments a poten-
tially important signalling role in acting to relax the borrowing con-
straint. This leads to a time variability of the borrowing constraint,
dividend payments, and the interest rate spread that would other-
wise get missed.
Despite finding a reduced importance of the agency problem on busi-
ness cycle dynamics, relaxing the GK assumptions introduced some
20 And subsequently a large number of papers embedding the framework.
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improvements in the empirical fit of some variables. Notably, we cap-
ture the strong positive skewness in the interest spread and equity is-
suance that are missing in the standard RBC and GK models. We also
replicate the counter-cyclical equity issuance observed in the data,
contrary to other papers, such as Gertler et al. (2012), which predict
pro-cyclical equity issuance.
Finally, with regards to the effects of the agency problem on the trans-
mission mechanism of monetary policy, for small shocks in the region
of the steady state, the transmission is unaffected by the presence of
the agency problem. However, the effects are asymmetric and non-
monotonic, and for very large unexpected rate increases, greater than
100 basis points under the model parametrisation, the financial con-
straints begin to bind and investment declines further than in the
financially efficient NK model. The indication is that during financial
crises, monetary policy will feature a financial accelerator mechanism,
but will not during normal economic periods.
4
A D V E R S E S E L E C T I O N A N D T H E E F F I C I E N C Y
W E D G E
In this chapter we show that asymmetric information in credit mar-
kets can lead to adverse selection that manifests as an investment
wedge between the risky return to capital and the risk-free rate, and an
efficiency wedge due to the inefficient allocation of capital. Whilst Chari
et al. (2007) have shown that the efficiency wedge has historically
played a crucial role in driving economic fluctuations, and the invest-
ment wedge a much smaller role, the latter has dominated recent re-
search into the macroeconomic effects of financial frictions. This chap-
ter seeks to rectify this issue with a credit friction arising from produc-
tive projects with privately observed risk profiles. A stylized model
with risky and safe projects is proposed and calibrated to match a
number of metrics from the U.S. firm and credit data, and macroe-
conomic time series. We find that large enough shocks can generate
sharp spikes in the efficiency wedge that drive endogenous financial
crises. These produce negative skewness in output and investment
that help match empirical third moments. The optimal contract is al-
ways separating when risky and safe projects have equal expected
value, but pooling can emerge when the relative expected value of
risky projects declines sufficiently. Finally, we show that adverse se-
lection does not have large effects on the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy around the ergodic mean, but larger negative mone-
tary policy shocks can generate significant non-linear effects.
4.1 introduction
This chapter proposes a model of financial frictions that can map to
both an efficiency wedge caused by the inefficient allocation of pro-
ductive resources, and an investment wedge between the return on
capital and the risk-free rate. Mapping to the former is important be-
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cause although researchers typically focus on financial frictions that
emerge as the latter, the empirical evidence suggests the efficiency
wedge plays a more important role in driving economic fluctuations
(see Chari et al. 2007). The financial friction in this chapter is caused
by an information problem; lenders seeking funds to finance a pro-
ductive project observe private information about the project risk. We
show how this feature can lead to an adverse selection problem that
can introduce both an investment wedge due to information rents,
and an efficiency wedge caused by the misallocation of capital. The
efficiency wedge drives episodes where falls in investments are signif-
icantly deepened, which we describe as financial crises. These intro-
duce negative skewness in simulated time series that match observed
macroeconomic data.
The chapter builds on a large literature examining the role of credit
frictions in generating and propagating business cycle fluctuations,
discussed in the introduction to this thesis. Many models of finan-
cial frictions can be characterised by a wedge between the risky re-
turn on capital and the risk-free rate. For instance, in Bernanke et al.
(1999), the wedge is caused by the external finance premium that de-
pends on the leverage of the borrower; and in models such as that
of Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010) (and the model proposed in chapter 3),
the spread between the rates depends on the net worth of the bank
due to limited contract enforceability. In both these cases, because the
wedge widens when asset prices are depressed, and shrinks when
asset prices increase, a financial accelerator is introduced that is used
to explain how financial factors can aggravate business cycles and en-
hance the transmission of monetary policy. As Chari et al. (2007) have
shown, the drawback of this type of approach to financial frictions is
that the empirical support is relatively weak. The authors show how
different types of frictions can be mapped to one of four wedges; an
efficiency wedge that appears like time-varying productivity, an in-
vestment wedge equivalent to a tax on capital, a labour wedge equiv-
alent to a labour tax, and a government consumption wedge. Using a
prototype economy with the four wedges, Chari et al. (2007) estimate
the relative importance of each of the wedges using U.S. business cy-
cle episodes of the Great Depression, the 1982 recession, and over the
entire post-war period. They find that efficiency and labour wedges
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play very important roles in generating the business cycle, the invest-
ment wedge a small role and government consumption almost none.
These findings provide strong support for a set-up such as that pre-
sented in this chapter as the financial friction emerges as an efficiency
wedge as well as an an investment wedge.
The model proposed in this chapter builds on a literature examining
optimal financial contracts with hidden information. The literature
began with the seminal contribution on asymmetric information in
Akerlof (1970), and the specific credit friction is closely related to that
discussed in Stiglitz & Weiss (1981). Much of research in this area has
been focused on the optimal financial contract in a partial equilibrium
context (e.g. Clementi & Hopenhayn 2006, Martin 2009), whereas
this literature attempts to bridge this to the macroeconomic literature
that has typically focused more on the costly-state verification model
rather than hidden information (cf. Bernanke et al. 1999, Christiano,
Motto & Rostagno 2010).
To analyse the macroeconomic effects of the credit friction, we pro-
pose a model of occupational choice in which entrepreneurs seek ex-
ternal finance to fund a project. Each period, entrepreneurs privately
draw either a risky or safe project, where the project type is inde-
pendent and identically distributed across time and entrepreneurs.
The lenders know the aggregate state of the economy, including the
proportion of risky and safe entrepreneurs, and propose incentive
compatible one period contracts. To model the problem in a sim-
ple, tractable way, we treat the economy as comprised of a contin-
uum of households, each with a large number of members. Every
period, a family head allocates households members to act as either
entrepreneurs, workers or remain unemployed. Each project drawn
by entrepreneurs requires a fixed level of funding comprised of both
internal and external finance so to ensure interior solutions to the
occupational allocation and project finance problems. These assump-
tions allow the treatment of the economy in a representative agent
framework, with its computational benefits, whilst allowing the pres-
ence of a credit friction between lender and borrower. It also allows
for limited project funding as when the value of the entrepreneur,
or rather the value of equity, is greater than the value of lending,
the household head will increase the household members to act as
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entrepreneurs. In equilibrium, this can lead to a lending feasibility
constraint whereby not all entrepreneurs seeking funds will be able
to secure them.
In section 4.2, we discuss the contract in a partial equilibrium econ-
omy to gain insight into the contract structure and possible outcomes.
We highlight firstly that the contract optimal to the lender can be
modelled as a static one-period contract. Both separating and pool-
ing equilibriums are available depending on the distribution of risk
and expected values of safe and risky projects. Within a large range
of parameter values, the central outcome produces a separating equi-
librium with full funding for risky borrowers, except when funding
is limited and either the value of risky projects is sufficiently less than
the value of safe projects, or risky projects are particularly risky. With
either of these characteristics, the lender will choose a pooling equilib-
rium to reduce the information rents paid to risky borrowers. Under
a separating equilibrium, the optimal contract is first-best for a range
of parameters if the expected value of risky projects is weakly greater
than safe projects unless: the expected return to risky projects is very
high; risky projects are particularly risky; or risky projects particu-
larly plentiful. Under these conditions, the information rents increase
to the point where the lender restricts credit to safe borrowers so to
reduce the information rents received by risky borrowers. If funding
is limited due to a feasibility constraint that implies some borrowers
seeking funds will be unable to secure loans, the safe borrowers will
never be fully funded.
In the general equilibrium model, we focus on shocks to aggregate
total factor productivity, the productivity of risky projects which al-
low differing values of safe and risky projects, and shocks to the risk
of risky projects. For the last, to isolate the role of risk, the produc-
tivity is also adjusted to keep the project values equal. As a point
of comparison, we solve the first-best economy which is equivalent
to a standard real business cycle model. The adverse selection prob-
lem introduces significant non-linearities. The specific impact of the
non-linearities differ for each type of shock but the general effects
can be discussed in the context of the outcomes implied by the con-
tract. Shocks that increase the information surplus received by risky
borrowers will cause the marginal value of safe loans to fall; if this
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reaches zero, the lender will begin to restrict credit to safe projects.
As the lender leaves capital unallocated despite profitable opportuni-
ties, an efficiency wedge is introduced. This generates sharp declines
in output, investment and employment that could well be described
as a financial crisis. Shocks that reduce the relative value of risky
projects cause falls in the marginal value of risky lending which, if
large enough, leads to the lender choosing a pooling equilibrium so
to increase lending to more profitable safe projects.
The adverse selection problem introduces significant non-linearities.
The specific impact of the non-linearities differ for each type of shock
but the general effects can be discussed in the context of various
thresholds introduced by the contract. Shocks can cause the marginal
value of lending to safe borrowers to fall usually by increasing the
information surplus received by risky borrowers, when this reaches
zero, the lender will restrict credit to safe projects introducing an
efficiency wedge as the lender sits on capital that could be lent to
profitable borrowers. On the other hand, shocks can cause large falls
in the marginal value of risky lending, usually by reducing the rela-
tive value of risky projects. If the fall is large enough, the lender will
choose a pooling equilibrium.
Full analysis is given in section 4.5 although we highlight several
key results here. Shocks to total factor productivity within a typical
range have little effect on aggregate output although imply higher
volatility in investment relative to the first-best economy. This occurs
because of fluctuations in information rents that lead to higher volatil-
ity in the value of equity relative to the value of debt. This generates
higher volatility in the number of entrepreneurs, which causes greater
fluctuations in the returns to investment. Shocks to the risk of risky
projects can manifest as both investment and efficiency wedges, the
former coming from increased information rents. The higher infor-
mation surplus increases the value of equity relative to debt causing
the marginal value of safe loans to decline. If the shock is sufficiently
large, a 2 percentage point fall in the probability of project success
under the calibrations, then the lender begins to ration credit to safe
borrowers. As capital is left unallocated, an efficiency wedge emerges
that produces much larger drops in output, investment and employ-
ment, and leads to negative skews in the simulated time series of
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these variables. The third shock we discuss effects the value of risky
projects; we refer to these as efficiency shocks due to the effect on
the efficiency wedge. For large enough positive shocks to the value of
risky projects, a 1.5% increase from steady state under model calibra-
tions, there are sharp adverse effects. Whilst the first-best economy
exhibits the expected positive effects from higher productivity, with
adverse selection, past this threshold, the lender begins to restrict
lending to safe projects in order to receive additional surplus from
risky projects. This, again, causes the efficiency wedge to emerge. The
impact on output on investment is much less marked following neg-
ative shocks to the value of risky projects, although if the shocks are
large enough negative, a 5% fall under calibrations, the lender will
choose a pooling equilibrium so to increase funding to higher value
safe projects. We find that whilst there is an increase in the efficiency
wedge following a negative efficiency shock, there is an offsetting fall
in the spread.
We begin the analysis with a derivation and discussion of the optimal
contract in a partial equilibrium setting. This allows an insight into
the impact of the asymmetric problem over a range of values of risk
and distribution of risk. In section 4.3, we propose a stylized general
equilibrium model with adverse selection. This is followed with a
discussion of the numerical strategy employed before analysing the
results.
4.2 asymmetric information in partial equilibrium
To characterise the adverse selection problem, we first consider the
friction in a partial equilibrium model. There are a large number of
borrowers and a single lender, each borrower has investment projects
that arrive exogenously each period with a type θ ∈ {s, r} repre-
senting safe and risky respectively. The projects yield return X (θ) ∈
{R (θ) , 0} where p (θ) ∈ (0, 1] is the probability of return R (θ). Each
project requires a single unit of investment. The lender only has funds
for a proportion γ of borrowers, where we assume max{λ, 1− λ} <
γ ≤ 1. Denoting variables of type θ with superscripts, we make the
following assumptions:
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Assumption 5. ps > pr and Rs < Rr
This defines the concept of risky and safe; the safe project has a higher
probability of success but yields lower returns when it is successful.
Assumption 6. The bank cannot observe the risk-type of the project but
whether the project is successful is public knowledge.
The first point, following Stiglitz & Weiss (1981, 1992), is the borrower
heterogeneity at the heart of the credit friction and we make the
second to simplify the contract. A number of papers focus on this
dimension of information asymmetry without heterogeneity in risk,
whereas this chapter draws on the importance of risk. If the lender
cannot observe the success of the project then there cannot be short-
term contracts as the borrower will always declare a bad state. We
are considering contracts without full commitment and as we find
that the optimal contract is equivalent to a sequence of one-period
contracts, we rule this possibility out.
Borrowers must source external finance to fund the project and we al-
low lender and borrower to agree a contract over the provision of
finance, where the optimal contract C will specify financing prob-
abilities x and transfers to the the lender τ. Following Prescott &
Townsend (1984)1, the lottery x is used to allow the lender to offer
incentive compatible contracts to all borrowers. Consider a single pe-
riod contract C (x, τ); the ex ante value of the contract to the borrower
is given by
V = λxs ps (Rs − τs) + (1− λ) xr pr (Rr − τr) (4.2.1)
and the total value of the project is
W = λxs (psRs − 1) + (1− λ) xr (prRr − 1) (4.2.2)
The lender proposes a contract C (x, τ) to maximise (W −V).
4.2.1 First-Best
As a point of comparison to quantify the inefficiency introduced by
asymmetric information, we solve the optimal contract under full in-
1 See also Besanko & Thakor (1987).
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formation. The contract is solved subject to individual rationality con-
straints
R (θ)− τ (θ) ≥ 0 (4.2.3)
which means there must be a weakly positive surplus to the borrower.
We can verify that the individual rationality (IR) constraint will bind,
and the resulting solution implies that any projects with positive net
present value will receive funding whilst those with negative value
will not. Whichever project has the highest value will receive funding
with probability one and the other type will receive any remaining
funds. As all borrowers will earn their reservation value and so are
indifferent about receiving funding, there is no restriction of credit
even with γ < 1.
4.2.2 Optimal Contract with Asymmetric Information
We assume that all projects require equal funding, and as borrower
type is i.i.d. across time and space, the contact optimal to the lender
will revert to an optimal static contract. In section 4.2.3 we look at a
long-term case, and whilst there is a socially optimal long-term con-
tract that produces a pooling equilibrium, it is not optimal to the
lender who will only offer one-period terms for funding. The prob-
lem of the lender is to post contract offers that maximise their value
subject to the incentive compatibility (IC) and individual rationality
constraints.2 The two IR constraints are the same as in the first-best
economy as shown in equation (4.2.3), and the incentive compatibility
constraints are given by
xi pi
(
Ri − τi
)
≥ xj pi
(
Ri − τ j
)
, i = r, s (4.2.4)
That is, the value to each borrower of declaring their type truthfully
must be weakly greater than lying. As is standard in these mechanism
design problems, the problem can be simplified by dropping two con-
straints; the IR constraint of the risky type and the IC constraint of
2 We assume a two-stage game following, for example, Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976)
and Wilson (1977), whereby lenders post contract offers that borrowers can choose to
accept. There are some consequences of the choice of assumptions; choosing a three-
stage game, for instance, could lead to pooling or separating equilibria depending
on the starting agent. A discussion of these issues is given in Hellwig (1987).
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the safe type. This is straightforward to show: the IC constraint of the
risky type is given as
xr pr (Rr − τr) ≥ xs pr (Rr − τs) > xs pr (Rs − τs) ≥ 0 (4.2.5)
where the relationship between the second and third argument fol-
lows from Rr > Rs, and the last because of the safe IR constraint. It
follows that Rr > τr and so the safe IR constraint must be the relevant
one, indeed, we find this constraint will be always binding. It follows
that the risky IC constraint is the relevant one, and again is found to
be binding. It follows that the repayment terms can be written
τs = Rs (4.2.6)
τr = Rr − x
s
xr
(Rr − Rs) . (4.2.7)
The safe IC constraint which, using Rs = τs, becomes 0 ≥ xr ps (Rs − τr),
implies τr ≥ Rs which from the binding risky IC constraint, implies
xr ≥ xs. Using this restriction and substituting in the expressions for
τs and τr, the problem3 is written
max
xs,xr
{λxs (psRs − 1) + (1− λ) xr (prRr − 1)− (1− λ) prxs (Rr − Rs)}
s.t. 0 ≤ xs ≤ xr ≤ 1
λxs + (1− λ) xr ≤ γ
(4.2.8)
leading to
(λps + (1− λ) pr) Rs − 1 = $+ ϕr − ϕs (4.2.9)
prRr − 1 = $+ 1
1− λ ϕ
r − 1
1− λψ (4.2.10)
where $ is the Lagrange multiplier on the overall finance limit, ϕs and
ϕr are lower bound on xs and the upper bound on xr respectively, and
3 Following the problem proposed in that presented in Bolton & Dewatripont (2005,
pp.59-60).
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ψ is the Lagrange multiplier on (xr − xs). These first order conditions
are also subject to Kuhn-Tucker conditions
ϕs ≥ 0
ϕr ≥ 0
$ ≥ 0
ψ ≥ 0
ϕsxs = 0
ϕr (1− xr) = 0
ψ (xr − xs) = 0
$ (γ− λxs − (1− λ) xr) = 0.
(4.2.11)
Using these it is possible to identify four clear outcomes from the two
first order conditions. These are (i) for the lender to lend to all risky
borrowers and remaining funds to the safe borrowers; (ii) the lender
to lend to all risky borrowers but no safe borrowers; (iii) the lender to
lend to an equal proportion of risky and safe borrowers; and (iv) to
extend no credit at all. The last only occurs if both
1 > (λps + (1− λ) pr) Rs (4.2.12)
1 > prRr. (4.2.13)
The second condition is that the net present value of risky projects is
negative, and the implication from the first condition and given that
pr < ps by definition, is that it is possible that positive net present
value safe projects will not receive funding at any price. Whilst it
is possible for all positive value safe projects to go unfunded, and
certainly no negative value safe project will ever be funded, it turns
out that negative net present value risky projects can get financing
provided that the surplus from safe projects is sufficiently high. This
occurs when
(λps + (1− λ) pr) Rs > 1 (4.2.14)
in which case, the lender finances each project type with equal proba-
bility γ, and the surplus from the safe projects subsides for the risky
projects. The equal financing will occur providing (4.2.14) holds and if
prRr < (λps + (1− λ) pr) Rs. Once prRr > (λps + (1− λ) pr) Rs, the
lender will finance risky projects with probability 1, with any remain-
ing funds going to safe projects which are financed with probability
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(γ− 1+ λ) 1λ unless the expected return to risky projects is particu-
larly high. In this case, it is in the interest of the lender to cease fund-
ing safe projects; this allows the lender to receive all surplus from the
risky projects and occurs when
(λps + (1− λ) pr) Rs < λ+ (1− λ) prRr. (4.2.15)
It is clear that the higher (lower) the proportion of risky projects, the
more (less) likely the safe projects will be excluded from the credit
market.
Further to the four outcomes given, if the conditions hold with equal-
ity there opens additional possible outcomes. If (λps + (1− λ) pr) Rs =
prRr then the only binding constraint is the feasibility constraint; all
funds will be lent. The lender and borrowers are indifferent as the
inverse relationship between τr and xr implies the expected distri-
bution of surplus is unchanged. When (λps + (1− λ) pr) Rs = λ +
(1− λ) prRr, the lender is indifferent about whether to finance safe
projects or not; as the safe borrowers receive no surplus anyway, they
are already indifferent. In partial equilibrium, the conditions are in-
sufficient to determine the outcomes; this will not usually be the case
in general equilibrium.
4.2.2.1 Misallocation of Funds
Let the safe project be perfectly safe, so ps = 1, and let the risk level of
risky projects and expected return of safe projects be fixed at pr < 1
and Rs respectively. If we evaluate the contract for different values of
Rr we can assess the inefficiency of the misallocation of funds intro-
duced by the information problem. Figure 4.1 shows the value of the
project for a range of values of Rr in the presence of asymmetric infor-
mation with the green line, compared to the first-best with the blue
line. The key thresholds highlighted represent those discussed above,
and are Rr = A =
(
1− λ
(
1− 1pr
))
Rs, B = Rs + (Rs − 1) 1pr λ1−λ , and
C = Rs 1pr . The value of the project with the first-best solution has a
kink at C at which point the projects have equal expected value. In
the region to the left of C, the lender finances the higher return safe
projects with probability one, with remaining funds financing risky
projects. The reverse occurs to the right of C where risky projects
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Figure 4.1: Value of project with asymmetric information W and the first-
best W∗ for a range of Rr.
have higher expected return. Pooling occurs to the left of threshold A
as the contract with asymmetric information offers exactly the same
terms to safe and risky projects; a probability γ of being financed and
repayment τ = Rs. With the information problem, it is not possible
for the lender to go better by increasing finance to safe projects as the
risky contract would no longer be incentive compatible. This pooling
can occur even if prRr < 1 provided the surplus from safe projects is
sufficiently high to subsidise losses from the risky projects, otherwise
the lender will cease all lending even if psRs > 1. To the right of A is
a separating equilibrium with all risky projects receiving finance with
the use of remaining funds dependant on Rr. Between A and B, the
lender uses the remaining [γ− 1+ λ] 1λ funds to finance safe projects,
and to the right of B the lender stops financing safe projects altogether.
This occurs because the expected return from risky projects is espe-
cially high and the information surplus received by risky borrowers
is greater than the surplus generated by safe projects; it is therefore
optimal to stop funding safe projects and set the repayment on risky
loans τr = Rr.
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The area between the thresholds C and B represents a state space
where the asymmetric information yields no inefficiency as the over-
all surplus is equal to the first-best case. The difference between the
first and second best is distributional; risky borrowers are able to earn
rents due to their informational advantage. To the left of C, risky bor-
rowers get an inefficient share of finance that generates the wedge
between W and W∗. Note that this wedge disappears in the case that
γ = 1 and W = W∗ in this area. To the right of threshold B, lenders
cease funding safe projects altogether, and so a large inefficiency is
introduced in this region under asymmetric information.
In the region to the left of C, the inefficiencies generated are an al-
location problem; the lender will use all available funds to finance
projects, but lower return projects are more likely to receive fund-
ing. If the restriction on the number of projects funded is removed
with γ = 1, all projects will be financed and the outcome will be
efficient. We can also consider the importance of λ and pr on the out-
look. With a lower value of pr corresponding to riskier risky projects,
all the thresholds will shift right due to a decreased expected value
of risky projects. As one might assume that the economy will tend
to be in an area where the expected return from each project is close
to equal, it is of interest to think of how the relative distances be-
tween the thresholds change given a change in the risk-level and the
associated changes in expected value. For a right-shift in C of size
∆ generated by a fall in pr4, threshold A would move by λ∆ and B
by
(
1− 1Rs
)
λ
1−λ∆. The shift in A is certainly less than the shift in C
indicating that pooling equilibrium would become relatively less im-
portant if the economy tends to be in the region of C. The shift in B
depends on the share of safe and risky projects, and the return on safe
projects. B will move away from C if λ > 1/
(
2− 1Rs
)
, that is, if both
the return and share of safe projects are sufficiently high. Consider
that if 90% of projects were safe, it would still require an expected
return of 12.5% for this to occur, otherwise B would converge on C as
the risk increased. Indeed, B would equal C, implying safe projects
would be restricted from credit when the expected value of safe and
risky projects were equal, if the share or riskiness of risky projects
were high enough. This would occur when pr = 1 − (1− 1Rs ) λ1−λ .
4 Incidentally, this would correspond to a shift in pr of −
√
Rs
∆ .
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We discuss this role of risk below but these results suggest that under
reasonable parametrisations, as the risk of risky projects increases, the
efficient region shrinks, the importance of pooling becomes less, and
extreme separation whereby safe projects cannot receive any funding
becomes more important.
4.2.2.2 Equal Expected Value and the Role of Risk
To think about the role of risk, we are interested in the case where R¯
remains constant but pr changes; an increase in risk would be associ-
ated with a fall in pr. The first order conditions become
λ (R¯− 1)− (1− λ) (R¯− prRs)− $λ+ ϕs − ψ = 0 (4.2.16)
(1− λ) (R¯− 1)− $t (1− λ)− ϕr + ψ = 0 (4.2.17)
Again using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we can examine the possi-
ble cases which become somewhat simpler. First, we find that pro-
vided R¯ > 1, the risky projects get finance with probability one and
so the pooling equilibrium disappears. This had occurred when the
surplus from higher value safe projects subsidised for low value, or
even negative value, risky projects. If it is assumed that R¯ > 1 we
find all risky projects will get funded with probability one , otherwise
no projects receive funding. Whether or not the remaining funds are
used to finance safe projects or are un-utilised depends on the same
condition as before. If pr < ps
(
1− λ1−λ
(
1− 1R¯
))
then the lender will
restrict credit to safe projects entirely, otherwise they will use the
remaining (γ− 1+ λ) 1λ of funds to finance the safe projects. From
this condition, it is clear that the probability of this event increases in
the share of risky projects (1− λ). With expected value equal across
projects, the higher the risk of the risky projects, the higher the in-
formation rents implied by the contract. At the threshold given, it is
optimal for the lender to restrict financing safe in order to receive this
surplus.
If safe projects are perfectly safe, so ps = 1, using the solution to the
optimal contract, the ex ante value of equity is given by
V = (1− λ) xsR¯ (1− pr) (4.2.18)
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and the ex ante value of the whole project
W = (xsλ+ xr (1− λ)) (R¯− 1) . (4.2.19)
Whilst the rate of return is unchanged, the overall expected value of
the project will fall if the probability of finance falls. The information
surplus to the risky borrower increases in risk, leading to an increase
in the value of equity. As mentioned, when this surplus is sufficiently
large, the lender finds it optimal to restrict lending to safe borrowers
entirely in order to receive the surplus from risky projects. It follows
from the condition above when ps = 1, that the probability of financ-
ing safe projects is determined by
λ (R¯− 1)− (1− λ) R¯ (1− pr) (4.2.20)
where if positive, the safe projects will receive funding, but not if
negative. Figure 4.2 shows the value of equity and the entire project
Figure 4.2: Overall value W and value promised to the borrower V by the
optimal static contract for range of risk.
for a range of risk values. The surplus to the lender is represented by
the green area above V and below W. This surplus falls linearly in pr
until the threshold given by
pr∗ = 1− λ
1− λ
(
1− 1
R¯
)
(4.2.21)
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at which point, credit to safe borrowers is restricted entirely. The sur-
plus to the borrowers reaches a peak of (γ− 1+ λ)W∗, and drops
to zero as the lenders receive all surplus. The level of W drops to a
fraction 1− λ of the first-best level when safe borrowers are excluded
and is the only inefficient region when the expected value of projects
are equal.
4.2.3 Long-term Contracts
It was stated above that the best the lender can expect is for static
one-period contracts; a long-term contract is derived here and shown
to offer higher expected social value but at the expense of lender
value. The one-period contract implied a static trade-off across states,
whilst with a long-term contract it is possible to specify a dynamic
trade-off between the current pay-off and the future value of equity.
Rather than having to restrict the proportion of safe projects invested
in today, the restriction can be made in the future, once the risk type
has been reset. Denoting borrower type θ ∈ {s, r}, the contract C
implies an expected discounted value of future cash flows V (θt, C)
and is solved subject to an initial participation constraint, a sequence
of incentive compatibility constraints, and a sequence of limited li-
ability constraints that replace the individual rationality constraints.
Letting θˆ∗ = {θˆt}∞t=1 and θ∗ = {θt}∞t=1 be the reporting strategy and
sequence of types respectively. The contract will be incentive compat-
ible if V (θ∗, C) ≥ V (θˆ∗, C) ∀θˆ and feasible provided
τt (θ) ≤ pt (θ) Rt (θ) , ∀t. (4.2.22)
V can very well be defined as the value of equity, and letting this
value be subject to project continuation, is given by
Vt = λpst (R
s
t − τst ) + (1− λ) prt (Rrt − τrt )
+ λβVˆst+1 + (1− λ) βVˆrt+1 (4.2.23)
where Vˆst+1 and Vˆ
r
t+1 are the future value of equity in reporting safe
and risky types respectively. These values must be positive, otherwise
a negative future cash-flow is implied that violates the limited liabil-
ity constraints. As before, the only incentive compatibility constraint
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required is that which leads to risky borrower truth-telling, and the
relevant limited liability constraint is that of the safe borrower. These
are written
τst ≤ Rst (4.2.24)
and
τrt ≤ Rst + β [Vrt+1 −Vst+1]
1
prt
(4.2.25)
Rather than specify a probability of finance for the current period, the
contract now sets a future probability of project liquidation. By the
time that liquidation occurs, it is too late for the borrower to match to
a new lender that period. We can denote the liquidation value with Q
and the value to the lender with S. These values are exogenous to the
contract, and whilst we assume that it is too late for the borrower to
seek new funding, it turns out that whether it is too late for the lender
to re-allocate funds does not effect the results. The period following
liquidation, borrowers can secure new funding with probability zt.
If e are the proportion of borrowers currently engaged on projects,
then a proportion [λxst + (1− λ) xrt ] et of all borrowers will continue.
Therefore, the feasibility constraint for funds becomes
γ ≥ [λxst + (1− λ) xrt ] et−1 + zt (1− et−1) (4.2.26)
The proportion of active borrowers evolves according to
et = [λxst + (1− λ) xrt ] et−1 + zt (1− et−1) . (4.2.27)
As this is external to the contract, we leave this and revisit once the
optimal contract has been solved.
As was shown in Atkeson & Lucas (1992), there is a recursive repre-
sentation for this type of contracting problem with private informa-
tion. Indeed, as the project requires only a fixed unit funding, so there
is no evolution of wealth, apart from possible stochastic variations in
returns that would lead to variations in pay-offs, the case is simpler
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still. The optimal contract problem the lender seeks to solve can then
be written
U (V) = max
τr ,τs,Vˆs,Vˆr
λ (psτs − 1) + (1− λ) (prτr − 1)+β [λUˆ (Vˆs)+ (1− λ) Uˆ (Vˆr)]
 (4.2.28)
s.t. V = λps (Rs − τs) + (1− λ) pr (Rr − τr)
+ β
[
λVˆs + (1− λ) Vˆr] (4.2.29)
τst ≤ Rs (4.2.30)
τr ≤ Rs + β [Vˆr − Vˆs] 1
pr
(4.2.31)
λpsτs + (1− λ) prτr ≥ 1 (4.2.32)
Where U is the value subject to continuation and Wˆ prior to liquida-
tion. The value of equity V is the only relevant state variable, with
equation (4.2.23) a constraint to the problem. To prevent negative
lender cash-flows, the last condition is a lender limited liability con-
straint. The lender then sets the probability of liquidation by solving
Uˆ (V) = λmax
V′,xs
Uˆ
(
Vˆs
)
+ (1− λ)max
V′,xr
Uˆ
(
Vˆr
)
(4.2.33)
s.t. Uˆ
(
Vˆ (θ)
)
= x (θ)U (V) + (1− x (θ)) S (4.2.34)
Vˆ (θ) = x (θ)V ′ + (1− x (θ))Q′ (4.2.35)
0 ≤ xs, xr ≤ 1 (4.2.36)
γ ≥ [λxs + (1− λ) xr] e + z (1− e) (4.2.37)
The optimal contract implies that the incentive compatibility and lim-
ited liability constraints bind determining repayment schedule τ (θ),
and if we focus on the stationary equilibrium, the conditions deter-
mining liquidation probability xr and xs are
U
(
V ′
)− S′ + (1+ µ) (V ′ −Q′) = $− ϕs + ϕr (4.2.38)
0 = ψ− (1− λ) ϕs − ϕr (4.2.39)
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier on the new limited liability con-
straint. By evaluating these conditions subject to the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions as before, concentrating initially on the case in which the
lender yields weakly positive returns so µ = 0, we find that provid-
ing U (V ′) +V ′ > S′ + Q′, so that continuation is more valuable than
liquidation, the only important constraint is the feasibility constraint
(4.2.37) as $ > 0. This condition will only be violated in the presence
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of negative expected returns, or with particularly high outside op-
tions, in which case ϕs,ψ > 0 and all projects will be liquidated with
probability 1. If we focus on states of the world where the condition
is satisfied, then this will lead to a pooling equilibrium as the propor-
tion of borrowers funded in the first period e = γ, then xr = xs = 1
and no projects will be liquidated, and τs = τr = Rs. To choose the
probability of funding new projects, z, the lender solves
U¯ (e) = max
e′,z
{
eU + βU¯ (e′)
}
(4.2.40)
subject to the evolution
e′ = [λxs + (1− λ) xr] e + z (1− e) (4.2.41)
and condition (4.2.37). Again, provided βU > 0, so projects are prof-
itable, the feasibility constraint will bind. It follows that if γ were
to increase, the lender would agree contracts with new borrowers
to ensure all funds are used. If γ falls, then the lender is indiffer-
ent about which projects to liquidate; if safe projects were liquidated,
then the lender would lose surplus on safe loans, but could receive off-
setting increased returns from risky projects in exchange for lower liq-
uidation probabilities, likewise, if the lender liquidated risky projects,
then they would need to subsidise losses incurred by reducing repay-
ments from these projects using safe project surplus.
Whilst pooling will occur for a large range of pr, ps or λ, a separating
equilibrium emerges when risk or the share of risky projects is too
high. Specifically, if pr, ps or λ fall low enough to violate the condition
(λps + (1− λ) pr) ≥ 1
Rs
(4.2.42)
then the lender would receive negative profits. The limited liability
constraint will bind and we find that safe projects face a positive prob-
ability of liquidation so to increase repayments by the risky borrowers
above Rs. In such states of the world, the liquidation probability of
safe projects is given by
xs = 1− 1− (λp
s + (1− λ) pr) Rs
(1− λ) β (V ′ −Q′) . (4.2.43)
By substituting into the expression for V the returns specified by the
optimal contract, treating the outside option Q = βV, and consid-
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ering the stationary equilibrium in which V ′ = V, the value of the
borrower cash-flows is given by
V =
(1− λ) pr (Rr − Rs)
1− β (xs + (1− xs) β) (4.2.44)
Using this and (4.2.43), we can give the relationship between the liq-
uidation, risk, return, and project shares as
xs = 1− 1
β
1− (λps + (1− λ) pr) Rs
(1− λ) (1− λ) pr (Rr − Rs)− 1+ (λps + (1− λ) pr) Rs
(4.2.45)
The solution to the problem in (4.2.40) implies that the lender will
maximise funding new projects if profitable, and from the evolution
of e, we can find a further threshold; once λ (1− xs) rises above 1γ −
1, the number of projects liquidated is greater than the number of
un-funded borrowers. In this circumstance, the total proportion of
funded projects falls from the maximum of γ to
e =
1
1− λ (1− xs) (4.2.46)
The total surplus falls until xs = 0 so that all safe projects are liqui-
dated with probability one, and the lender receives all information
rents from the risky borrowers.
4.2.3.1 Equal Expected Value Projects
To compare to the static contracts we can analyse graphical repre-
sentation of the lender, borrower and social values and, as before, set
ps = 1 so Rs = prRr = R¯. When the expected returns are equal, unless
risky projects are very risky, the social value is equal to that under the
first-best solution as all funds are allocated, and there can be no misal-
location between projects. However, in this region, the risk does have
distributional effects. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of surplus for
a range of risky project riskiness. The plot shows the static contract
results from figure 4.1. Whilst a high risk led to an extreme separat-
ing equilibrium and a large drop in efficiency, the long-run contract
is socially optimal up to point B. At point pr(A) =
( 1
R¯ − λ
)
/ (1− λ),
to avoid negative cash-flows to the lender, safe projects begin to get
liquidated to reduce the risky borrower’s information rents. The prob-
ability of liquidation increases up to threshold B when xs = 1− 1−γγ 1λ
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Figure 4.3: Overall value W and value promised to the borrower V by the op-
timal long-term contract for range of risk. The upper boundary
represents total social value, the blue area represents the surplus
to the borrowers, and the green area the surplus to the lender.
The green and blue lines represent the social value and borrower
value with static contracts.
when the proportion of projects getting credit falls from the maxi-
mum of γ as the number of liquidations exceeds the possible new
projects. This continues to fall to point C when all safe projects are
liquidated. This occurs at
pr(C) =
(1+ β) (1− λRs)
β (1− λ) (1− λ) Rr + (1+ βλ) (1− λ) Rs (4.2.47)
Finally, we can recall from the static case that pr∗ = 1− λ1−λ
(
1− 1R¯
)
,
then it follows that pr∗ = A + 1− 1R which implies pr∗ > A∀λ, pr. In
the static contract, the expected social value of the contract for pr <
pr∗ is given by WS = (1− λ) (R− 1), whilst in the long-term contract,
for pr < pr (C), it is given by WL = 11−λ (R− 1) so WL > WS and the
social welfare is always higher under long-term contracts than one-
period contracts for any value of λ and pr5. It is not possible to say
that the static contract is preferred by the lender for all distributions
of pr but we can make the following observations: for pr > pr∗, we
5 The value here is a per-period value for comparison.
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can measure the marginal value of risk in the two contracts for per-
period borrower cash-flows as
∂VS
∂ (−pr) =
1− λ
λ
(γ− 1+ λ) R, ∀pr ≤ pr∗ (4.2.48)
∂VL
∂ (−pr) = γ (1− λ) R, ∀p
r ≤ pr ∗ −1+ 1
R
(4.2.49)
noting we have transformed our definition of risk to −pr for conve-
nience. This implies that the marginal value of risk to the borrowers
in the long-term contract is always greater than that in the static con-
tract providing γ < 1, else they are equal6. There will be a threshold
between points B and C above which the long-term contract is strictly
preferred to the static contract by the lender providing our assump-
tion that γ > 1− λ holds. This occurs when the long-term contract
specifies
xs <
(R− 1) (γ− 1+ λ)
(1− λ) (1− pr) (4.2.50)
Evaluating equation (4.2.45) at this threshold will yield a quadratic
expression that determines the value of pr at which this occurs.
4.2.3.2 Misallocation of Funds in the Long-term Contract
If we relax our assumption that the projects have equal expected
value, then we can repeat the exercise above and compare the value
yielded by the contract for a range of Rr. The condition (4.2.42) that
determines whether there is a pooling equilibrium is independent of
Rr, and so finding that pooling occurs under most parametrisation,
figure 4.4 adds the per-period value of the long-term contract to fig-
ure 4.1. As the contract implies an equal funding of both types of
project, WL represented by the red dashed line is linear in Rr with
no kink. At point C, all projects have equal expected value, and with
all funds used, the value of all contracts is equal. Whilst under the
static contract, with Rr > C the more profitable risky projects are
all funded, under the long-term contract, pooling implies a misallo-
cation of funds as less profitable safe projects have equal chance of
funding. Of course with A < Rr < C, the long-term contract im-
plies less misallocation of funds than the static contract which funds
6 This compares static and long-term cases by using the ex ante expected per-period
value of the contract rather than the value conditional on being under a contract.
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Figure 4.4: Per-period value of project with asymmetric information implied
by static contract WS, long-term contract WL, and the first-best
W∗ for a range of Rr.
all less-profitable risky projects. The long-term contract does prevent
funds not being used that occurs for Rr > B under the static contract.
Whether the long-term or static contract is socially optimal depends
on the distribution of Rr.
4.3 adverse selection in general equilibrium
To analyse the theoretical macroeconomic implications of adverse se-
lection in credit markets, the contract problem is embedded in a
general equilibrium framework. To rationalise γ < 1, we want to
think about occupational selection and the value of acting as an en-
trepreneur seeking funds relative to other occupations. To achieve
this in a simple, tractable way, we model the economy as comprised
of a continuum of households each with a large number of house-
hold members.7 This also allows the agency problem to be framed
appropriately, by assuming that the entrepreneur must seek external
7 See Christiano, Trabandt & Walentin (2010) as an example of this assumption, in this
case to model the allocation of family members to employment.
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funds from other households. This is equivalent to the island assump-
tion of Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010) and chapter 3. It is assumed that a
family head chooses occupational allocation to maximise a utilitarian
welfare function that equally weights the utility of all members. Sup-
pose that every period household members can be assigned to three
possible roles: entrepreneurs that draw projects and seek funds; work-
ers that receive a wage for providing a unit of work; and unemployed
that do neither. As in Christiano, Trabandt & Walentin (2010), the util-
itarian welfare function implies that all family members receive the
same level of consumption. We follow the standard timings by assum-
ing that investment decisions are made at the end of the period and
employment decisions once shocks are drawn. To find well behaved
interior solutions to the occupational allocation, we want the expected
marginal value of the share of entrepreneurs, and the marginal util-
ity of worker share to be negative. The latter gives motivation for
including unemployed household members in the model, but the for-
mer needs some further restrictions. As in the partial equilibrium
model, we assume that each project requires the same quantity of
capital input; this is a necessary assumption to capture the assump-
tion γ > max{λ, 1− λ}, key to the results in partial equilibrium. We
could alternatively model decreasing returns to scale in projects but
choose a simpler method able to capture the mechanisms we wish
to study. Because there are many households, the probability of re-
ceiving finance will be external to the occupational allocation, and so
to capture the negative marginal value of entrepreneur share, we as-
sume that a project requires both internal and external capital inputs.
This might seem ad-hoc, but we can calibrate the share of external fi-
nance to match the empirical share, and it avoids a potentially much
more complicated agency problem to explain the financial structure
of projects. We proceed to give detailed explanation of the model.
4.3.1 Households
With population size normalized to 1, the household head chooses
the number of entrepreneurs et at the end of the period, and the num-
ber of workers 1− et−1 − ut, and unemployed ut at the start of the
new period. The workers provide one unit of labour and, if funded,
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entrepreneurial activity also uses up a unit of labour. As in Christiano,
Trabandt & Walentin (2010), we assume that household members dif-
fer in their dis-utility of labour, and so household j ∈ [0, 1] receives
the utility
log Ct − χ1− j , χ > 0 (4.3.1)
if assigned as a worker or entrepreneur, and
log Ct (4.3.2)
if unemployed. Utilitarian preferences convex in consumption imply
all household members receive equal consumption. The total num-
ber of workers and funded entrepreneurs is given by 1− ut, and so
it follows that those members with 0 ≤ j ≤ 1− ut will be assigned
as workers or entrepreneurs, and those with j > 1 − ut as unem-
ployed. Of those entrepreneurs, following the contract design above,
only a proportion λxst + (1− λ) xrt will receive external finance for
their project and so the total labour supply by the household is given
by Ht ≡
(
1− [1− (λxst−1 + (1− λ) xrt−1)] et−1 − ut). Using this defi-
nition and equations (4.3.1) and (4.3.2), we can write the total house-
hold utility
Ut = log Ct + χ log (1− Ht) (4.3.3)
where the right hand term results from integrating household mem-
ber utility over j ∈ [0, 1].8
Each project requires e units of internal finance and so if the total
capital owned by the household is Kt, the amount available to invest
in external projects is given by Kt − eet. At the end of the period,
the family head on each island simultaneously chooses consumption
and next period capital stock, posts a contract offer for entrepreneurs
on other islands, and chooses the number of households to assign
to the entrepreneur role for the following period. The contract will
8 There is an implicit assumption here that the household head can switch fund-
ing from entrepreneurs with the highest dis-utility of labour to those with
the lowest. In fact, because et−1, xst−1 and x
r
t−1 are known at the end of
period t − 1, and Ht is not chosen until period t shocks are drawn, the(
λxst−1 + (1− λ) xrt−1
)
et−1 household members with the lowest dis-utility of labour
and the
[
1− (λxst−1 + (1− λ) xrt−1)] et−1 with highest will be assigned as en-
trepreneurs.
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be discussed below, but the household head chooses et and ut, and
consumption and saving to maximise
max
Ct+s,Kt+s,et+s,ut+s
Et
∞
∑
s=0
βt+sU(Ct+s, et+s, ut+s) (4.3.4)
Subject to the budget constraint
Ct + Kt = Rt (Kt−1 − eet−1) +Wt (1− et−1 − ut) + pitet−1
where pit are average dividends from each project, Wt the wages paid
in a perfect labour market, and Rt the expost return across lending to
outside profits. The consumption savings decision is characterized by
1 = Et [Λt,t+1Rt+1] (4.3.5)
where Λt,t+1 = β CtCt+1 , and labour supply by
χ
Ct
1− Ht = Wt. (4.3.6)
The occupation allocation decision leads to a further condition
Et [Λt,t+1 (pit+1 −Wt+1 (λxst + (1− λ) xrt))− e] = 0, (4.3.7)
which equates the expected discounted profit from an additional en-
trepreneur with the opportunity cost which sums the expected wel-
fare gain from the additional leisure and the expected discounted
value of an additional e units of funds.
4.3.2 Entrepreneurs
A measure et of entrepreneurs draw investment projects of type i =
s, r yielding efficiency units of productive capital Xit ∈ {ωi, 0}. pit ∈
[0, 1] is the probability of efficiency units Xit = ω
i
t. The two types
i = s, r represent safe and risky projects respectively. A proportion
λ of the projects are safe, the remaining 1− λ are risky, and as be-
fore ωst < ω
r
t and p
s
t > p
r
t . Each project requires κ units of outside
investment which must be financed by another island and e units of
internal finance. The number κ+ e will be a normalisation device for
the units of capital to introduce the idea of one indivisible unit of cap-
ital used in each project, and we will calibrate the ratio κ/e to match
the empirical first moment.
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Entrepreneur i with a successful, funded project hires hit units of
labour and produces output using
yit = At
(
ωit (κ + e)
)α (
hit
)1−α
(4.3.8)
where At is a stationary stochastic process. The entrepreneur will hire
workers so that the marginal product of labour equals the real wage,
Wt = (1− α) y
i
t
hit
(4.3.9)
Capital depreciates at δ, so the gross surplus equals
αyit + (1− δ) (κ + e)ωit (4.3.10)
of which the entrepreneur must repay the lender τi. There are two
types of entrepreneur; risky and safe, but a single labour market.
Equation (4.3.9) implies that the efficiency capital-labour ratio must
be equal across firms, and so the risky firms will hire more labour
than safe firms.
Let Rit be the gross rate of return on capital for project i. To simplify
the problem, we assume that the safe projects always convert one unit
of capital input to a single unit of productive capital, so ωs = 1, and
so imply a rate of return Rst with probability p
s
t = 1, whilst risky
projects convert one unit of capital into ωrt leading to a rate of return
Rrt with probability p
r
t . Recall that the efficiency capital-labour ratio
is the same across projects; denoting this Kt, we can write
αyit = αω
i
t (κ + e) AtKα−1t (4.3.11)
Therefore, if the safe projects yield gross rate of return
Rst = αAtKα−1t + (1− δ) (4.3.12)
the risky project will yield
Rrt = ω
r
t R
s
t (4.3.13)
when successful. At the end of each period, remaining surplus is paid
to the family as a dividend.
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4.3.2.1 Optimal Contract
We have shown that the contract optimal to the lender can be char-
acterised as a static, one period debt contract. We assume that debt
repayments are indexed to the aggregate state of the economy, and
are only repaid providing the project is successful. We further as-
sume that the success of the project is public information. Modified
from above, the individual rationality and incentive compatibility
constraints are given by
Et
[
Λt,t+1τit+1
]
≤ Et
[
Λt,t+1Rit+1
]
(4.3.14)
Et
[
Λt,t+1
(
xit p
i
t+1
(
Rit+1 − τit+1
)
≥ xjt pit+1
(
Rit+1 − τ jt+1
))]
, j 6= i
(4.3.15)
for i, j ∈ {s, r}. As the contract problem is analogous to the partial
equilibrium problem described above, we jump straight to the first
order conditions
Et
[
Λt,t+1
(
prt+1R
r
k,t+1 − 1
)]
= $t − ψt 11− λ + ϕ
r
t
1
1− λ (4.3.16)
Et
[
Λt,t+1
(
(λ+ (1− λ) prt+1) Rsk,t+1 − 1
)]
= $t + ϕ
r
t − ϕst
(4.3.17)
that imply the same four possible outcomes as in partial equilib-
rium. The key difference to the partial equilibrium framework re-
lates to outcomes on the defined threshold as the constraints bind.
The partial equilibrium model implies a step function; for instance,
(λps + (1− λ) pr) Rs > λ + (1− λ) prRr but if a change to pr leads
to (λps + (1− λ) pr) Rs < λ + (1− λ) prRr, then the contract will
imply a sudden stop in funding safe projects. What happens when
(λps + (1− λ) pr) Rs = λ+(1− λ) prRr is undetermined; at this point,
the lender is indifferent about xs ∈ [0, (γ− 1+ λ) 1λ ], and the safe
borrowers are indifferent anyway as they receive no surplus. In gen-
eral equilibrium, the level of investment and number of entrepreneurs
can be adjusted depending on finance probabilities and expected prof-
its so rather than jumping, the model is likely to remain at the thresh-
old as other variables adjust. Taking the same example, suppose
Et [Λt,t+1 (λ+ (1− λ) prt+1) Rst+1]
= Et [Λt,t+1 (λ+ (1− λ) prt+1Rrt+1)] (4.3.18)
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and that the risky projects have a strictly positive net present value.
In this case by examining the first order conditions we can find
λϕrt + (1− λ) ϕst > ψt (4.3.19)
$t (1− λ) + ϕrt > ψt (4.3.20)
λ$t + ψt = ϕ
s
t (4.3.21)
Using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, it then follows that ϕrt > 0 and
ϕst = $t = ψt = 0. The first condition indicates that x
r
t = 1, but the
second that the contract does not specify a value for xst . This will be
determined by the general equilibrium conditions and discussed in
further detail below.
Summing the return on inside finance e and the surplus received by
entrepreneurs set by the debt contract yields the total profits from
entrepreneurial activity
pit = (1− λ) prt xst−1 (Rrt − Rst) κ
+ (λpst x
s
t−1R
s
t + (1− λ) prt xrt−1Rrt) e (4.3.22)
If a household does not lend funds, then the capital will not depreci-
ate and the gross return will equal 1. Total rate of return on capital
used as debt finance is given by
Rt = 1+ λ
xst−1
γt−1
(τst − 1) + (1− λ)
xrt−1
γt−1
(prtτ
r
t − 1) . (4.3.23)
4.3.3 Aggregations
Each project requires κ units of debt finance and e units of internal
finance. Furthermore, every entrepreneur has the internal finance ir-
respective of whether they receive debt finance. Capital is either allo-
cated to external debt finance or internal equity finance and if there
are et entrepreneurs per island, Kt units of capital in aggregate, and
an efficient matching process, we have
γt = (Kt − ete) 1etκ (4.3.24)
which is the maximum proportion of entrepreneurs that can get debt
finance. Total labour supplied will equal that demanded, so
(λxst h
s
t + (1− λ) xrt prt hrt) et−1 = 1− et−1 − ut (4.3.25)
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At each firm, labour demand is a linear function of local capital pro-
ductivity
hit = ω
i
t (κ + e)
(
At
1− α
Wt
)1/α
(4.3.26)
and using this and letting
hˆt ≡ 1− et−1 − ut (4.3.27)
kˆt ≡ (λxst + (1− λ) xrt prtωrt ) (κ + e) et−1, (4.3.28)
the labour market clearing condition can be written
Wt = (1− α) At
(
kˆt
hˆt
)α
(4.3.29)
Likewise, total output
Yt = At kˆαt hˆ
1−α
t (4.3.30)
Finally, we close the model with an aggregate resource constraint
Yt = Ct + It (4.3.31)
where investment is the difference between the new capital stock
Kt, and the sum of the depreciated returned capital, and the un-
depreciated, unused capital
It = Kt + δ (λxst−1 + (1− λ) xrt−1) (e+ κ) et−1 − Kt−1 (4.3.32)
4.3.4 First-Best Economy
As a point of comparison we use the same model with the informa-
tion asymmetry removed. As in the partial equilibrium model, the
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first-best contract sets τrt = τ
s
t = R
s
t , with first order and Kuhn-Tucker
conditions
λEt [Λt,t+1 (pst+1R
s
t+1 − 1)] + ϕst − ϕ
s
t − λ$t = 0 (4.3.33)
(1− λ)Et [Λt,t+1 (prt+1Rrt+1 − 1)] + ϕrt − ϕ
r
t − (1− λ) $t = 0
(4.3.34)
ϕrxrt = 0 (4.3.35)
ϕsxst = 0 (4.3.36)
ϕr (1− xrt) = 0 (4.3.37)
ϕs (1− xst) = 0 (4.3.38)
$t (γ− λxs − (1− λ) xr) = 0 (4.3.39)
1 ≥ xs, xr (4.3.40)
xs, xr ≥ 0 (4.3.41)
γ ≥ λxs + (1− λ) xr (4.3.42)
ϕr ≥ 0 (4.3.43)
ϕs ≥ 0 (4.3.44)
ϕr ≥ 0 (4.3.45)
ϕs ≥ 0 (4.3.46)
$t ≥ 0 (4.3.47)
These conditions also imply that ϕr
t
ϕrt = ϕ
s
t
ϕst = ϕ
r
t
$t = ϕst$t = 0. As
in partial equilibrium, if the expected discounted return from both
projects are positive then $t > 0 and all funds will be used. The
project with the highest net present value will then be funded with
probability 1, with all funds used to finance the lower value projects.
Under the first-best contract, the expected return on equity and debt
are equal, and given that both are state contingent, the realised return
is also equal. Given the general equilibrium set-up, debt is always
preferred to equity as the latter requires the contribution of an en-
trepreneur so the opportunity cost is greater. One could solve this by
making the debt-equity finance decision endogenous with an agency
problem, taxes, or some other feature. To keep things simple, we as-
sume in the first-best economy, the households are forced to provide
e units of equity finance for every κ units of debt finance. This implies
that γt = 1∀t and so xst = xrt = 1 providing the expected project value
is positive.
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4.3.5 Efficiency and Investment Wedges
The credit friction emerges both as a wedge between the saving rate
and the return to capital, and as an inefficient allocation of the factors
of production. Chari et al. (2007) describe the first as the investment
wedge and the second the efficiency wedge. To measure the invest-
ment wedge, we take the spread between the saving rate Rt and the
return to capital in safe projects in the model with adverse selection
and the benchmark first-best economy. We then take the ratio which
removes the spread component coming from possible differences in
the expected value of projects. In steady state, the investment wedge
is given by
λxs∗ + (1− λ) xr∗prωr
λxs + (1− λ) (xs (1−ωr) + xrωr) pr
γ∗
γ
(4.3.48)
where an asterisk indicates a first-best9. The model with adverse se-
lection has an additional term (1− λ) xs (1−ωr) pr < 0 in the de-
nominator, which given our assumption that ωr > 1, implies a larger
spread even with the same finance probabilities. Considering first the
model with equal expected value of projects we show the investment
wedge in figure 4.5 for a range of values of pr for four different val-
ues of λ. The spread falls in pr as risky projects become safe and
the average information rents fall. The spread increases in the risky
project share, represented by a lower λ, as the total information rents
increase.
The efficiency wedge emerges due to the misallocation of the factors
of production. Total steady state output is given by
Y =
(
hˆ
kˆ
)1−α
kˆ (4.3.49)
The capital-labour ratio differs from that in the first-best economy
due to the investment wedge; a higher return from capital implies
a lower capital-labour ratio. To measure the efficiency wedge then,
we draw focus on kˆ which is the efficiency units of capital used in
9 As discussed below, in the adverse selection model, we choose κ to target an em-
pirical debt-to-equity ratio; e to match an empirical worker-to-firm ratio; and pr to
target a steady state value of γ. in the benchmark model for this comparison, we are
just fixing γ and pr, so the comparison just relates the the credit friction itself.
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Figure 4.5: Steady state investment wedge against pr for a range of values
of λ.
production. In the first-best economy, the lender finances the higher
value projects with probability 1, with remaining funds financing the
less productive projects. Weighting kˆ by the value kˆ∗ that emerges
from this, will give a measure of the efficiency wedge. This is written
λxs∗ + (1− λ) xr∗prωr
λxs + (1− λ) xr prωr (4.3.50)
Note that we have ignored the ratio ee∗ and so this is the ratio of
the efficiency units of capital per firm in the adverse selection and
first-best models. This allows us to concentrate solely on the mis-
allocation issue arising from the information problem. Allowing the
expected value of projects to differ, can generate the efficiency wedge;
this is shown in figure 4.6 for λ fixed at 70%. The efficiency wedge is
bound below at 1, as the measure is normalised by the first-best econ-
omy which features the same composition of project values but uses
resources efficiently. A further increase in the efficiency wedge can
occur if the return to risky projects were high enough, as the lender
would stop lending to safe projects all together.
One interesting result highlighted by the figures is the marginal inef-
ficiency of project risk, which is the inverse of the slope of the plots.
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Figure 4.6: Steady state efficiency wedge against pr for a range of values of
the relative expected value of the risky project, given by R
r
Rs =
ωr pr, with λ fixed at 70%.
4.3.6 Monetary Policy
As part of the analysis, the impact of the adverse selection problem on
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is analysed. For this,
we introduce a retail sector comprising firms that act under monop-
olistic competition, purchase what is now intermediate output from
the existing firms, and produce differentiated final goods. We assume
the price rigidity proposed in Calvo (1983) so that every period the
retail firms face a fixed probability of being able to reset prices. The
existing model will be adjusted to account for the importance of the
price level; as this is a trivial procedure, we leave the amended ex-
pressions for appendix A.2. We let PI,t be the price level in the in-
termediate good sector, and Pt be the price index of the final goods
used in consumption and investment. The market power stems from
the household preference function for final goods; it is assumed that
households combine the differentiated goods into a bundle using
Ct =
(∫ 1
0
Ct(j)
σ−1
σ dj
) σ
σ−1
(4.3.51)
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where σ denotes the elasticity of substitution between the different
varieties. The household purchases good Ct(j) from retailer j ∈ (0, 1)
at price Pt to maximise (4.3.51) subject to total expenditure PtCt =∫ 1
0 Pt(j)Ct(j)dj, with an equivalent problem for investment demand
It. This leads to Dixit & Stiglitz (1977) demand schedules
Ct (j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−σ
Ct (4.3.52)
It (j∗) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−σ
It. (4.3.53)
Summing these demand schedules implies a total demand for good j
given by
Yt (j) =
(
PPt (j)
PPt
)−σ
Yt (4.3.54)
Every period, each firm faces a fixed probability 1− ξ that they will
be able to update their prices. Denoting the optimal price at time t
for good j as P∗t (j), the firms allowed to re-optimize prices maximise
expected discounted profits by solving
max
P∗t (j)
Et
∞
∑
k=0
ξk
Λt,t+k
Pt+k
Yt+k (j) [P∗t (j)− Pw,t+k] . (4.3.55)
Substituting in the demand schedule, taking first-order conditions
with respect the new price and rearranging leads to
P∗t =
σ
σ− 1
Et ∑∞k=0 ξ
k Λt,t+k
Pt+k
(Pt+k)
σ Yt+kPw,t+k
Et ∑∞k=0 ξk
Λt,t+k
Pt+k
(Pt+k)
σ Yt+k
(4.3.56)
where the j index is dropped as all firms face the same marginal cost,
so the right-hand side of the equation is independent of firm size or
price history. We denote the real marginal cost as MCt =
Pw,t
Pt , and the
price inflation over the interval [t− 1, t] as Πt−1,t ≡ PtPt−1 , we write the
real optimal price
P∗t
Pt
=
σ
σ− 1
Et ∑∞k=0 ξ
kΛt,t+k (Πt,t+k)
σ Yt+k MCt+k
Et ∑∞k=0 ξkΛt,t+k (Πt,t+k)
σ−1 Yt+k
(4.3.57)
Denoting the numerator and denominator Ω1,t and Ω2,t we can write
these in recursive form
Ω1,t ≡ σ
σ− 1Yt MCt + ξEt
[
Λt,t+1 (Πt,t+1)
σΩ1,t+1
]
(4.3.58)
Ω2,t ≡ Yt +Et
[
ξΛt,t+1 (Πt,t+1)
σ−1 Ω2,t+1
]
. (4.3.59)
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Using the aggregate producer price index Pt and the fact that all reset-
ting firms will choose the same price, by the Law of Large Numbers
we can find the evolution of the price index as given by
Pt1−σ = ξPt−11−σ + (1− ξ)Pt1−σ (4.3.60)
which can be written in the form required
1 = ξ (Πt−1,t)σ−1 + (1− ξ)
(
P∗t
Pt
)1−σ
(4.3.61)
where Πt−1,t is the gross inflation in the price of domestically pro-
duced goods between periods [t − 1, t]. Whilst the distribution of
prices is not required to track the evolution of the aggregate price
index, equation 4.3.51 implies a loss of output due to dispersion in
prices. Using the demand schedules, we can write the price disper-
sion that gives the average loss in output as
St =
1
J
J
∑
j−1
(
Pt (j)
Pt
)−σ
(4.3.62)
for non-optimizing firms j = 1, ..., J. It is not possible to track all Pt(j)
but it is known that a proportion 1− ξ of firms will optimise prices in
period t, and from the Law of Large Numbers, that the distribution
of non-optimised prices will be the same as in the overall distribution.
Therefore price dispersion can be written as a law of motion
St = ξΠσt−1,tSt−1 + (1− ξ)
(
Ω1,t
Ω2,t
)−σ
. (4.3.63)
Using this, aggregate final output is given as a proportion of the in-
termediate output
Yt = Yw,t
1
St
. (4.3.64)
To determine the path for prices, we introduce a monetary policy
with an inflation target which we assume is credible, such that the
private sector believe the economy will return to the inflation level
in the long-run. The monetary authority sets a nominal policy rate
using the rule
RPt =
[
R¯P
(
Πt−1,t
Π∗
)ηpi (Yt
Y¯
)ηy]1−ηr (
Rpt−1
)ηr
exp(εM,t), (4.3.65)
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where εM,t ∼ N (0, σM) is a monetary policy shock. The policy rate,
Rpt , is applied to a one period bond issued to households. In equilib-
rium no bonds will be issued, but the availability will set the expected,
discounted nominal return on capital via the zero arbitrage condition
Et
[
Λt,t+1
Πt,t+1
Rt+1
]
= Et
[
Λt,t+1
Πt,t+1
]
Rpt = 1 (4.3.66)
where now Rt is a nominal return.
A further modification added before analysis of the transmission mech-
anism of monetary policy, so to draw closer comparison to the New-
Keynesian literature, is costs in adjusting investment. We follow the
method proposed in Christiano et al. (2005). Full derivation is not
shown here but the resulting first order conditions are listed in ap-
pendix A.2.
4.3.7 Shocks
To evaluate the model, we consider three possible exogenous transi-
tory shocks to the economy; a total factor productivity shock, a risk
shock, and an efficiency shock. The first needs little introduction and
allows comparison with the real business cycle literature with total
factor productivity given by
log At = ρA log At−1 + εA,t, εA,t ∼ N (0, σA) . (4.3.67)
A positive risk shock decreases prt whilst keeping p
r
t R
r
t constant and
an efficiency shock is the opposite; changing the return on a risky
project whilst keeping the risk constant. The former relates the anal-
ysis to a literature looking at second moment shocks (e.g Christiano,
Motto & Rostagno 2013) with prt given by
logit prt − logit p¯r = ρp (logit prt−1 − logit p¯r) + εp,t (4.3.68)
with εp,t ∼ N
(
0, σp
)
, and where the logit function imposes bounds
prt ∈ (0, 1). The efficiency shock relates the analysis to the (Chari
et al. 2007) that assigns a significant role to the efficiency wedge in
generating the business cycle; to introduce the efficiency shock, we
let νt ≡ ωrt prt denote the relative value of risky projects subject to a
stochastic process given by
log νt = ρν log νt−1 + εν,t, εν,t ∼ N (0, σν) . (4.3.69)
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4.3.8 Parametrisation and Calibration
We choose the steady state expected return on risky projects to equal
the return on safe projects so prωr = 1, prRr = Rs. In addition to
the parameters common to the RBC literature, we are left with sev-
eral parameters specific to the adverse selection economy. We cali-
brate λ and pr to target a loan default rate and a lending rate spread.
For the former, we target a value of 2.8%, taken from the average
delinquency rate on commercial and industrial loans over the period
1987Q1 – 2016Q2.10 A steady state spread between the lending rates
τr − τs of 0.9897% is targeted; this is the average spread between the
yields of Moody’s BAA and AAA rated corporate bonds11 over the
period 1986Q1 – 2016Q3. In a stylized model such as this, it can prove
difficult to provide evidence in support of some parameters; we do
however look to fit U.S. firm and employment data as best as possible.
In the U.S. non-financial firm sector, there is significant difference in
financial structure across sectors, and across firm size and age. For
a simplified representative framework we look at the aggregate book
debt to capital ratio which in the U.S., at the start of 2016, was esti-
mated across 7480 firms at 62.63%12. We therefore choose κ to target
κˆ ≡ κκ+e = 0.6263. To pin down the average size of the firm, we
use data from the Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB) which indicates
that there were 7.5 million establishments with a total employment of
118 million in 2013, implying there were 15.8 workers per establish-
ment;13; we choose e to match wˆ = 1−e−ue = 15.8. These calibrations
are listed in table 4.1 For parameters common to the RBC literature,
10 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Delinquency
Rate on Commercial and Industrial Loans, All Commercial Banks [DR-
BLACBS], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DRBLACBS, September 4, 2016.
11 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Moody’s Seasoned
Baa Corporate Bond Yield c©[BAA] and Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate
Bond Yield c©[AAA], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAA, September 5, 2016.
12 Data taken from the “Debt Fundamentals by Sector (US)” dataset maintained
by Aswath Damodaran at Stern Business School http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/
~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/dbtfund.htm.
13 It is naturally impossible to fit the diverse distribution of firm type and size into a
representative framework. There are a large number of smaller business such as sole
traders ignored in these numbers but we catch the majority of U.S. workers.
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Parameter Description Value Target
λ Share of safe projects 0.8091 λ(1−p
r)
γ = 0.0280
pr Risky project success proba-
bility
0.8603 τr − τs = 0.00990
κ Required debt finance for
project
102.46 κˆ ≡ κκ+e = 0.6263
e Required equity finance for
project
61.14 wˆ ≡ 1−e−ue = 15.8
Table 4.1: Calibrations of adverse selection model parameters. κ and e are
in units of capital, with the targets of the representative financial
structure and firm size providing the intuition to the meaning of
the values.
we choose values typically used to ensure a useful comparison and
shown in table 4.2. We calibrate the shock variance to match second
Parameter Description Value
α Capital share of production 0.3
β Household discount factor 0.99
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.023
χ Utility share of labour 0.5
Table 4.2: Parametrisation of common real business cycle parameters.
and third moments in aggregate output; this is discussed further be-
low in section 4.5.3.
Some robustness checks of the parametrisation were carried out on
both the implied deterministic steady state and the model dynamics.
The latter is discussed in the numerical analysis below. The choice
of time discounting, and capital share and depreciation are standard
and we focus on the novel parametrisation, beginning with their im-
pact on the steady state equilibrium. The number of workers per firm,
wˆ is an endogenous variable, but this and the debt-equity ratio are
chosen to calibrate e and κ where e + κ is the capital per firm. Ad-
justing wˆ up (down) from 15.8 implies a lower (higher) population
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share of entrepreneurs and so less (more) firms. There is not a large
effect on the steady state equilibrium conditions, except, with γ fixed,
reducing (increasing) wˆ reduces (increases) the likelihood14 that all
funds are lent, when $ > 0 and ϕr > 0; and increases (reduces) the
likelihood that safe projects have restricted access to credit markets,
that is with $ = 0 and ϕr > 0. There is a similar effect of adjusting
the debt-equity ratio; increasing (reducing) the share of credit in the
economy by reducing κˆ, increases (reduces) the likelihood that safe
borrowers face credit restrictions. The effect disappears for a given pr,
and so whilst having both debt and equity play an important role to
ensure an interior solution to the occupational allocation, the exact
composition does not have a large impact on steady state values.
As would be expected given their role in the optimal contract, the val-
ues of pr and λ do have a significant impact on steady state conditions
as well as model dynamics. These two parameters are calibrated to
target a loan delinquency rate and lending spreads. Setting λ higher
implies that risky projects occupy a smaller share of lending oppor-
tunities and it shrinks the proportion of the surplus that is received
by risky entrepreneurs as information rents. As shown in figure A.1
in appendix A.4, this implies a higher value of $, so that the lender
is less likely to restrict credit to safe borrowers; and a lower value of
ϕr so the lender is more likely to choose a pooling equilibrium. For
a given value of γ, a higher value of pr, which indicates safer risky
projects implies the opposite: a lower value of $, so that the lender is
more likely to restrict credit to safe borrowers; and a higher value of
ϕr so the lender is less likely to choose a pooling equilibrium.
4.4 numerical strategy
To evaluate the model dynamics, we compute second and third order
pruned perturbation approximations to the model transition and de-
cision functions, using the algorithm proposed in Holden (2016a) to
implement the inequality constraints. The second order approxima-
tion is used to compute simulated moments, and the third order for
impulse response functions. A description of these methods is given
14 Assessing the steady state across a range of parametrisations.
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in section 2.2 of the methodology chapter of this thesis and so we
provide only relevant detail here. There are five inequality constraints
that must be considered; positivity constraints on the four Lagrange
multipliers, $t, ϕst , ϕ
r
t and ψt and an upper bound γ ≤ 1, which is the
proportion of entrepreneurs that can receive funding.
Recall that the bounds problem is to compute the sequence of news
shocks required to impose the constraints, and in order to account
for the effects stemming from the risk of hitting the bounds in the
future, we integrate over a finite horizon in a similar manner to the
stochastic-extended path method proposed in Adjemian & Juillard
(2013). We use different integration methods for each exercise where,
in each case, the choice is made to achieve solutions in reasonable
time at as high an accuracy as possible. To compute the simulated
time-series, we employ a second order approximation and use a de-
gree 3 monomial rule without negative weights to integrate over fu-
ture uncertainty up to a horizon of S = 16 periods. As the monomial
rule evaluates the integral far from the origin, it can introduce some
bias, but the method is chosen for its robustness and speed.
For the impulse response functions, with the exception of the mone-
tary policy shock, we compute a third-order approximation and use
a Gaussian cubature rule with O (SˆK) points and maximum mono-
mial degree of 7 = 2K + 1. Two techniques are employed to increase
computational speed; firstly, an adaptive cubature degree is used, im-
plying a lower degree is used when far from the bound. Secondly,
as discussed in section 2.2, the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix
of the distribution from which we integrate smaller than 1% of the
largest eigenvalue are set to zero. Sˆ ≤ S is the number of remaining
non-zero eigenvalues. We compute average impulse response func-
tions around the ergodic mean and whilst a standard perturbation
without bounds requires Monte-Carlo simulation to compute the av-
erage, the pruning technique allows analytical moments to be calcu-
lated. This implies a Monte-Carlo simulation is not required in the
absence of the bounds, but with bounds, although we integrate out
the effects of uncertainty of future news shocks, we miss current un-
certainty. To remedy this, we use a Monte Carlo simulation that will
capture these effects.
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Examining the matrix M, which contains relative impulse response
functions to the news shocks as defined in section 2.2, indicates that
there are some states of the world where there are either multiple
solutions or no solution to the bounds problem. We found that there
is always a solution in the vicinity of the steady state, and when
there are multiple solutions, we choose the one that minimises the
size of news shocks. Because the impulse response functions shown
in the section below follow large shocks, the model moves into a re-
gion relatively far from the steady state. We found that computing
the impulse response functions with the calibrated shock standard
deviations would cause the computation to fail; this stems from inte-
grating over an area of the state space where there is no solution to
the bounds problem. To deal with this, at some loss of accuracy, the
shock standard deviations are scaled down.15
For the monetary policy shock, the introduction of the Calvo price set-
ting mechanism and investment adjustment costs increase the num-
ber of state variables; the number of forward looking variables jumps
from 4 to 9. To compute impulse response functions, we therefore use
a Monte Carlo simulation but without cubature. Although introduc-
ing some bias by ignoring the precautionary effects stemming from
the bound, in earlier tests, we found that Monte-Carlo delivers rea-
sonable accuracy by computing expectations of the impulse response
functions that include the expected sequence of news shocks required
to impose the bounds.
4.5 discussion of numerical results
We begin the discussion of the numerical results with analysis of the
impulse response functions to the three modelled shocks. Following
the positive transitory shock to aggregate productivity, in the first-
best economy there is an increase in output and investment, a rise in
employment as well as an increase in the number of entrepreneurs
seeking funds. As shown in figure 4.7, in the model with adverse
selection, the shadow value of lending opportunities, $t, increases on
15 We choose σa = 0.001, σp = 0.01 and σv = 0.001, all smaller than the calibrated
values in table 4.3.
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Figure 4.7: Average impulse response functions to a positive transitory
shock to total factor productivity At of approximately 1.5%. Plots
show relative deviation around zero for u and e, and level devia-
tion around zero for all other variables except $ which is around
the ergodic mean.
impact then overshoots as it falls before returning to the steady state.
For shocks of a typical size, the only impact on the real economy is
to increase the volatility of investment. The value of equity increases
relative to debt in the adverse selection model following the shock
because entrepreneurs receive all the gains in the returns on equity
but the additional surplus from the debt contract is shared. This leads
to a larger relative increase in entrepreneurs and initial investment
in capital for equity finance. We can be slightly more specific about
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what is meant by ‘of a typical size’. If the shock is sufficiently large,
and under chosen parametrisations, this is of the order of a transitory
12% increase, or 8% decrease to total factor productivity; $t will fall to
zero causing the feasibility constraint on lending to slacken, and if the
shock is larger still, γt increases to the upper bound of 1. At this point
we observe some significant non-linear effects and by saying typical
size, we include a very large interval of the probability distribution
of At.16
When the $t at the zero lower bound and γt increase to 1, there is
no equivalent increase in xst . This represents the under-utilization of
capital as the cost in information rents to risky borrowers would ex-
ceed the gain in additional surplus earned by increasing lending to
safe entrepreneurs. This causes an increase in the spread between the
gross rate of return on lending Rt and the average return on capital,
denoted
∆t ≡ Et
[
λxst + (1− λ) xrt prt+1ωrt+1
λxst + (1− λ) xrt
Rst+1 − Rt+1
]
. (4.5.1)
For instance, $t can hit the zero constraint following a negative pro-
ductivity shock as shown in figure 4.8, where the fall in the number
of entrepreneurs dominates the fall in the number of loans causing
γ to increase to 1. The shadow value of lending, $t, falls to zero
which causes the proportion of funded projects to actually decline.
This leads to a very large drop in investment. In this case we find
there is a sharp increase in the interest spread ∆t on impact, followed
by a hump-shaped increase. Here we introduce a variable ζ that is a
measure of the efficiency wedge given by
ζt ≡ γt λ+ (1− λ)ω
r
t p
r
t
λxst + (1− λ) xrtωrt prt
. (4.5.2)
As this is multiplied by γt it is simply a measure of the inverse aver-
age firm productivity relative to the first-best case. When $t = 0, the
lender leaves a proportion of capital unallocated which drives the ob-
served sharp increase in ζ. We purposefully define ∆t using the rate
of return on all lent funds, rather than the gross return on all capital
so to separately identify the effects of the efficiency wedge ζt which
16 For example, a negative shock large enough to cause γt = 1 under the estimation of
Smets & Wouters (2007) would be a 5 standard deviation shock and even higher for
a positive shock
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Figure 4.8: Impulse response functions to a large (10%) negative transitory
shock to total factor productivity At. Plots show relative devia-
tion for Y, I and ∆, and are in levels for the other variables.
focuses on the misallocation of capital. Further impulse responses to
a larger number of variables for shocks of different signs and magni-
tudes are shown in appendix A.4.
4.5.1 Risk Shock
An increase in the risk of risky projects, caused by a decline in prt with
ωrt kept at 1/p
r
t , generates economic fluctuations in the adverse se-
lection economy whilst leaving the first-best economy unaffected. In
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the first-best case, the only important factor regarding the financing
of projects is the discounted expected value, which does not change
in the face of a risk shock. With the asymmetric information prob-
lem, the increased risk leads to higher information rents to the en-
trepreneur and so a higher value of equity and lower value of debt on
average. As shown in figure 4.9, this causes the shadow value of lend-
Figure 4.9: Impulse response functions to a transitory risk shock caused by a
reduction in the probability of risky project success prt of approx-
imately 2 percentage points. Plots show level deviation around
zero except for xs and $ which are around the ergodic mean.
ing opportunities, $t and the safe project finance probability xst to both
decline, the latter caused by a drop in the availability of loans γt. The
reduction in lending produces a decline in output and investment,
136 adverse selection and the efficiency wedge
and the number of entrepreneurs and level of employment. Quantita-
tively, under the chosen parametrisations, a 1 percentage point drop
in the rate of risky project success leads to a 3% decline in invest-
ment, a 0.1 percentage point drop in employment, and a 9 basis point
increase in the interest spread. The adverse selection introduces sig-
nificant non-linearities; for instance, a 2 percentage point drop in prt
causes $ to hit the zero lower bound leading to an increase in the
efficiency wedge as lenders do not lend all available capital. The ef-
ficiency wedge rises to about 5% of potential output. The impact on
other variables also becomes more severe: there is approximately a
15% decline in investment on impact;17 a 0.4 percentage point fall in
employment; and a 30 basis point increase in the spread. The impulse
responses to the 1, 2 and 3 percentage point drops in prt are shown in
figures A.5 – A.7 in appendix A.4.
This result is sensitive to the parametrisation of λ. Increasing λ to
0.85 from 0.8, so reducing the proportion of risky projects to 15%
from 20%, does not have a large impact on the marginal effect on the
real economy close to the steady state, but it shifts the region of the
state space that $ is at the zero bound causing the lender to restrict
funding. For example, with the alternative parametrisation, following
a 2 percentage point drop in prt , $t falls by about 60% from the steady
state value, and lending is unrestricted, investment declines by about
6%. In fact, it requires a drop in prt of about 4% for $ to become
constrained at zero to aggravate what could be considered a ‘financial
crisis’. The impulse responses are shown in figures A.9 and A.10. The
key result to highlight is that by reducing the number of risky projects
by 5 percentage points, the drop in prt needs to be 2.5 percentage
points greater to lead to a financial crisis.
4.5.2 Efficiency Shock
The efficiency shock is called such because of the way it manifests in
the adverse selection economy, although it is more precisely a risky
project productivity shock. For small shocks, the impact is greater in
the first-best economy; in the adverse selection economy, the change
17 This is a level deviation of log It of about 0.15 units.
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in the value of equity is greater than the change in the value of debt
and so there is a relative increase in capital allocated to debt and so
a rise in the proportion of projects funded. This acts as a buffer to
the adverse effects of the shock not present in the first-best economy.
An adverse efficiency shock will reduce the shadow value of risky
lending opportunities, ϕrt , and will be constrained at zero if the ex-
pected risky project value falls by more than 5%, leading to a pooling
equilibrium. This is shown in figure 4.10. The pooling occurs when
Figure 4.10: Impulse response functions to a transitory efficiency shock
caused by a reduction in the productivity of risky projects ωrt
by 5% whilst keeping probability of success, prt constant. Plots
show level deviation around the ergodic mean except for ζ and
∆ which are both around zero.
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the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint xst ≤ xrt , ψt, rises above zero.
This occurs when the expected value of risky projects has deteriorated
to the point that increasing lending to safe projects has higher value
than the share of information surplus received from risky projects.
The shock leads to an increase in the efficiency wedge, ζt and drop in
the investment wedge ∆t; the former due to the risky projects receiv-
ing finance whilst there remains unfunded, higher value safe projects,
and the latter due to the relative increase in the value of debt over eq-
uity. Whilst adjusting the share of risky projects has an impact on the
fall in output and the efficiency wedge, as the average productivity
of projects will differ, the size of shock sufficient to lead to a pooling
equilibrium is virtually unchanged. Impulse responses with λ = 0.85
are shown in figure A.19.
We find that the adverse selection economy response to the efficiency
shock is particularly asymmetric. When the shock to the productivity
of risky projects is positive, in the first-best economy, at least for small
shocks,18 the impulse responses mirror those for negative shocks. For
risky project productivity shocks smaller than 1%, the same is true
for the adverse selection economy, but for larger shocks, the lender
begins to restrict credit to safe projects; this is shown in figure 4.11.
The marginal value of lending, $t is constrained at zero and the lender
begins to reduce debt finance to safe projects so to receive a greater
share of the additional risky project surplus. This increases the value
of debt relative to equity, and so there is a fall in the number of en-
trepreneurs and an increase in the amount of debt finance. Although
γt rises, the lenders begin to restrict credit to safe projects and so the
efficiency wedge increases due to this non-allocation of capital. For a
1.5% increase in the productivity of risky projects under the chosen
parametrisation, there is a 2% increase in the efficiency wedge, a 25
basis point increase in the interest spread, and a 0.5% fall in output.
As with the risk shock, these movements are sensitive to the choice of
λ. A higher λ corresponds with a higher marginal value of lending,
$t and so a larger shock is needed to cause this ‘financial crisis’. If
λ = 0.85 instead of 0.8, a shock of approximately 3% is required for
$t to reach the zero lower bound.
18 There will inevitably be some asymmetries introduced at approximation orders
greater than 1.
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Figure 4.11: Impulse response functions to a transitory efficiency shock
caused by an increase in the productivity of risky projects ωrt
by 1.5% whilst keeping probability of success, prt constant. Plots
show level deviation around the ergodic mean for $t, γt and xst ,
and around zero for the other variables.
4.5.3 Simulated Moments
The model is simulated over 1000 periods using the extended-path
type approach discussed above, and moments computed. The simu-
lation is used to calibrate the productivity shock standard deviations;
whilst other parameters were chosen without formal calibration the
impact of the choice of these values is discussed here. Table 4.3 shows
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the calibrations with the associated moments and output correlations
under four separate environments. Firstly, and by way of comparison,
we include just the productivity shock calibrated to target the stan-
dard deviation of output in the first-best economy. This is repeated
but to match the simulated time series of output in the adverse se-
lection economy. As technology shocks within a typical range are not
sufficient to produce financial crises in the adverse selection economy,
the results of the two economies are relatively similar. As was dis-
cussed above, the adverse selection economy generates higher volatil-
ity in investment which also causes higher volatility in consumption;
as shown in the table of results, smaller shocks are required to fit
the empirical output standard deviation. The adverse selection model
does improve on the cyclicality of the loan rate spread, achieving the
correct sign even though implying a far higher correlation with out-
put than is observed in the data. Across the simulated time series with
just the productivity shock, the negative skewness in output, invest-
ment and consumption and strong positive skewness in the spread is
missed entirely, and the volatility in the interest rate spread is widely
under-predicted, capturing only the time varying risk premium.
To rectify these issues, the third and fourth environments also cal-
ibrate the risk and efficiency shocks respectively to target output
skewness, with the other shock set to zero. This exercise shows how
introducing adverse selection in credit markets can improve the em-
pirical fit of a typical RBC model by capturing the negative skewness
in the time series of output and investment. The model that only
includes shocks to total factor productivity and the productivity of
risky projects does an especially good job of matching some key mo-
ments in the U.S. time series, in particular, the second and third mo-
ments of output and investment, and the correlation of investment
and consumption with output. The risk and efficiency shocks also
generate volatility in the lending rate spread in the adverse selection
economy although miss the very high positive skewness. Both higher
risk and efficiency shock variance leads to lower interest spread skew-
ness and reduce the correlation with output; the simulations with the
risk shock find a very close match for the correlation with output.
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Standard deviation Skewness Correlation w/ Y
% Periods
Pooling
% Periods
Restricted
Credit
Y I C ∆ Y I C ∆ I C ∆
U.S. data 1.015 4.240 0.927 0.0957 -0.141 -0.676 -0.320 3.098 0.869 0.871 -0.336
σa = 0.0030
σp = 0
σν = 0
A.S. 1.049 4.36 0.815 4x10-5 0.101 0.263 0.065 -0.01 0.792 0.907 -0.959 0% 0%
F.B. 1.014 3.16 0.642 4x10-5 0.100 0.239 -0.068 0.066 0.902 0.829 0.417 – –
σa = 0.0029
σp = 0
σν = 0
A.S. 1.015 4.23 0.789 4x10-5 0.101 0.259 0.059 -0.01 0.792 0.907 -0.959 0% 0%
F.B. 0.981 3.06 0.621 4x10-5 0.099 0.237 -0.068 0.066 0.902 0.829 0.417 – –
σa = 0.0026
σp =
σν = 0.0731
A.S. 1.017 6.29 0.810 0.160 -0.141 -0.429 0.061 -0.06 0.709 0.694 -0.361 0% 4.3%
F.B. 0.867 2.70 0.549 1.71 0.097 0.227 -0.069 -0.090 0.902 0.829 -0.09 – –
σa = 0.0027
σp = 0
σν = 0.0098
A.S. 1.010 4.86 0.736 0.177 -0.141 -0.754 0.064 -1.48 0.805 0.853 -0.041 0.6% 5.9%
F.B. 0.967 4.14 0.741 0.157 0.018 0.219 0.065 -0.095 0.800 0.472 0.322 – –
Table 4.3: Calibration of risk shock variance to target second and third moments of output. Five different model environments calibrated: (i) first-best
economy with only productivity shocks; (ii) adverse selection economy with only productivity shocks; (iii) adverse selection economy with
productivity and risk shocks; (iv) adverse selection economy with productivity and efficiency shocks. Data is HP-filtered U.S. time series
1986Q2 – 2015Q4; spread ∆ as Moody’s AAA-BAA rated corporate bond yield spread. Further details are given in chapter 2. Standard
deviations are in percent for Y, I and C and percentage points for ∆.
142 adverse selection and the efficiency wedge
4.6 monetary policy
To study the effects of the adverse selection problem on the trans-
mission mechanism of monetary policy, price setting frictions and
investment adjustment costs are introduced into the model. The re-
vised equilibrium conditions are outlined in appendix A.2, and the
parametrisations in appendix A.3. The impulse response functions to
a 10 basis point negative monetary policy shock are shown in figure
4.12. The credit friction has a limited effect on the transmission of the
Figure 4.12: Impulse response functions to a negative 10 basis point mone-
tary policy shock. Plots show level deviation around the ergodic
mean for $t and ϕrt , and around zero for all other variables.
monetary policy shock compared to the first-best economy; the only
difference is a small accelerator caused by a reduction in the spread,
∆t. Cutting the policy rate reduces the nominal return on capital, but
increases private sector demand and so too the price index and the
demand for investment goods. There is an expansion in aggregate
credit, in the number of entrepreneurs, and in employment. Even
though this model does not focus on the balance sheet channel, the
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relative value of equity experiences a small decline due to the cost
of diverting potential workers into entrepreneurship; this increases
the availability of loans, γt, and, because risky projects are already
fully funded, reduces the share of risky loans as new safe projects are
funded, decreasing the average entrepreneur surplus. We can note
that when $t > 1 and ψt = 0, the spread as defined above can be
written
∆t = Et
[
(1− λ) x
s
t
γt
prt+1 (ω
r
t+1 − 1) Rst+1
]
(4.6.1)
so falls in Rst+1.
For a positive shock of the same size, the plots would be an approxi-
mate mirror image; around the ergodic mean, the transmission mech-
anism is largely unaffected and has symmetric effects on the economy.
As can be seen in figure 4.12, $t and ϕrt both decline; for a positive
monetary policy shock, these increase and so move further from their
bounds. Consequently, the impulse response functions to a positive
shock increase close to monotonically in the shock size, whereas neg-
ative shocks can generate significant non-linear responses as the La-
grange multipliers approach the bounds. To understand the underly-
ing cause, let us re-examine the contract first-order conditions. When
ψt = ϕst = 0, we can write
$t = Et
[
Λt,t+1
Πt,t+1
((
1+
1− λ
λ
prt+1 (1−ωrt+1)
)
Rsk,t+1 − 1
)]
(4.6.2)
So, as a first-order effect, $t decreases as the expected gross return
on capital Rsk,t+1 falls, occurring because the borrower share of risky
project surplus increases as xst increases
19. At the point at which $t =
0, it is optimal for the lender to restrict credit to safe projects so to
extract information rents from risky borrowers. Figure 4.13 compares
the impulse responses of a selection of variables to three monetary
policy shocks of different sizes that capture these non-linear effects.
When $t reaches the zero bound, following a cut of about 40 basis
points, the amount of funding available for debt finance, γt, increases
whilst xst is unchanged, leaving a share of capital unallocated. This
causes the decline in investment seen in the centre column of figure
19 See equation (4.2.7) which gives the risky borrower lending rate. The borrower share
of surplus is given by (ωrt − 1) x
s
t−1
xrt−1
.
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Figure 4.13: Impulse response functions to negative monetary policy shocks
from the ergodic mean. First column is a 30 basis point cut;
second column a 40 basis point cut; third column a 60 basis
point cut. Plots show level deviation around the ergodic mean
for $t, and around zero for all other variables.
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4.13. Further restrictions to safe project funding would otherwise act
to decrease the information surplus to risky borrowers, which can be
written as a share of project surplus as (ωrt − 1) x
s
t−1
xrt−1
. Because of these
two competing effects, the adverse effects weaken for larger negative
monetary policy shocks, and whilst investment is reduced relative to
the first-best economy, the increase in the efficiency wedge is limited;
under the chosen parametrisation, the limit is 5% which is a measure
of the drop in aggregate capital efficiency.
4.7 conclusion
In this chapter we have shown that asymmetric information in mar-
kets for business loans can lead to adverse selection that manifests
as both an investment wedge and an efficiency wedge. Although
a stylized model, this has allowed us to match the observed nega-
tive skewness in the empirical output time-series and, due to non-
linearities in financial contracts, generate occasional financial crises
arising from sharp spikes in the efficiency wedge. These results are
an important contribution to the financial frictions literature which
typically assumes that the economy is always financially constrained
and subject to an investment wedge that depends on the balance sheet
of the borrower. Firstly, under the standard approach, there are usu-
ally insufficient non-linearities to produce the type of financial crisis
episodes observed in the data; by focusing on potentially important
non-linearities present in financial contracts, we have been able to pro-
pose a model that, when thresholds in optimal contracts are breached,
pushes the economy into a financial crisis. The second important re-
sult is that by abstracting from the balance sheet channel and focus-
ing on the misallocation, or under-allocation, of productive resources,
we have been able to respond to the issue highlighted in Chari et al.
(2007), that the investment wedge has not been an important driver
of the business cycle.
Under the chosen parametrisation, we have found that a two per-
centage point increase in the risk of risky projects, defined as a two
percentage point decline in the probability of project success whilst
keeping the expected value constant, is sufficient to generate financial
146 adverse selection and the efficiency wedge
crisis as lenders begin to restrict credit to safe projects so to reduce
the information surplus due risky borrowers. This result is sensitive
to the population share of risky borrowers, for instance, requiring
over twice as large a risk shock to cause financial crisis with 25% less
risky projects.
The optimal contract is always separating when risky and safe projects
have equal expected value, but pooling can emerge when the ex-
pected value of risky projects declines sufficiently. Under the cho-
sen parametrisation, we find that a 5% drop in expected value leads
to a pooling equilibrium. Output and investment increase, but the
marginal value of lending falls as the productivity of risky projects
rises. This may seem counter-intuitive, but it stems from rising in-
formation surplus received by risky borrowers reducing the value of
debt relative to equity. A financial crisis episode occurs following a
shock that increases the productivity of risky projects by over 1%; at
this point, the marginal value of lending is constrained at zero and
the lender restricts funds to safe projects in order to reduce the infor-
mation surplus.
Finally, we have shown that the transmission of monetary policy is
largely unaffected in the vicinity of the ergodic mean, except for a
small accelerator effect, but for larger unexpected cuts in the rate
(greater than 30 basis points at the chosen parametrisations) some
non-linear effects are introduced. For cuts of 30-40 basis points, an ef-
ficiency wedge emerges due to the non-allocation of capital, reaching
a size of 5% which, in this case, relates to the proportion of capital
not allocated to productive projects.
5
I N T E R B A N K M A R K E T F R I C T I O N S A N D P O L I C Y I N
A C U R R E N C Y U N I O N
In this chapter we show how interbank market frictions can play an
important role in propagating and enhancing the effects of shocks
in a currency union, and discuss the efficacy of two unconventional
policy measures; multi-period central bank refinance operations and
large scale asset purchases. To this end, a two-country DSGE model
with idiosyncratic risk and country-specific transactional costs on in-
terbank lending is proposed and used to show that (i) the effective-
ness of monetary policy is enhanced when banks face an external
finance premium in the interbank market; (ii) adverse shocks to the
real economy can be the source of banking crisis, causing an increase
in the interbank finance premia, aggravating the initial shock; and
(iii) asset purchase policies and long-term refinancing operations can
both be successful in supporting conventional monetary policy in mit-
igating the adverse effects of shocks.
The chapter includes research from ongoing joint work with Tobias
Blattner1 at the European Central Bank.
5.1 introduction
In the years following the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, the
process of financial integration in the euro area moved into reverse
as firms and households in the southern European periphery faced
much higher borrowing costs than for those in the northern core.
One of the key channels at the heart of this financial fragmentation
was the interbank market, as the costs of cross-border lending costs
rose sharply, and the volumes fell dramatically, especially to periph-
ery borrowers. In the standard open-economy model with complete
1 Contact Tobias.Blattner@ecb.int .
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markets, rather than contributing to financial fragmentation, a cross-
border interbank market will smooth asymmetric economic volatility,
and temper the adverse effects of asymmetric shocks. This chapter
analyses the role of frictions in the interbank market of a currency
union, and the transmission of conventional and unconventional pol-
icy. To this aim, we develop, calibrate and simulate a two-country
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in which lend-
ing banks obtain funds from both domestic and foreign savings banks
to refinance loans to the private sector, but where interbank lending
is subject to both borrower-specific idiosyncratic risk as borrowing
banks may default on their loans as well as to a country-specific risk
premium. Using this framework, we show that (i) the effectiveness
of monetary policy is enhanced when banks face an external finance
premium in the interbank market; (ii) adverse shocks to the real econ-
omy can be the source of banking crisis, causing an increase in the
interbank finance premia, aggravating the initial shock; and (iii) asset
purchase policies and long-term refinancing operations can both be
successful in supporting conventional monetary policy in mitigating
the adverse effects of shocks.
The interbank market plays a pivotal role in the Euro Area. Its smooth
functioning is central for banks to cope efficiently with idiosyncratic
liquidity shocks and to ensure a uniform transmission of the com-
mon monetary policy. Frictions in the interbank market may blur the
signal coming from monetary policy and ultimately hamper its trans-
mission. One reason why interbank markets may not operate effi-
ciently has to do with transaction costs: owing to the unsecured lend-
ing nature of the market, and its over-the-counter (OTC) structure2,
trading relationships are often plagued by asymmetric information,
counterparty risk and search and monitoring costs (see e.g. Afonso
et al. 2011, Flannery 1996). That is, banks are subject to frictions in
raising funds in the interbank market and may face borrowing con-
straints, which could affect both credit supply and the ultimate bor-
rowing conditions of the non-financial sector. As a result, imperfect
interbank markets make the policy interest rate insufficient to charac-
terize the monetary policy stance.
2 Electronic trading accounted for less than 10% of total unsecured transactions in
2014 (Euro money market study 2014).
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These frictions are particularly relevant in cross-border transactions,
where differences in banking supervision,3 the state of the business
cycle or accounting standards may obfuscate the evaluation of credit-
worthiness of foreign banks and expose lenders to significant counter-
party risk. Freixas & Holthausen (2005) show that such market imper-
fections may cause liquidity shortages or the payment of interest rate
premia that reflect the adverse selection of borrowers across countries.
In crisis times, these effects may become even more visible. Using
bank-to-bank loan level data from TARGET24, Abbassi et al. (2014)
find that for the same borrower on the same trading day, and after
controlling for lender and borrower fixed effects, cross-border loans
were up to 25 basis points more expensive than domestic loans in the
first three months following the collapse of Lehman. The presence of
a risk premia unrelated to the specific borrower in crisis times sug-
gests that information asymmetry constraints are important and that
factors other than direct counter-party risks may also drive pricing
behaviour in interbank markets.
Cross-border interbank lending has been an important element of the
financial structure in Euro Area. Prior to the outbreak of the global
financial crisis, more than half of the average daily turnover in the
unsecured market was with non-domestic Euro Area counterparts.
Strong credit growth in parts of the Euro Area, buoyant financial in-
novation and lax financial regulation all contributed to an increasing
reliance on confidence-sensitive wholesale funding, with banks in cur-
rent account surplus countries providing funding to banks in current
account deficit countries (see van Rixtel & Gasperini 2013). After the
outbreak of the crisis, the share of cross-border interbank lending fell
dramatically to just over 25% in 2013 before recovering again to some
40% in 2014. de Andoain, Hoffmann & Manganelli (2014) estimate
the premium charged to banks in more stressed economies spiked
dramatically reaching over 63 basis points. This was especially im-
portant as those banks relying more heavily on wholesale markets
for debt finance had to restrict lending to the private sector relative
to those banks more dependant on household deposits (see Cornett
3 A more unified approach to supervision was introduced with the launch of the
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in 2014.
4 TARGET2 is the Eurosystem’s payment and settlement system and carries out more
than 90% of all fund flows between pairs of credit institutions in the Euro Area.
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et al. 2011). The implication of this finding is that real shocks may
be amplified, and financial shocks accelerated, by bank exposure to
wholesale financing.
Despite its empirical relevance, however, few efforts have been un-
dertaken to study the main mechanisms and propagation channels
of the interbank market in a structural model of the macroeconomy.
As discussed throughout this thesis, there was a shortage of research
into the macroeconomic effects of financial frictions in general. The
dominance of the Modigliani-Miller theorem (1958) that the financ-
ing structure of a firm is irrelevant for its value confined the analy-
sis to real and nominal frictions in the wider economy (Christiano
et al. 2005, Smets & Wouters 2007). Only recently some progress has
been made in understanding the impact of the financing structure of
banks on lending conditions of the private sector and, hence, on ag-
gregate output and inflation. Gerali et al. (2010) and Darracq Paries,
Sørensen & Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2011) illustrate the effects of im-
perfect competition in the banking industry on credit spreads and
show that changes in banks’ leverage ratio can impact loan supply
conditions. However, in these models, banks can obtain funding in a
frictionless interbank market at the rate set by the central bank.
Others have made attempts to model the interbank market more ex-
plicitly. The agency problem leading to the borrowing constraint in
Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010) is also applied to the interbank market. Dib
(2010) and de Walque et al. (2010) include an interbank market in
which, due to an implicit enforceability problem, borrowing banks
can choose an optimal level of default,5 and where banks must hold
a regulatory level of capital. Calibrated for the US economy, both pa-
pers show that bank capital attenuates, rather than amplifies, the real
effects of shocks in this framework. Hilberg & Hollmayr (2011) incor-
porate a secured interbank market into an otherwise standard DSGE
model and study the impact of central bank collateral policy on inter-
bank lending rates. They show that a change in the haircut applied
to central bank refinancing operations can be effective in steering in-
terbank rates, but that the presence of an interbank market also atten-
uates the effects of conventional monetary policy. Similarly, Carrera
5 That is, default is not related to banks’ own idiosyncratic risks but a choice variable
subject to an exogenous cost of default.
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& Vega (2012) model the interactions between banks’ reserve require-
ments and interbank lending activity, which they assume is costly due
to monitoring costs. They find that an increase in required reserves in-
creases demand in the competitive interbank market and pushes up
the interest rate charged on these operations as lending banks will
have to pay higher monitoring costs. Funding conditions in the inter-
bank market then trickle down to lending and deposit rates, affecting
real activity. In the framework of Carrera & Vega (2012), changes in
reserve requirements are therefore qualitatively similar to traditional
changes in policy rates.
Cross-border interbank lending, by contrast, has been largely ignored
so far in the literature. In ’t Veld & van Lelyveld (2014) examine the
role of international capital flows in the boom-bust cycle in Spain by
allowing borrowing-constrained households to borrow directly from
foreign lenders. Using an estimated three-country model, they find
that the convergence of interest rates in Spain to the levels prevail-
ing in other Euro Area Member States, a loosening of collateral con-
straints as well as falling risk premia on Spanish housing and capi-
tal has fuelled the Spanish housing boom. Poutineau & Vermandel
(2015) model the banking sector explicitly in a two-country DSGE
model. Contrary to Quint & Rabanal (2014), who study the optimal
design of macro-prudential policies in the Euro Area in a two-country
DSGE model, they allow for cross-border lending to firms and banks.
They find that cross-border loans amplify the propagation of country-
specific shocks. Dra¨ger & Proan˜o (2015) also allow for cross-border
banking where an international wholesale branch is collecting de-
posits from across the currency union and distributes them to retail
banks in the two countries. Although their model gives not rise to
interbank flows, similar to Poutineau & Vermandel (2015), they find
that cross-border banking amplifies the effects of exogenous shocks
in a currency union.
In this article, we incorporate credit risk in the interbank market in
a New Keynesian two-country, two-sector set-up with sticky prices,
habits in consumption and investment adjustment costs, and a com-
mon monetary policy. There are two types of banks in each country:
savings banks, which have excess liquidity that they are willing to
trade in the interbank market and lending banks, which operate un-
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der a structural liquidity deficit and require funding that they can ob-
tain from the unsecured area-wide interbank market. Following the
costly state verification framework of Bernanke et al. (1999), however,
lending banks face idiosyncratic loan return shocks that are unobserv-
able from the point of view of savings banks. A positive probability
of default gives rise to an external finance premium that depends on
the leverage of the borrower.
In addition, lending banks face a risk premium when taking a posi-
tion in the cross-border interbank market. This second friction is in
the same spirit as the external financial intermediation premium in
Christoffel et al. (2008), but tailored to the features of an interbank
market: as lending banks’ domestic economy’s net foreign asset po-
sition weakens, or when the risk in the domestic economy increases,
foreign lenders demand a higher rate of interest vis-a`-vis the bor-
rower from that country as counter-party risk rises, thereby driving a
further wedge between the policy rate and interbank lending rates.
We use our model to answer three important questions: (1) how is the
transmission of monetary policy in a currency union affected when fi-
nancing conditions in the interbank market depend on the quality of
banks’ balance sheets; (2) how do asymmetric shocks to the value of
assets propagate through a currency union when savings banks dif-
ferentiate between domestic and foreign borrowers in the interbank
market; and (3) how effective are some of the measures central banks
have taken in the past to address funding bottlenecks in the interbank
market.
Regarding the first question, we find that our model exhibits the fi-
nancial accelerator effect (see Bernanke et al. 1999) in the face of a
monetary policy shock. The decline in the policy rate stimulates de-
mand for durable goods, house prices and the price of capital rise,
resulting in an increase in the value of banks’ collateral. This lowers
the rate charged in the interbank market due to reduced probability
of default, and as the bank passes the lower funding costs on to its
non-financial borrowers, stimulates aggregate demand even further.
Our simulations therefore contradict previous findings that the inclu-
sion of an interbank market in a DSGE model tempers the effects of
monetary policy (Hilberg & Hollmayr 2011).
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Regarding the second question, our model is able to replicate some
of the key features of the financial crisis that resulted in a segmented
interbank market.6 We show that in the wake of an adverse shock
to the value of assets in one country, the rate charged by foreign
lenders in the common interbank market will rise as banks’ balance
sheet deteriorate amid a fall in the collateral value. The increase in
the funding costs of banks offset, to some extent, the effort by the
central bank to stimulate the economy by lowering the policy rate in
response to the initial shock. That is, compared to a model without
cross-border interbank lending, monetary policy will be less effective.
Due to the worsening of financial conditions, the economy that draws
the shock must increase the trade balance more sharply relative to
without the financial frictions.
Finally, we study the effectiveness of two of the ECB’s recent non-
standard measures in our model economy. We find that issuing multi-
period loans to banks leads to a accelerator mechanism such that
lower interest rate cuts are required for an equivalent stimulus. We
also show that the policy allows for different equivalent one-period
funding rates with the same policy rate due to the duration effects,
and that the policy has a greater impact in the non-stressed econ-
omy. The second policy is an asset purchase programme. This works
through the bank balance sheet channel; as the central bank purchases
a large number of risky assets, the bank balance sheets are strength-
ened and the external finance premium reduced. We find this is par-
ticularly successful at improving financial conditions and preventing
such a sharp increase in the trade balance if the central purchases
risky assets in the more highly stress country.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 lays out the
model set-up. Section 5.5 presents numerical simulations, illustrating
the role of the interbank market in driving the dynamics of the model,
with the policy measures analysed in section 5.5.5. Section 5.6 offers
some concluding remarks.
6 In our model we focus on loan return risk. Ultimately, the implications of our find-
ings are more broad-based and less dependent on the ultimate source of risk. For
example, the sharp increase in spreads paid by banks in stressed Member States dur-
ing the sovereign debt crisis (see e.g. de Andoain et al. 2014) works through the same
channel, that is, a (perceived) deterioration in the quality of banks’ balance sheets.
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5.2 the model
The model economy is made up of two economies that share a sin-
gle currency and monetary policy. In each economy there are two
types of households, savers and borrowers, monopolistic competitive
firms, savings and lending banks as well as a fiscal authority. The two
economies trade in both non-durable consumption goods and finan-
cial services in the form of interbank credit. The two economies, home
and foreign, are of size n and (1− n). In the following, we describe
the decision-making problems of the economic agents resident in the
home economy. Unless otherwise stated, analogous conditions hold
for the foreign economy. As in the other chapters, the time notation
refers to the period in which the value is determined. We begin the
model description with the households and firms before outlining the
novel part of the model; the financial sector.
5.2.1 Households
The household sector is made up of a mass λ ∈ [0, 1] of patient house-
holds with discount factor β and 1− λ of impatient households with
discount factor βB < β. The patient households are referred to as the
savers and the impatient households as the borrowers.
5.2.1.1 Savers
The saver household h ∈ [0,λ] chooses the level of consumption of
non-durable goods Ch,t, hours worked Lh,t, the housing stock Dh,t,
and bank deposit savings Sh,t to maximize its lifetime utility
Et
∞
∑
s=0
βs
{
$ ln (Ch,t+s − κCt+s−1) + (1− $) ln(Dh,t+s−1)−
L1+φh,t+s
1+φ
}
, (5.2.1)
subject to the nominal budget constraint
PCt Ch,t + P
D
t (Dh,t − (1− δD)Dh,t−1) + Sh,t + Bh,t ≤
RSt−1Sh,t−1 +WtLh,t + pit − Tt, (5.2.2)
where β is the discount factor, $ determines the relative weight of
non-durable consumption and housing Dh,t in the saver’s utility and
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where κ measures the degree of external habit formation in consump-
tion. The parameter φ refers to the inverse of the Frisch labour sup-
ply elasticity. PCt and P
D
t are the prices for consumption and housing
goods respectively and are defined in more detail below. The saver
can save in domestic banks with deposits paying the risk-free nom-
inal rate RSt . Finally, the saver provides labour at the flexible wage
rate Wt and owns the stock of net wealth of the economy, except for
housing that is in part also owned by the borrower household, there-
fore receiving profits pit from the banking and corporate sector and
paying lump sum taxes Tt.
Because saver households have the same preferences over consump-
tion, housing, labour, savings and investment, and are assumed to
have the same initial wealth, we focus on a representative saver from
now onwards and drop the h subscript. The saver household chooses
the optimal inter-temporal consumption plan subject to the budget
constraint, resulting in a set of first-order conditions that will hold in
equilibrium,
1 = RStEt
[
Λt,t+1
ΠC
t+1
]
(5.2.3)
λCt Q
D
t = βEt
[
λDt+1 + (1− δD)QDt+1λCt+1
]
(5.2.4)
wt =
Lφt
λCt
, (5.2.5)
where λCt and λ
D
t are the marginal utilities of consumption and hous-
ing respectively, and Λt,t+1 ≡ βλ
C
t+1
λCt
is the real stochastic discount
factor over the interval [t, t+ 1]. QDt ≡ P
D
t
PCt
is the relative price of hous-
ing and ΠCt ≡ PCt /PCt−1. The real wage rate is given by wt = Wt/PCt
which is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between labour
and consumption in equilibrium. Equations (5.2.3) and (5.2.4) are the
Euler equations implied by the demand for domestic deposits and
the demand for housing respectively, the latter which acts both as a
store of wealth and as a good delivering utility.
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5.2.1.2 Borrowers
Preferences of the borrowers are the same as those of the saver except
for the difference in the time discounting. Borrower household h ∈
[λ, 1] maximises
Et
∞
∑
s=0
βsB
$ ln(CBh,t+s − κCBt+s−1) + (1− $) ln(DBh,t+s−1)− (LBh,t+s)1+φ1+φ
 , (5.2.6)
subject to the nominal budget constraint
PCt C
B
h,t + P
D
t
(
DBh,t − (1− δD)DBh,t−1
)
+ RMh,tCR
HH,D
h,t−1
≤ CRHHh,t +WtLBh,t. (5.2.7)
The notations are identical to the saver household and where the
superscript B characterizes variables specific to borrowers. In par-
ticular, borrowers are assumed to be less patient than savers with
βB < β, so financing their consumption of housing with credit CRHHt
obtained from lending banks. This follows a number of papers (see
e.g. Kiyotaki & Moore 1997, Iacoviello 2005) that impose collateral
constraints by assuming the lender levies a maximum loan-to-value
ratio; this implies a constraint of the form
CRHHh,t ≤ mPDt DBh,t. (5.2.8)
The motivation is that, due to limited liability concerns, the lender
would want to ensure that household will not default the following
period if repayments due are greater than the value of their house.
With this in mind, we rule out the possibility of default by having the
loan repayment state contingent indexed to the house price. For nu-
merical simplicity we further assume that the borrowing constraint is
always binding. This will certainly be true in the deterministic steady
state, but with uncertainty the issue is less clear. For instance, the
borrowers could self insure in some states of the world by borrow-
ing below the limit to protect against the effects of adverse shocks.
We choose the parameter m so that the probability of this is reduced
to ensure this is a good approximation. The decision-making prob-
lems of the representative borrower household lead to a labour sup-
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ply condition analogous to that of the saver household. The housing
investment decision leads to an Euler equation in the form.
Et
[
β
λD,Bt+1
λC,Bt
PCt
PDt
+
ΛBt,t+1
Πt,t+1
(
ΠDt,t+1 (1− δD)− RMh,t+1m
)]
= 1−m. (5.2.9)
5.2.2 Housing Producers
The price of durable housing goods can differ from that of consump-
tion goods due to the presence of adjustment costs. To ensure that
savers and borrowers observe the same house price, we let housing
good producers augment the existing stock according to a law of mo-
tion
DTt = (1− δD)DTt−1 +
[
1− S
(
IDt
IDt−1
)]
IDt (5.2.10)
where δD ∈ (0, 1) denotes the depreciation rate of housing and the
function S(·) is a positive function of changes to investment, as ap-
plied to capital formation in Christiano et al. (2005), and is given by
S
(
IDt
IDt−1
)
=
ζD
2
(
IDt
IDt−1
− 1
)2
. (5.2.11)
The housing good producers solve
max
IDt
Et
∞
∑
s=0
Λt,t+s
PCt+s
(
PDt+s
[
1− S
(
IDt+s
IDt−1+s
)]
IDt+s − PPt+s IDt+s
)
,
(5.2.12)
where PPt is the domestic producer price, P
C
t the final consumption
good price index, and PDt the price at which housing goods are sold.
This leads to the first-order condition
PPt
PCt
= QDt
1− ζD
2
(
IDt
IDt−1
− 1
)2
− ζD
(
IDt
IDt−1
− 1
)
IDt
IDt−1

+Et
Λt,t+1QDt+1ζD
(
IDt+1
IDt
− 1
)(
IDt+1
IDt
)2 . (5.2.13)
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5.2.3 Firms
We introduce nominal rigidities in the price of consumption goods fol-
lowing Calvo (1983) and to this end we assume there are two types of
firms in the model economy: intermediate goods firms that are price
takers in perfect competition, and final goods firms that operate un-
der monopolistic competition. There is ‘price-stickiness’ introduced
in the latter sector due the assumption that only a fixed proportion
of firms are able to update prices each period.
5.2.3.1 Intermediate goods firms
Each intermediate goods producer hires capital services KDt and labour
LDt to produce a homogeneous output subject to a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function
Yt = Zt AtKDt
α
LDt
1−α
(5.2.14)
where At and Zt are stationary stochastic processes. The latter allows
for country-specific total factor productivity shocks and the former a
union wide shocks. Both are modelled as an AR(1) processes; aAt =
ρAaAt−1 + ε
A
t with at ≡ ln At and εAt being an normal i.i.d. stochastic
shock. There is an equivalent process for zt ≡ ln Zt. taking both the
aggregate real wage index wt and rental price of capital rkt as given,
the profit maximisation implies labour and capital demand given by
wt = α
Pw,t
PCt
Yw,t
LDt
(5.2.15)
rkt = (1− α)
Pw,t
PCt
Yw,t
KDt
, (5.2.16)
where Pw,t is the price at which the output is sold to all final goods
firms, and PCt the aggregate price index of consumption goods; this
implies that Pw,t/PCt = MCt is the real marginal cost in the final good
sector good sector.
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5.2.4 Final Good Demand Schedules
Households purchase differentiated final goods and combine bundles
of domestically produced goods Ht and aggregate imports IMt to
produce the final consumption bundle according to
Ct =
[(
τC
) 1
θC H
θC−1
θC
t +
(
1− τC
) 1
θC IM
θC−1
θC
t
] θC
θC−1
(5.2.17)
where τC is interpreted as the degree of home bias in household
consumption expenditures, and θC is the constant elasticity of sub-
stitution (CES) between domestic and foreign produced goods (see
Armington 1969). Ht and IMt are bundles of differentiated domestic
and foreign produced goods which households combine into baskets
of goods using
Ht =
(∫ 1
0
Ht(j)
σ−1
σ dj
) σ
σ−1
(5.2.18)
IMt =
(∫ 1
0
IMt(j∗)
σ−1
σ dj∗
) σ
σ−1
(5.2.19)
where σ denotes the elasticity of substitution between the different
varieties, assumed to be identical across the currency union, and the
asterisk indicates variables of the foreign country. The firm purchases
good Ht(j) from producer j ∈ (0, 1) at price PPt (j) to maximise (5.2.18)
subject to total expenditure PPt Ht =
∫ 1
0 P
P
t (j)Ht(j)dj, with an equiva-
lent problem for imports IMt(j∗). PPt is the producer price index. This
leads to Dixit & Stiglitz (1977) demand schedules
Ht (j) =
(
PPt (j)
PPt
)−σ
Ht (5.2.20)
IMt (j∗) =
(
PIMt (j
∗)
PIMt
)−σ
IMt. (5.2.21)
Equivalent conditions for the domestic demand of the investment
good and government consumption also hold. These demand func-
tions will be used in the intermediate good price setting problem
below. For now, we derive the consumption good price index in each
country and assume no pricing to market, which implies that PIMt =
PP
∗
t . The final good firms take input prices as given and maximize
their profits PCt Ct − PPt Ht − PIMt IMt. Profit maximization yields the
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following demand schedules for the domestic bundle and aggregate
imports
Ht = τC
(
PPt
PCt
)−θC
Ct (5.2.22)
IMt = (1− τC)
(
PIMt
Pt
)−θC
Ct (5.2.23)
This leads to the consumer price index PCt given by
PCt =
[
τC
(
PPt
)1−θC
+ (1− τC)
(
PIMt
)1−θC] 11−θC
. (5.2.24)
5.2.5 Final Good Producers
Each final good producer firm j ∈ (0, 1) purchases output from the
intermediate good sector at price Pw,t and converts into a differenti-
ated goods sold at price PPt (j) to households, durable good producers
and governments. Summing the demand schedules from each buyer
implies a total demand for good j given by
Yt (j) =
(
PPt (j)
PPt
)−σ
Yt (5.2.25)
Every period, each firm faces a fixed probability 1− ξ that they will
be able to update their prices. Denoting the optimal price at time t
for good j as P∗t (j), the firms allowed to re-optimize prices maximise
expected discounted profits by solving
max
P∗t (j)
Et
∞
∑
k=0
ξk
Λt,t+k
PCt+k
Yt+k (j) [P∗t (j)− Pw,t+k] . (5.2.26)
Substituting in the demand schedule, taking first-order conditions
with respect the new price and rearranging leads to
P∗t =
σ
σ− 1
Et ∑∞k=0 ξ
k Λt,t+k
PCt+k
(
PPt+k
)σ Yt+kPw,t+k
Et ∑∞k=0 ξk
Λt,t+k
PCt+k
(
PPt+k
)σ Yt+k (5.2.27)
where the j index is dropped as all firms face the same marginal
cost so the right-hand side of the equation is independent of firm
size or price history. To use the numerical approximation techniques
discussed in the methodology section of chapter 2, we require the
5.2 the model 161
model equations to be expressed as stochastic difference equations
rather than the infinite sums in equation 5.2.27. It is also necessary for
all variables need to be stationary and so rather than price levels, we
want to express the solution in terms of rates of change, and mark-ups
or price ratios. Recall from the previous section that the real marginal
cost is given by MCt =
Pw,t
PCt
, using this and the price inflation over the
interval [t− 1, t] denoted Πt−1,t ≡ PtPt−1 , we write the fraction
P∗t
PPt
=
σ
σ− 1
Et ∑∞k=0 ξ
kΛt,t+k
(
ΠPt,t+k
)σ
Yt+k MCt+k
PPt
PCt
Et ∑∞k=0 ξkΛt,t+k
(
ΠPt,t+k
)σ (
ΠCt,t+k
)−1
Yt+k
(5.2.28)
Denoting the numerator and denominator Ω1,t and Ω2,t we write in
recursive form
Ω1,t ≡ σ
σ− 1Yt MCt + ξEt
[
Λt,t+1
(
ΠPt,t+1
)σ
Ω1,t+1
]
(5.2.29)
Ω2,t ≡ P
P
t
PCt
Yt+k +Et
[
ξΛt,t+1
(
ΠPt,t+1
)σ (
ΠCt,t+1
)−1
Ω2,t+1
]
,
(5.2.30)
as required. Using the aggregate producer price index PPt and the
fact that all resetting firms will choose the same price, by the Law of
Large Numbers we can find the evolution of the price index as given
by
PPt
1−σ
= ξPPt−1
1−σ
+ (1− ξ)P∗t 1−σ (5.2.31)
which can be written in the form required
1 = ξ
(
ΠPt
)σ−1
+ (1− ξ)
(
P∗t
PPt
)1−σ
(5.2.32)
where Πt is the gross inflation in the price of domestically produced
goods between periods [t − 1, t]. Whilst the distribution of prices is
not required to track the evolution of the aggregate price index, equa-
tion 5.2.18 implies a loss of output due to dispersion in prices. Using
the demand schedules, we can write the price dispersion that gives
the average loss in output as
∆t =
1
J
J
∑
j−1
(
PPt (j)
PPt
)−σ
(5.2.33)
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for non-optimizing firms j = 1, ..., J. It is not possible to track all Pj,t
but as it is known that a proportion 1− ξ of firms will optimise prices
in period t, and from the Law of Large Numbers, that the distribution
of non-optimised prices will be the same in as the overall distribution.
Therefore price dispersion can be written as a law of motion
∆t = ξΠσt ∆t−1 + (1− ξ)
(
Ω1,t
Ω2,t
)−σ
. (5.2.34)
Using this, aggregate final output is given as a proportion of the in-
termediate output
Yt = Yw,t
1
∆t
. (5.2.35)
5.2.6 Financial Intermediation
There are two types of banks: savings banks that take deposits from
domestic households and lend in the currency union-wide interbank
market. Lending banks provide loans to both domestic firms and
households and finance these using interbank borrowing and their
own net worth. The financial friction emerges due to idiosyncratic
loan return shocks faced by the lending banks. Costly state verifi-
cation leads to an external finance premium as that proposed in
Bernanke et al. (1999). We add a further friction whereby cross-border
interbank credit faces additional monitoring costs that depend on the
exposure of the borrowing country to foreign debt.
The banks are owned by the patient households who are due any
profits earned. As savings banks act under perfect competition with
free-entry there are zero normal profits. Shocks that cause profits
(or losses) in a single period are transferred to (subsidised by) the
savers in that period. Lending banks face idiosyncratic shocks that
are costly for creditors to observe; limited liability then implies that
these banks earn profits in equilibrium. The lending banks are treated
slightly differently to the savings banks by assuming these banks pay
a fixed dividend rate to ensure lending banks cannot become self-
funding. This is a standard assumption in the literature equivalent to
the popular exogenous exit rate (see e.g. Bernanke et al. 1999, Gertler
& Kiyotaki 2010). The friction implies that equity is always more valu-
able than debt and so without this the banks would not pay dividends
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in equilibrium. Another difference in how lending banks are treated
is that savings banks can access central bank credit whilst lending
banks cannot. This could be motivated due to the risk-exposure of
lending banks; the savings banks are well diversified and the cen-
tral bank requires a proportion of safe assets as collateral. In reality
only a very small proportion of banks are able to access central bank
credit whilst the remaining banks must rely on the interbank and
other money markets.7
5.2.6.1 Lending Banks
There are many lending banks of unit mass indexed j ∈ [0, 1]. They
extend credit CRt to the non-financial sector, which they finance with
domestic IBHt and cross-border IB
F
t interbank borrowing and net
worth Nt:
CRt = Nt + IBHt + IB
F
t (5.2.36)
where IBHt and IB
F
t are chosen to maximise a CES Armington aggre-
gator (see Armington 1969) of domestic and foreign interbank bor-
rowing
IBt =
[(
τ IB
) 1
θIB (IBHt )
θIB−1
θIB +
(
1− τ IB
) 1
θIB (IBFt )
θIB−1
θIB
] θIB
θIB−1
, (5.2.37)
where τ IB is the home bias in interbank borrowing and θIB is the elas-
ticity of substitution between domestic and foreign borrowing. This
is similar to the assumption about household preference to domestic
goods and imports and is used to pin down steady state shares of in-
terbank borrowing. A non-zero θIB implies that domestic and foreign
interbank borrowing are not perfect substitutes and so also supports
differences in the lending rates. This yields the following demand
schedules
IBHt = τ
IB
(
RIB,Ht
RIBt
)−θIB
IBt (5.2.38)
IBFt = (1− τ IB)
(
RIB,Ft
RIBt
)−θIB
IBt (5.2.39)
7 As highlighted in Carrera & Vega (2012), only 6 out of 2500 banks in the Eurozone
are allowed to participate in the bidding process in main refinancing operations of
the ECB.
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where RIB,Ht is the lending rate on the domestic interbank market and
RIB,Ft the rate on the cross-border market. Using the demand sched-
ules and RIBt IBt = R
IB,H
t IB
H
t + R
IB,F
t IB
F
t , a definition of composite
interbank funding costs is given by
RIBt =
[
τ IB
(
RIB,Ht
)1−θIB
+ (1− τ IB)
(
RIB,Ft
)1−θIB] 11−θIB
. (5.2.40)
When granting loans to the non-financial private sector, we assume
that lending banks cannot diversify risk in their loan portfolio and
that they experience idiosyncratic loan return shocks ωt(j) that af-
fect the value of the asset side of their balance sheets.8 The shocks
are log-normally distributed, log(ωt(j)) ∼ N
(−(σ2ω,t/2), σ2ω,t), with
mean Et[ωt] = 1 and standard deviation σω,t, which is time-varying
and is modelled as an AR(1) process: log(σω,t) = (1− ρσ) log(σω,ss) +
ρσ log(σω,t−1) + uω,t and uω,t ∼ N (0, σσ).
After aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks hit the economy, net worth
of lending banks evolves according to
Nt (j) = ωt (j) RCRt CRt−1 (j)− RIBt−1 IBt−1 (j) (5.2.41)
where RCRt is the ex post return on banks’ loan portfolio CRt = CR
HH,S
t +
CRFt . Limited liability implies that if the realization of the shock is
below a threshold value ω¯t, which can be interpreted as the loan-
to-value ratio, then the lending bank will default on its interbank
borrowing as they would otherwise be insolvent. This is found when
Nt (j) = 0 and so defined as
ω¯t (j) =
RIBt−1 IBt−1 (j)
RCRt CRt−1 (j)
(5.2.42)
The lending banks will pay the saver households a fixed dividend
rate,9 investing all remaining profits in their own net worth. It is as-
sumed that a defaulting bank will exit but that for every exiting bank,
a new one enters and is given a small start-up fund by the other banks.
This ensures the number of banks is held constant. The idiosyncratic
8 This can be thought of as there being many islands and on each island there is
representative bank and borrower. We allow the borrowers to insure against the
shock so they pay a risk-free nominal rate. This simple device allows us to study
imperfect diversification in a tractable way.
9 Equivalent to the fixed probability of exit in Bernanke et al. (1999).
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loan return and default leads to a distribution of lending banks over
all possible values of net worth.
The loan portfolio is comprised of mortgage loans to households and
lending to firms. The former are treated as state-contingent (indexed
to house prices) one period bonds whilst, for the latter, it is conve-
nient to consider the banks owning the physical capital and renting
to firms10. Capital investment accumulates and is subject to costs anal-
ogous to those in housing investment and so to ensure the leverage of
a bank is independent of its net worth, we introduce a representative
capital producer that sells capital to the banks at relative price QKt .
This leads to a first order condition equivalent to equation (5.2.13)
that determines QKt . Gross nominal return on capital is given by
RKt =
rKt + (1− δK)QKt
QKt−1
Πt−1,t. (5.2.43)
The lending banks specify a contract for interbank funds subject to
participation constraints given in the following section. After work-
ing through the saving banks’ problem, we discuss the contract that
determines the demand for interbank credit, and the supply of credit
to the non-financial private sector.
5.2.6.2 Savings Banks
A representative savings bank has access to the central bank’s liquid-
ity providing operations CBt, raises deposits St from patient house-
holds and extends both domestic IBHt and cross-border IB
F∗
t inter-
bank loans:
St + CBt = IBHt + IB
F∗
t (5.2.44)
Maximising the expected profits lead to the arbitrage conditions
Et
[
Λt,t+1
PCt+1
RSt
]
= Et
[
Λt,t+1
PCt+1
R˜IBt+1
]
(5.2.45)
where R˜IBt is the ex post return on interbank lending. We will consider
the role of long-term central bank credit so leave discussion of the
10 As in Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010). This is equivalent to the firms using state-contingent
debt to purchase the capital themselves. It is natural to assume that debt contracts are
state-contingent due to costless monitoring and enforcement, and the risk neutrality
of the lender.
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relationship with the policy rate until further below. Under standard
one-period central bank finance, the deposit rate must equal the pol-
icy rate in equilibrium. The saving bank can only observe the loan
return of the lending bank if it pays a proportional fee µ. As shown
in Townsend (1979), the implication of this costly state verification is
that the fee will only be paid in the event of default, with all other
debtors paying the same interest rate. The interbank lending is sub-
ject to a participation constraint that accounts for the distribution of
idiosyncratic shocks drawn by lending banks and the aggregate state
of the economy. The savings banks require the expected real return
from granting each domestic interbank loans to be equal to their ex-
pected real funding rate, using the household Euler equation, this can
be written
1 = Et
[
Λt,t+1
ΠCt+1
[1− F(ω¯t+1 (j) , σω,t+1)] RIB,Ht (j)
]
+Et
[
Λt,t+1
ΠCt+1
(1− µ) ∫ ω¯t+1(j)0 ωRCRt+1 CRt(j)IBHt (j)+IBFt (j)dF(ω, σω,t+1)
]
.
(5.2.46)
µ is the monitoring cost banks pay to recover the remaining assets of a
bank in the case of default, and F(ω¯ (j) , σ) ≡ ∫ ω¯(j)0 f (ω; −σ22 , σ2) dω
is the cumulative density function up to ω¯ (j), with probability den-
sity function f
(
ω; −σ22 , σ
2
)
. Note this implies that F(ω¯t+1 (j) , σω,t+1)
is the probability of default. We will find that individual bank net
worth does not effect the interest rate paid on credit as all banks will
choose the same leverage ratio, and therefore equation (5.2.46) will
hold if the index j is dropped, with the variables treated as the aggre-
gate averages. When taking positions in the cross-border interbank
market, we assume that savings banks incur additional monitoring
costs ΓIB,t that are increasing in its exposure of the destination coun-
try to cross-border debt, and to risk within the economy. Such costs
reflect factors such as asymmetric information, counter-party risk as
well as differences in cross-border macroeconomic conditions. Specif-
ically, this is given by
ΓIB,t = ζ IB
[(
1− exp
(
IBFt −CB∗t −IBF
∗
t
PYj,tYj,t
))
+ ζσ
(
σ∗ω,t
σω
− 1
)]
. (5.2.47)
where the second element in the fraction highlights an additional in-
crease to the cost of accessing funds following a shock to the variance
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of the idiosyncratic loan return shock. Therefore, the participation
constraint for international interbank loans can be expressed as
1 = Et
[
Λt,t+1
ΠCt+1
(1− ΓIB,t)
[
1− F(ω¯t+1 (j∗) , σ∗ω,t+1)
]
RIB,Ft (j
∗)
]
+Et
[
Λt,t+1
ΠCt+1
(1− µ)G(ω¯t+1(j∗),σ∗ω,t+1)
ω¯t+1(j∗)
RIBt (j
∗) IBt(j
∗)
IBHt (j∗)+IBFt (j∗)
]
.
(5.2.48)
where G(ω¯t+1 (j∗) , σ∗ω,t+1) ≡
∫ ω¯t(j)
0 ωdF(ω, σt) and F
j
t = F(ω¯t (j) , σt).
Equation (5.2.48) implies a spread in the cross-border interbank mar-
ket R
IB,F
t (j
∗)
RSt
that is a function of the monitoring cost ΓIB,t, which itself
is an increasing function of total cross-border exposure. That is, the
higher the volume of cross-border loans, the higher the spread re-
quired to compensate savings banks for the increase in credit risk.
In a similar vein, aggregate shocks that lead to a decline in nominal
domestic GDP will cause the ratio of net foreign assets to output to
increase, thereby leading to a rise in the spread. Also, the spread is
increasing in the standard deviation of the loan return shock: a higher
σω,t will increase the risks of default by making lower realization of
ωt(j) more likely.
5.2.6.3 Interbank Credit Market
To model the over-the-counter structure of the interbank market, we
follow Bernanke et al. (1999) in our treatment of the lending contract.
The lending banks choose credit to the non-financial private sector
CRt, the volume of interbank lending IBHt and IB
F
t , and interest rates
RIB,Ht and R
IB,F
t to maximise their expected real net worth. The en-
trepreneur pays a fraction 1− γ as a dividend, with the remaining
surplus used as internal equity finance. Substituting in the expres-
sion for ω¯t+1 the problem is written
max
Xt
Et
[
Λt,t+1
PCt+1
γ [1− G (ω¯t+1)− (1− F (ω¯t+1)) ω¯t+1] RCRt+1CRt
]
(5.2.49)
where Xt =
{
CRt, IBHt , IB
F
t , R
IB,H
t , R
IB,F
t
}
is a vector of controls and
dropping any individual bank index for ease of reading. The maximi-
sation is subject to the bank balance sheet equation (5.2.36), the inter-
bank fund demand functions equations (5.2.38) and (5.2.39), the com-
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posite interest rate (5.2.40), the loan-to-value equation (5.2.42), and
the saver bank participation constraints given in equations (5.2.46)
and (5.2.48).
The solution to the contract problem yields a condition that deter-
mines the wedge between the nominal risk-free rate RSt , and the ex-
pected return from credit to the non-financial sector RCRt+1. We can
express this as
Et
[
RCRt+1
RSt
]
= Et
[
s
(
RSt , R
IB,H
t , R
IB,F
t , Γ
∗
IB,t,
IBt
CRt
, ω¯t+1σω,t+1
)]
(5.2.50)
with key arguments given, although the nominal stochastic discount
factors of both countries are also arguments of function s. In this solu-
tion, which is given in full in appendix B.1, the expected real return to
lending is equated with the real marginal cost of external finance. Be-
cause the solution is a function of the leverage rather than the bank
size, the contract interest rates will independent of the bank’s own
history of shocks and so we focus only on aggregate identities. The
function s can be described as the investment or credit wedge, or the
external finance premium as discussed in (Bernanke et al. 1999). This
acts as the financial accelerator and it is particularly worth noting the
relationship between s and the capital-asset ratio of the lending bank.
As leverage increases, so NtCRt falls, the probability of default increases,
and the marginal cost of borrowing rises. This is the financial accel-
erator mechanism; if, for instance, an adverse shock reduces the net
worth of the banking sector, bank leverage will increase, and so to
will the credit wedge s causing a further deepening of the downturn.
5.2.7 Firm and Household Credit
As discussed, the firm loans are treated as equivalent to equity, and
so the return on firm credit is simply the gross return on capital,
RKt , defined in equation (5.2.43). The credit to households is indexed
to the house prices, so ex post return is given by RMt = Rˆ
M
t−1P
D
t for
the contracted rate RˆMt−1. The optimality condition implies the zero
arbitrage conditions
Et
[
Λt,t+1
PCt+1
RCRt+1
]
= Et
[
Λt,t+1
PCt+1
RMt+1
]
= Et
[
Λt,t+1
PCt+1
RKt+1
]
(5.2.51)
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must hold in equilibrium.
5.2.8 Monetary Policy
The monetary authority sets the nominal short-term interest rate in
response to deviations of the consumer price inflation rate from the
inflation target and off-trend output growth
Rt =
R¯(ΠEMUt
Π¯EMU
)ϕpi (YEMUt
YEMUt−1
)ϕy1−ϕr Rϕrt−1 exp(εmt ) (5.2.52)
The union-wide variables ΠEMUt and Y
EMU
t are given as averages over
the home and foreign country variables, where
ΠEMUt =
PEMUt
PEMUt−1
=
(
PCt
)n (PC∗t )1−n(
PCt−1
)n (PC∗t−1)1−n (5.2.53)
YEMUt = (Yt)
n (Y∗t )
1−n
The economy as presented to this point features a unit root stemming
from a single savings rate across both economies. As savers in both
countries face the same return on assets, long-run effects from tran-
sitory shocks are introduced. For instance, if one of the economies
draws a positive supply shock; the net foreign asset position will
improve and the economy will have a current account surplus that
persists in the long-run, with a permanent increase in the wealth of
the savers in the economy that draws the shock. To restore the sta-
tionary property to the model, we assume that the central bank ap-
plies a small premium on the refinancing rate that depends on the
net foreign asset position of the country.11 The rates paid on CBt are
determined by
Rt = RPt − ϑt
(
exp
[
κ
NFAt
PCt Yt
]
− 1
)
. (5.2.54)
where ϑt is a stationary, mean 1 shock to the premium, and κ the pre-
mium elasticity. RPt = R
P
t
∗ is the central policy rate, and Rt and R∗t
the rates paid on central bank credit. Central bank funds are in zero
net supply so if savings banks in the home country borrow from the
11 See Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2003) for a full discussion of the techniques used to
remove the random walk in open-economy models.
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central bank, it follows that foreign country savings banks are depos-
itors, and Rt > Rt∗. The risk premium will cause the net foreign asset
position of banks in each country to adjust until NFAt = NFA∗t = 0
and Rt = R∗t . The structure of the premium implies that there will be
weakly positive profits in equilibrium which are transferred equally
to savers in the union. In the numerical simulations we choose κ suf-
ficiently low to allow the rates to be very close but generating persis-
tent effects.
5.2.9 Market clearing conditions
The labour market is in equilibrium when total supply by households
equals the demand from intermediate good producers,
LDt = λLt + (1− λ) LBt . (5.2.55)
The corresponding capital market equilibrium condition is given by
KDt = Kt−1. (5.2.56)
Total demand for domestically produced goods include the demand
from domestic households HTt ≡ λHt + (1− λ) HBt , demand from
foreign consumers XTt ≡ λXt + (1− λ)XBt , demand from capital pro-
ducers IKt
(
1− ζK (IKt /IKt−1 − 1)2) and from housing good producers
IDt
(
1− ζD (IDt /IDt−1 − 1)2) which are net the adjustment costs, and
demand for government consumption. The implied real resource con-
straint is then
Yt = HTt + X
T
t + I
K
t
(
1− ζK
(
IKt /I
K
t−1 − 1
)2)
+ IDt
(
1− ζD
(
IDt /I
D
t−1 − 1
)2)
+ gtYt (5.2.57)
where government consumption is given as a proportion gt of output,
with gt following a stationary stochastic process. The net foreign asset
position evolves according to the following nominal law of motion
IBF
∗
t − IBFt −CBt = RIB,F
∗
t−1 IB
F∗
t −Rt−1CBt−1−RIB,Ft−1 IBFt +TBt, (5.2.58)
where the trade balance is defined as
TBt = PPt Xt − PIMt IMt. (5.2.59)
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The bilateral terms of trade are given by:
ToTt =
PIMt
PXt
(5.2.60)
and the central bank funds are zero net supply worldwide, so
nCBt + (1− n)CB∗t = 0. (5.2.61)
5.3 policy
The focus of the chapter is the analysis of unconventional monetary
policy in an economy with interbank market frictions. The two poli-
cies we discuss are longer term central bank refinance operations, and
central bank asset purchases.
5.3.1 Long-term Refinance Operations
As discussed above, savings banks have access to funding from the
central bank. The operations of the central bank can be standard one-
period loans to banks or may take the form of multi-period loan con-
tracts, similar to the ECB’s long-term refinancing operations (LTRO).12
To maintain tractability and keep the number of state variables man-
ageable, we follow Rudebusch & Swanson (2012)13 and introduce
multi-period loan contracts using geometrically decaying repayments
over an infinite horizon. This set-up reflects the aggregation of a large
number of loans at different points of repayment and of different ma-
turities. As well as introducing just one new state variable rather than
potentially very many with long maturities, the appeal is that using
infinitely long loans with geometrically declining repayments allows
us to control the average maturity with just one parameter, nesting
the possibility of ψ = 0, in which case it collapses to a standard one-
period loan contract. Every period t, a savings bank will take out a
12 See e.g. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111208_1.en.
html for information on this policy.
13 Described in detail to analyse term premia on bonds in a working paper version of
the article (see Rudebusch & Swanson 2008). Used to introduce multi-period loan
contracts in Benes & Lees (2010).
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new loan amount CBt and agree to repay an infinite number of de-
clining payments such that the total amount due at period t is given
by:
CBTt−1 =
∞
∑
k=1
ψk−1RLTt−kCBt−k (5.3.1)
The parameter ψ ∈ [0, 1) determines the average loan duration. When
ψ > 0, RLTt is no longer equivalent to an interest rate; to analyse the
role of the LTRO policy, we assume that the central bank chooses
RLTt so that the average interest rate on long-term borrowing equals
the policy rate Rt. As we are using perpetual loan repayments, we
measure the average duration using Macaulay’s duration of a stream
of payments. It is then straightforward to calculate the equivalent
average nominal interest rate on the amount borrowed CBt from the
total amount repaid. We find this leads to the following relationship
between the rate RLTt and the policy rate Rt:
Rt =
(
RLTt
1− ψ
)(1/d)
(5.3.2)
with average loan duration d = R/(R − ψ), where R is the steady-
state policy rate.14 We can then express equation (5.3.1) in recursive
form as
CBTt = ψCB
T
t−1 + R
LT
t CBt. (5.3.3)
Even if the bank does not borrow from the central bank in equilib-
rium, as will be the case with purely symmetric shocks, the avail-
ability of these loans is sufficient to have an important impact on
the household saving rate. Using equation 5.3.3 as a constraint in the
profit maximisation problem of the savings bank leads to the first-
order conditions
φt = Et
[
Λt,t+1
ΠCt
(1+ φt+1ψ)
]
(5.3.4)
φtRLTt = Et
[
Λt,t+1
ΠCt
RSt
]
(5.3.5)
14 For perpetual loan repayments, the average loan duration is measured using
Macaulay’s duration of a stream of payments, given by dt = ∑∞t=1 tPVt/∑
∞
t=1 PVt
where PVt is the present value of the cash flow (see e.g. Marrison 2002). Applying
this to our example, we find in simulations that dt experiences only tiny fluctuations
around it’s steady state value, and so we use the steady state value as a close approx-
imation. This can be simplified to d =
R
R− ψ . It is then straightforward to calculate
the average interest rate given that borrowing is a convergent series.
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Which, with equation (5.3.2), gives the spread between the policy rate
Rt and the deposit rate RSt . φt is the real present value of the Lagrange
multiplier on the law of motion of repayments due, and is a nominal
pricing kernel on central bank credit. When d = 1 and ψ = 0, then
RLTt = Rt = R
S
t as in the standard model, and φt is just the nominal
stochastic discount factor. As the loan duration increases so ψ > 1,
the implied future stream of payments increase and ψt >
Λt,t+1
Πt,t+1
. This
mechanism captures some important features. Suppose there is an ad-
verse shock causing the central bank to lower rates, the bank observes
that these low rates lower the average rates for longer and so demand
even lower rates from the households; this implies that smaller drops
in rates are required to achieve the equivalent stimulus in a single
period loan economy.
5.3.2 Asset Purchases
A further instrument available to the policy maker is to purchase
assets financed by issuing one-period bonds. The bonds are issued at
the market rate, which by zero arbitrage will equal the deposit rate
RSt and the policy maker uses the proceeds to purchase some number
of loans from the lending banks.
At the start of the period during which the asset purchase will take
place, the policy maker announces the purchase decision. This im-
plies the lending bank first order conditions are unchanged except
the volume of loans on the bank balance sheet changes to
CRt = (1−Θt)
(
CRHHt + CR
F
t
)
(5.3.6)
where Θt is the proportion of assets held by the central bank. We
treat asset purchases as if the central bank lends directly to the pri-
vate sector as Gertler & Karadi (2011) postulate. The central bank
raises Θt
(
CRHHt + CR
F
t
)
in the bond market to make loans to the pri-
vate sector with profits distributed to the households via lump sum
transfers. The central bank budget constraint can be written as two
constraints
Θt
(
CRHHt + CR
F
t
)
= BCBt (5.3.7)
Tt = RCRt Θt
(
CRHHt−1 + CR
F
t−1
)
− RSt−1BCBt−1 (5.3.8)
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where RCRt is the average ex post return on all assets, Tt transfers to
households, and BCBt central bank issued bonds. The first constraint
is that all funds raised are used to purchase assets and the second
that all profits are transferred to households.
5.4 calibration and parametrization
We calibrate a number of the structural parameters of our model,
as shown in table 5.1, with the aim of matching key empirical first
moments with remaining parameters given values based on previous
estimates in the literature, see table 5.2. On the household side, we fix
the fraction of savers λ in each economy to 0.65, close to the estimate
obtained by Quint & Rabanal (2014). The discount factor of savers
(borrowers) β (βB) is chosen to be 0.995 (0.89), ensuring a nominal
steady-state return on risk-free savings of around 4%. External habit
Parameter Description Value Target
β Patient agent discount factor 0.995 R = 1.0408
$ Utility weight of non-durable
consumption
0.82 IH/Y = 0.045
τC Home-bias in consumption 0.75 X
T
XT+HT = 0.25
σ Elasticity of substitution across
consumption varieties
3.86 Mark-up = 1.35
σω Standard deviation of loan re-
turn shock
0.0339 ω¯ = 0.9
γ Retained share of bank profits 0.947 F (ω¯, σω) = 0.004
τ IB Home-bias in interbank bor-
rowing
0.75 IB
F
IBH+IBF = 0.25
g Steady-state G/Y 0.2 G/Y = 0.2
Table 5.1: Calibrations of model parameters.
in consumption κ is set at 0.564 according to estimates of Christoffel
et al. (2008) for the Euro area. The relative share of non-durables in
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consumption $ is calibrated to be 0.82 to target the output share of
housing investment. The inverse of the Frisch labour supply elasticity
φ is parametrised to be 0.4 (cf. Quint & Rabanal 2014). The quasi-share
of domestic goods in total consumption τC is fixed at 0.75 to ensure
a steady-state share of imports in consumption of 25%. The elasticity
of substitution between domestic goods and imports θC is set at 1.9
in line with Quint & Rabanal (2014) estimates.
On the production side, we choose a value of 0.3 for the share of
labour α in the Cobb-Douglas production function. Capital deprecia-
tion δ and δH are assumed to be 10% per annum. Adjustment costs
ζ I in capital investment are fixed at 5.2 (following estimations in
Christoffel et al. 2008), while those in housing investment (ζH) are
set at 1.7 as estimated in Quint & Rabanal (2014). The elasticity of
substitution across consumption goods σ is chosen so as to ensure a
steady state mark-up of 1.35 and the Calvo parameter ξ is set to be
0.9, both in line with estimates obtained by Christoffel et al. (2008).
On the banking side, savings banks’ monitoring costs, µ, are assumed
to be 0.2 as in Quint & Rabanal (2014) and Carlstrom & Fuerst (1997).
For the borrowers loan-to-value ratio, we use the estimated value of
m =0.55 from Iacoviello (2005). The steady state standard deviation
of the loan return shock, σω, and the bank dividend payment rate,
1− γ, are calibrated to 3.39 percentage points and 4.53% respectively
to target a steady-state value of the loan-to-value ratio ω¯ of 0.9 in-line
with typical industry leverage ratios, and a default rate of banks of
around 0.4% in steady state, matching the average historical default
rate in the banking industry over the period 1970-2010, as well as an
equilibrium spread for mortgage and interbank loans of around 1.75
percentage points and 10 basis points respectively over the policy rate,
in line with typical measures of the average spreads (see e.g. Housing
Finance in the Euro Area 2009). The share of cross-border intra-Euro
area interbank borrowing τ IB is set at 0.75 to match figures reported
by Colangelo & Lenza (2013). The elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign interbank funding θ IB is fixed at 2, implying
that these sources of funding are not perfect substitutes.
On the policy side, we fix the share of government spending in GDP
to 20%. Together with the other parametrizations of our model, this
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Parameter Description Value
λ Fraction of savers 0.65
βB Borrowers discount factor 0.89
eC Habits formation 0.564
φ Inverse Frisch elasticity 0.4
θC Elasticity between domestic goods/imports 1.9
α Capital share of production 0.3
β Household discount factor 0.99
δK Capital depreciation rate 0.025
δD Housing depreciation rate 0.025
ζK Capital adjustment parameter 5.2
ζD Housing adjustment parameter 1.75
ξ Calvo parameter 0.9
µ Monitoring costs 0.2
m Borrowers LTV ratio 0.55
θIB Elasticity of substitution between domestic/cross-
border interbank credit
2
ζ IB Cross-border interbank cost coefficient 0.5
ϕy Taylor rule response to output growth 0.15
ϕpi Taylor rule response to inflation 1.9
ϕr Taylor rule persistence 0.87
Π¯ Inflation target 1.005
Table 5.2: Parametrisation of model parameters.
ensures that we are able to get close matches of the relative spending
shares of consumption (59%), investment (21%) and housing invest-
ment (4.5%) in GDP with their empirical first moments for the Euro
area as a whole. Regarding monetary policy, we follow Christoffel
et al. (2008) and set the central bank response to inflation ϕpi to 1.9
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and to output growth ϕy to 0.15. Policy inertia is set at 0.87. For the
LTRO, average loan duration ψ is calibrated to be 0.9213 with a view
to matching the ECB’s latest series of three-year loans.
Finally, the standard deviations and persistence coefficients of the
shock processes are largely taken from Christoffel et al. (2008), with
the exception of the risk shock, which is taken from Quint & Ra-
banal (2014), and the government spending shock, which has been
calibrated on the basis of estimates obtained by Smets & Wouters
(2003). For the interbank risk premium shock, for which no estimates
in the literature are available, we assume a persistence of 0.8 and a
standard deviation of 0.2. These are shown in table 5.3.
Parameter Description Value
σA Technology shock 0.0126
σG Government spending shock 0.00325
σIB Interbank cost shock 0.2
σσ Risk shock 0.00339
σM Monetary policy shock 0.00115
ρA Technology shock 0.9
ρG Government spending shock 0.95
ρIB Interbank cost shock 0.8
ρσ Risk shock 0.85
Table 5.3: Parametrisation of shock parameters.
5.5 numerical results and analysis
To evaluate the model dynamics, we compute a second order Tay-
lor approximation of the decision and transition functions of the
model and simulate impulse response functions. We draw particu-
lar focus on shocks to the risk of the loan return shocks, in addition
to the asymmetric total factor productivity and government spend-
ing shocks, and a standard monetary policy shock. We then discuss
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the alternative policy measures. To provide comparison, we simulate
a version of the model with the spread between final private sector
lending rates and the policy rate fixed to the steady state value, and a
version with the the cross-border interbank borrowing cost switched
off. Whilst fixing the spreads might seem an ad-hoc modification,
this allows us to compare the model dynamics with the same steady
state but without the financial accelerator mechanism, as suggested
in Bernanke et al. (1999).
5.5.1 Monetary Policy Shock
Figure 5.1 shows the impulse response to a reduction in the policy
Figure 5.1: Impulse response functions to a negative monetary policy shock.
s (·) is the external finance premium. Deviations in levels from
the deterministic steady state.
rate and highlights the financial accelerator in action. The interest rate
drop increases private sector demand as expected, but, in the model
in which banks face idiosyncratic uncertainty on loan returns, the
shock strengthens the banks balance sheets which lowers their fund-
ing costs. This causes the private sector lending rates to fall, leading
to an increase in mortgage loans and capital investment. This feeds
back into the overall aggregate demand providing an additional boost
to total output. The plotted variable s (·) is the external finance pre-
mium, or, alternatively, the investment wedge, to relate it to the other
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chapters in this thesis. Although there is a large impact on mortgage
issuance, just under 5% increase for a policy rate fall of just less than
10 basis points, the impact on total housing investment is rather more
muted. This is the result of distributional issues introduced by the
friction. Whilst the friction lowers borrowing costs for firms and im-
patient households, the policy maker keeps the interest rate higher
relative to the fixed spread economy due to the increased output and
inflation resulting in higher savings rates for savers who consume less
non-durable and durable goods in response. This effect offsets the in-
crease in housing investment coming from borrowers. As the shock is
uniform across the monetary union, the response of each economy to
the policy shock are entirely identical. This also implies that the net
foreign asset position of each economy is unchanged so causing no
impact on the cross-border interbank market friction.
5.5.2 Home Country Productivity Shock
We now consider an asymmetric negative supply shock in just one
of the countries. Suppose the home country draws a 1 standard de-
viation reduction in total factor productivity. In a standard closed-
economy model, the policy maker will cut the policy rate to stimu-
late demand and smooth the impact of the shock. Within a monetary
union, the interest rate cut will have a impact in all economies, and
there will be further effects via cross-border spillovers. A selection of
the impulse response functions are plotted in figure 5.2 comparing
to the economy without the cost applied to cross-border interbank
borrowing, but still with the financial accelerator coming from the id-
iosyncratic asset return shock. We find that the friction generates sig-
nificant distributional effects between the countries whilst leaving the
response of union-wide output and inflation closely matched across
the two models. As the monetary authority only reacts to union-wide
fluctuations, the policy response in both models is similar. In the
home country, reduced productivity leads to an output decline and in-
crease in prices causes by a downward shift in the supply curve. The
policy maker reacts to an increase in inflation with an interest rate
rise; the greater weight on inflation is important here as the response
could change sign with a higher weight on output. In the home coun-
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Figure 5.2: Impulse response functions to a negative transitory shock to
home country total factor productivity comparing baseline
model with a version with ζ IB = 0 and a version without any
financial frictions. Deviations in levels from the deterministic
steady state.
try, an increase in prices and higher savings rates generates a decline
in demand for real consumption from the savers, and without fric-
tions there are large falls in cross-border interbank borrowing and a
slow decline in capital investment. The falls in cross-border interbank
borrowing stem from higher real interest rates in the foreign coun-
try where the increase in the inflation rate is smaller; this tightens
the participation constraint for foreign banks to lend in the interbank
market, raising cross-border interbank rates for home lending banks.
There is a fall in net exports due to the higher relative prices of do-
mestically produced goods leading to a fall in the net foreign asset
position of the economy to fund the trade deficit, despite the fall in
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cross-border interbank credit; the savings banks increase reliance on
central bank refinance operations for funds. The interest rate increase
raises borrowing costs, but the reduction in saver demand for hous-
ing reduces house prices causing an expansion in mortgage loans. In
the foreign country, there is an small decline in output due to de-
creased investment and domestic consumption, offset by higher net
export demand.
With the financial accelerator mechanism but with ζ IB = 0, in the
home country, the interest rate rise actually increases demand for
savings sufficiently to generate a small initial increase in investment
and rise in the cost of capital. This has important consequences as it
strengthens the balance sheet position of the lending bank which low-
ers their funding rates, causing a fall in the external finance premium,
and feeding through to higher relative demand for mortgage credit
and capital investment. The accelerator mechanism reduces saver con-
sumption demand relative to the friction-less case which causes a
smaller in crease in inflation. The fall in demand for cross-border in-
terbank funds is much reduced due to the lower interbank rates, and
the savings bank borrow less from the central bank. In the foreign
country, the interaction between the policy rate hike and the financial
accelerator dominates the cross-border effects, and we observe the
typical response one might expect from a monetary policy shock, as
discussed above. Demand falls from savers whom increase savings,
borrowers experience a negative wealth effect that lowers both de-
mand for consumption and credit, and firms reduce investment. A
resulting fall in the relative price of capital weakens the balance sheet
of the lending bank, increasing borrowing costs in the economy. The
result is a weakening of the balance of trade in the home country rela-
tive to the no friction case with the additional credit via the interbank
market.
Considering the baseline case, with the cross-border interbank fund-
ing cost in additional to the costly state verification friction, we find
some features of the last model are enhanced whilst some are re-
versed. Firstly, the effect of the financial accelerator is reduced, as
lending banks face higher funding costs from the interbank market.
The drop in cross-border interbank borrowing is greater than both the
no-friction case, and the financial accelerator case. The higher inter-
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bank funding costs lead to a much larger drop in investment causing
a deeper recession, and a greater reduction in interbank funds which
lead to lower relative imports. The foreign country receives the ben-
efit as funds that would otherwise have invested in home-country
capital are invested in foreign country capital, leading to an increase
in price of capital, a strengthening of lending banks balance sheets,
and, hence, a reversal of the financial accelerator mechanism causing
an boom in total output.
5.5.3 Home Country Government Consumption Shock
The third shock is a reduction in home country government spend-
ing with plots shown in figure 5.3. In the absence of the cross-border
interbank funding cost, the reduction in aggregate demand leads to
a crowding in of saver consumption, but, due to an increase in the
investment wedge caused by the external finance premium, an in-
crease in the cost of credit that lowers borrower consumption and
reduces investment. The lower relative prices of the home produced
consumption good increases net exports leading to an increase in the
net foreign asset position of the home country and reduced demand
for cross-border interbank funds. Additional funds and positive de-
mand shock coming from the lower policy rate in the foreign country
contributes to a boost to investment and output. Introducing the cost
that increases in the exposure to international debt raises the funding
cost in the foreign country but reduces the cost in the home country.
This acts to dampen the negative effects in the home country, and
generate negative cross-border spillovers in the form of falls in invest-
ment and output in the foreign country.
5.5.4 Home Country Risk Shock
The fourth shock considered is an adverse risk shock to loan returns
in the home country. Specifically this is a positive shock to the vari-
ance of the idiosyncratic loan return shock ω(j). Whilst the chosen
probability distribution is mean preserving, so ceteris paribus, the av-
erage loan return is unchanged, the shock raises the skewness of the
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Figure 5.3: Impulse response functions to a transitory reduction in home
country government consumption, comparing baseline model
with a version with ζ IB = 0. Deviations in levels from the de-
terministic steady state.
distribution of ω(j), and the probability of a low ω(j) increases. This
leads to increased bank default in the home country, so higher in-
terbank funding rates and a reduction of credit in the home coun-
try. Plots of the impulse response functions are shown in figure 5.4.
As the risk shock only effects the models with the costly state veri-
fication friction, we concentrate attention on the baseline model, the
model with ζ IB = 0, and a version with ζσ = 0. The latter includes
the cross-border interbank cost that increases in the international debt
position of the borrower country but switches off the element of the
cost that is increasing in the risk. As is clear from figure 5.4, the cost
only plays a particularly important role if the lender on the interbank
market punishes additional risk in loan returns; in this case, the ad-
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Figure 5.4: Impulse response functions to a transitory risk shock, comparing
baseline model with (i) a version with ζ IB = 0, and (ii) a version
with ζσ = 0. Deviations in levels from the deterministic steady
state.
verse effects of the risk shock are worse for both economies. In the
model with ζ IB = 0, the reduction in credit reduces investment and
aggregate supply as a result, and reduces credit to borrowers leading
to a fall in aggregate demand. There is an overall drop in prices and
net exports increase following a small initial fall. Although there is
a contraction in interbank borrowing, this is largely replaced by sav-
ings bank receiving credit from the central bank; this leads to a fall
in the net foreign asset position of the home country, although this
increases in the trade balance in the periods following the shock. The
spillover to the foreign country generates similar responses although
an order of magnitude smaller.
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With ζσ = 0, the initial fall in the net foreign asset position of the
home country leads to an additional cost in accessing interbank credit
which reduces the initial cross-border interbank borrowing in the
home country and increases it in the foreign country. The higher cost
of funding costs is passed on to the home country private sector caus-
ing a larger fall in investment, and output. There is a similarly sized
relative increase in investment and output in the foreign country who
are the beneficiaries of additional private sector credit. The reduction
in exposure to interbank credit drives a higher net foreign asset po-
sition relative to the no-cost case, and so causing a shrinking of the
additional cost of interbank credit. This results in only a small effect
of the cost on aggregate outcomes.
If we allow creditors on the interbank market to discriminate against
foreign borrowers on the basis of the variance of the loan return shock,
σω, then the impact of the risk shock is more severe. The friction acts
as an accelerator mechanism compared to the ζ IB case; the cost of
interbank funds increase, reducing the volume of credit in the home
country and both capital investment and the volume of mortgages
fall. The resulting contraction in output and drop in prices are deeper
relative to either of the other models tested. In the foreign country,
the spill-over effects of the risk-shock are enhanced, with a deeper
decline in output, investment and prices. With less credit available to
the home country as a whole, the net exports increase relative to the
other tested models.
5.5.5 Policy Experiments
The monetary authority is given two additional tools that can be used
to respond to shocks: purchasing asset-backed securities, and intro-
ducing multi-period refinancing operations.
5.5.5.1 Asset Purchase Program
For this policy, the central bank raises funds in the bond market
which are used to purchase baskets of assets from the lending banks.
This is equivalent to the set-up in Gertler & Karadi (2011), whereby
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the central bank can act as a commercial bank, taking deposits and
lending to the private sector, but avoiding the agency problem inher-
ent to the banking sector. This point is important, because, by acting
as a commercial bank, the central bank reduces the risky assets on
the lending banks balance sheet reducing the external finance pre-
mium. Figure 5.5 shows the response to temporary asset purchase
Figure 5.5: Impulse response functions to a transitory central bank asset-
purchase shock. The central bank purchases 2% of all non-
financial private sector loans in the first period, returning to the
lending banks after 16 periods. Deviations in levels from deter-
ministic steady state.
programme. In the first period, the central bank purchases 2% of all
available assets and holds them for 16 periods. The asset purchases
reduces the leverage of lending banks and so the external finance pre-
mium. This reduces the cost of credit in the private sector increasing
the demand for loans and mortgages. As both firms and households
demand credit, the policy has both supply-side and demand side ef-
fects. The monetary policy rule causes the policy rate to counter the
expansionary effects of the asset purchases but the indication is that
there is an short-term expansionary role of asset purchases. As the
lending banks become more highly leveraged after the policy is intro-
duced, the external finance premium returns to the steady state value
and some of the gains are reversed, the economy also responds to the
contractionary monetary policy and there is a decline in economic
activity once the purchase program completes. At this point, as the
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lending banks become more highly leveraged due to the returned as-
sets, there is a spike in the external finance premium and reduction in
credit. In an episode when the interest rate is at the zero lower bound,
the indication is that there could be role as an alternative measure.
Figure 5.6 plots impulse response functions to a risk shock with a
Figure 5.6: Impulse response functions to a transitory risk shock with cen-
tral bank asset-purchase policy response. Deviations in levels
from deterministic steady state.
16-period asset purchase programme whereby the central bank pur-
chases 2% of all loans in the economy. The policy, which is applied
equally to both economies, is successful at smoothing deviations in
the home country, although generates greater volatility in the foreign
country. Due to the symmetric nature of the shock, there is no impact
on net exports and the net foreign asset position of the two countries.
The results change if the policy were focused on the home country
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alone. Figure 5.7 plots the same but with only home country assets
Figure 5.7: Impulse response functions to a transitory risk shock with cen-
tral bank home country asset-purchase policy response. Devia-
tions in levels from deterministic steady state.
purchased. The policy reduces the depth of the decline in output in
the home country, although extending the period of recovery. The
same is also true in the foreign country. As the policy is focused
on supporting credit conditions in the home country, the country
is able increase international finance to support a lower trade bal-
ance. These results suggest a targeted approach to the asset purchases
could achieve more desirable outcomes.
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5.5.5.2 Long-term Refinance Operations
The second unconventional policy discussed is the availability of long-
term refinance operations. For a tractable solution we follow Rude-
busch & Swanson (2012) with geometrically declining repayments
over an infinite horizon. This allows the introduction of multi-periods
bonds with just a single additional state variable. As discussed above,
we can compute the equivalent average loan duration, and average in-
terest rate which allows a mapping between the geometrically declin-
ing repayment rate and a policy rate set by the Taylor Rule. One diffi-
culty in the approach is that to either introduce the policy, or change
the average duration, during a model simulation would cause the
mapping between these variables to be lost. For example, the average
loan duration stems from the continued existence of the loans with a
fixed parameter ψ, if ψ were time varying, it would be considerably
more difficult to compute the average loan duration, or the average
rate across the loans. For this reason, we draw comparison between a
model in which the central bank arranges standard one-period credit,
and a long-term refinancing case with ψ > 0 and duration d > 1 fixed.
Consider the relationship between the deposit rate and the policy rate.
Figure 5.8 plots the impulse response functions to a monetary policy
shock comparing the baseline model with d = 1 to a version with
d = 12. This equates to 3 year loan duration which matches the latest
ECB LTRO policy. When the policy rate is cut, the model in which the
refinance operations are available as three-year maturity loans gener-
ate a larger fall in the funding the rate of the banking sector, which
stimulates private sector demand for consumption and credit. The in-
creased demand strengthens the balance sheets of the lending banks
which, via standard the financial accelerator mechanism, further en-
hances the stimulative effect of the policy rate cut.
Figure 5.9 plots the impulse response of a number of variables follow-
ing a risk shock in the home country with duration d = 1 and d = 12.
As before, the policy rate is cut following the shock, although with
the multi-period refinancing, the cut set by the policy maker is much
smaller due the the additional demand generated. An interesting fea-
ture is the asymmetric effect of introducing the policy with a larger
effect on output, inflation and other real variables in the foreign coun-
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Figure 5.8: Impulse response functions to a monetary policy shock compar-
ing average loan duration d = 1 and d = 12. Deviations in levels
from deterministic steady state.
try. With loan duration d = 1, the deposit rate in each country will
be fixed to the policy rate by the zero arbitrage condition. Once d > 1
(φt > 0), this is no longer the case due to duration effects. As equa-
tions (5.3.2) and (5.3.5) highlight, the spread between the policy rate
and the deposit rate depends the Lagrange multiplier which contains
information on the household stochastic discounting. Specifically, us-
ing equations (5.3.2) and (5.3.5) we can give the spread as
Rt
RSt
=
Et
[
Λt,t+1
ΠCt
]
[φt (1− ψ)]1/d
(5.5.1)
where
φt = Et
[
Λt,t+1
ΠCt
(1+ φt+1ψ)
]
. (5.5.2)
This makes clear that asymmetric shocks will affect the spread dif-
ferently in each country as a first-order effect, as is observed in the
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Figure 5.9: Impulse response functions to a transitory risk shock with cen-
tral bank with an without LTRO policy response. Deviations in
levels from deterministic steady state.
impulse response plots. From equations (5.3.4) and (5.3.5), we find, to
a first order approximation, that
RSt
Et [1+ φtψ]
=
RSt
∗
Et [1+ φ∗t ψ]
(5.5.3)
If the expected path of the nominal stochastic discount factor is greater
in home than foreign, then it follows that Etφt+1 > Etφ∗t+1, which
from equation (5.5.3), implies that RSt > R
S
t
∗. Of course, this is only
strictly true to first order, but given that first-order effects dominate
higher orders, it is likely to hold at higher orders even with time-
varying risk premia. This phenomena is observed following the risk
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shock; the home country experiencing the shock expects a higher fu-
ture marginal utility of consumption relative to the foreign country
and so it follows that RSt > R
S
t
∗. This stimulates relatively higher
demand in the foreign country, which is enhanced further via the
financial accelerator mechanism leading to a larger increase in eco-
nomic activity. Because the positive impact of the LTRO policy has
a larger impact on financial conditions in the foreign country, the
net foreign asset position of the home country weakens leading to
a higher increase in net exports. As with asset purchases, the long-
term refinancing can support standard monetary policy to stimulate
demand, but has a bigger impact on the less stressed economy.
5.6 conclusion
In this chapter, a two-country general equilibrium model with inter-
bank market frictions is proposed to match some observed features
of the business cycle in the Euro monetary union. In the years fol-
lowing the global financial crisis, there was a fragmentation in the
European interbank market as banks in more highly stressed coun-
tries experienced higher premiums accessing interbank market funds
(see de Andoain et al. 2014). This led to a reduction in the volume
of cross-border credit to these countries and a restriction of credit to
the non-financial private sector. This also caused rapid adjustments
of the trade balance in stressed countries which increased sharply. In
the model proposed in this chapter, we show how the costly-state
verification model of Townsend (1979) applied to over-the-counter in-
terbank transactions can propagate and enhance the effects of shocks,
including monetary policy shocks; this contradicts previous findings
that the inclusion of an interbank market in a DSGE model tempers
the effects of monetary policy (see e.g. Hilberg & Hollmayr 2011). Sec-
ondly, that applying further transactional costs which depend on the
debt exposure and risk in the destination country can help match the
observations.
Following adverse shocks occurring in the home country, we find the
presence of transactional costs worsen the financial conditions due to
higher interbank funding costs; this leads to higher borrowing costs
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in the non-financial private sector that have an adverse effect on sup-
ply via the firm credit channel, and demand via the mortgage loan
channel. The higher interbank borrowing costs also cause a reduc-
tion in credit that leads to increases in the trade balance. Whilst there
are negative spill-overs to the foreign country from home-country ad-
verse shocks, the presence of the transactional costs improves condi-
tions in the foreign countries whom benefit from lower relative fund-
ing costs that stimulate both supply and demand in the non-financial
private sector. If the adverse shock in the home country is a purely
demand-side shock, a reduction in government spending for instance,
there is a crowding-in effect that increases demand for exports from
the foreign country. This leads to reduction in the demand for in-
ternational interbank finance and so in this respect, the frictions can
provide support for the home country.
In addition to standard monetary policy, we investigate two uncon-
ventional measures; multi-period central bank refinance operations,
and central bank asset purchases. Both policy measures can support
the stimulative effects of standard monetary policy but with different
side effects and asymmetries. As the long-term refinance operations
allow a spread to emerge between the policy and deposit rates, the
savers in each country can observe different savings rates in the pres-
ence of the policy. Following an adverse shock, the spread between
the policy and deposit rates is typically larger in the country that ex-
periences smaller deviations in saver consumption levels due to the
impact on the stochastic discount factor; this leads to a larger stimu-
lus effect of the policy in the country that does not directly draw the
shock. Because of this feature, if the transactional costs in the inter-
bank market generate undesirable distributional outcomes following
asymmetric shocks, this policy may not be an appropriate policy re-
sponse. The asset purchase policy can also support interest rate cuts
to stimulate economic activity. This works through the bank balance
sheet channel; if the purchase is large enough, the banks will be less
highly leveraged which will reduce the external finance premium.
The policy program is particularly successful if the central purchases
risky assets in the more highly stress country. In reality, the ECB has
purchased less risky assets in less stressed economies with the aim of
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increasing liquidity; the policy as prescribed in this model may not
be politically feasible.
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A
C H A P T E R 4 A P P E N D I C E S
a.1 general equilibrium model conditions
Equilibrium conditions for Kt, ut, et, xst , x
r
t
1 = Et [Λt,t+1Rt+1] (A.1.1)
χ
Ct
1− Ht = Wt (A.1.2)
Et [Λt,t+1 (pit+1 −Wt+1 (λxst + (1− λ) xrt))− e] = 0 (A.1.3)
Et
[
Λt,t+1
(
λ
(
Rsk,t+1 − 1
)− (1− λ) prt+1 (Rrk,t+1 − τst ))]
− $tλ+ ϕst − ψt = 0
(A.1.4)
Et
[
Λt,t+1 (1− λ)
(
prt+1R
r
k,t+1 − 1
)]− $t (1− λ)− ϕrt + ψt = 0
(A.1.5)
where for Λt−1,t, Rt, kˆt, hˆt, Wt, Ht, Yt, It, Ctγt, xˆst , xˆrt , pit, Rst , Rrt , τst , τrt ,
$t, ψt, ϕst , ϕ
r
t
Λt−1,t = β
UC,t
UC,t−1
(A.1.6)
Rt = 1+ λ
xst−1
γt−1
(τst − 1) + (1− λ)
xrt−1
γt−1
(prtτ
r
t − 1) (A.1.7)
kˆt = (λxst + (1− λ) xrt prtωrt ) (κ + e) et−1 (A.1.8)
hˆt = 1− et−1 − ut (A.1.9)
Wt = (1− α) At
(
kˆt
hˆt
)α
(A.1.10)
Ht = (1− [1− (λxst−1 + (1− λ) xrt−1)] et−1 − ut) (A.1.11)
Yt = At kˆαt hˆ
1−α
t (A.1.12)
It = Kt + δ (λxst−1 + (1− λ) xrt−1) (e+ κ) et−1 − Kt−1 (A.1.13)
Ct = Yt − It (A.1.14)
γt = (Kt − ete) 1etκ (A.1.15)
xˆst =
xst
γt
(A.1.16)
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xˆrt =
xrt
γt
(A.1.17)
pit = (1− λ) prt xst−1 (Rrt − Rst) κ
+ (λpst x
s
t−1R
s
t + (1− λ) prt xrt−1Rrt) e
(A.1.18)
Rst = αZt
(
hˆt
kˆt
)1−α
+ (1− δ) (A.1.19)
Rrt = ω
r
t R
s
t (A.1.20)
τst = R
s
t (A.1.21)
τrt = R
r
t − (Rrt − Rst)
xst−1
xrt−1
(A.1.22)
$t (γ− λxst − (1− λ) xrt) = 0 (A.1.23)
ψt (xrt − xst) = 0 (A.1.24)
ϕst x
s
t = 0 (A.1.25)
ϕrt (1− xrt) = 0 (A.1.26)
which are subject to the inequality constraints.
$t ≥ 0 (A.1.27)
ψt ≥ 0 (A.1.28)
ϕst ≥ 0 (A.1.29)
ϕrt ≥ 0 (A.1.30)
γ ≥ λxst + (1− λ) xrt (A.1.31)
0 ≤ xst ≤ xrt ≤ 1 (A.1.32)
plus stationary AR(1) processes for ωrt , p
r
t and δt.
a.1.1 Deterministic Steady State
Calibrate κ to target κˆ ≡ κκ+e = 0.6263; e to match wˆ = 1−e−ue = 15.8;
pr to target γ¯ = 0.8409.
Guess and verify xs and xr.
We can then solve β (pi −W (λxs + (1− λ) xr)) = e for pr with
γ = γ¯ (A.1.33)
Λ = β (A.1.34)
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R =
1
β
(A.1.35)
Rs =
Rγ− γ+ λxs + (1− λ) xr
λxs + (1− λ) (prxrωr − pr(ωr − 1)xs) (A.1.36)
kˆ
hˆ
=
(
α
Rs − 1+ δ
) 1
1−α
(A.1.37)
W = (1− α)
(
kˆ
hˆ
)α
(A.1.38)
e =
kˆ
hˆ
wˆ (1− κˆ)
(λxs + (1− λ) xr prωr) (A.1.39)
κ =
κˆ
1− κˆ e (A.1.40)
The labour supply condition is χ C1−H = W, substituting this into the
aggregate resource constraint gives
kˆ
(
hˆ
kˆ
)1−α
− δ (λxs + (1− λ) xr) (e+ κ) e = 1
χ
W (1− H)
(A.1.41)
kˆ
(
hˆ
kˆ
)1−α
− δ (λxs + (1− λ) xr) (e+ κ) e = WH−φ (A.1.42)
Using H = (1− [1− (λxs + (1− λ) xr)] e− u), and the identities of kˆ
and hˆ gives(
(λxs + (1− λ) xr prωr)
(
hˆ
kˆ
)1−α − δ (λxs + (1− λ) xr)) (e+ κ) e
=
1
χ
W
(
1−
(
hˆ + (λxs + (1− λ) xr) e
))
.
(A.1.43)
We calibrate the number of workers per firm hˆe = wˆ, so this condition
is written
hˆ =
W(
χ
(
hˆ
kˆ
)1−α − χδ+W ((γ− (1− λ)(1− pr)) 1wˆ + 1) hˆkˆ
) hˆ
kˆ
(A.1.44)
hˆ =
(
1
χW
(λxs+(1−λ)xr prωr)
(
hˆ
kˆ
)1−α
e+κ
wˆ +(λx
s+(1−λ)xr)( 1χW−δ(e+κ)) 1wˆ+ 1χW
)
(A.1.45)
kˆ =
kˆ
hˆ
(
W((λxs+(1−λ)xr pr) 1wˆ+1)
−φ(
(λxs+(1−λ)xr prωr)
(
hˆ
kˆ
)1−α−δ(λxs+(1−λ)xr)) e+κwˆ
) 1
1+φ
. (A.1.46)
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We then write
hˆ =
hˆ
kˆ
kˆ (A.1.47)
Y = kˆαhˆ1−α (A.1.48)
e =
hˆ
wˆ
(A.1.49)
H = (λxs + (1− λ) xr) e + hˆ (A.1.50)
C = Y− δ (λxs + (1− λ) xr) (e+ κ) e (A.1.51)
K = (γκ + e) e (A.1.52)
I = δ (λxs + (1− λ) xr) (e+ κ) e (A.1.53)
pi = [(1− λ) prxs (ωr − 1) κ + (λxs + (1− λ) prxrωr) e] Rs
(A.1.54)
Rr = ωrRs (A.1.55)
τs = Rs (A.1.56)
τr = Rr − (Rr − Rs) xs (A.1.57)
xˆs =
xs
γ
(A.1.58)
xˆr =
1
γ
(A.1.59)
Then using
β (λ (Rs − 1)− (1− λ) pr (Rr − Rs)) = $λ− ϕs + ψ (A.1.60)
β (1− λ) (prRr − 1) = $ (1− λ) + ϕr − ψ (A.1.61)
we find
1. If
prRr < (λps + (1− λ) pr) Rs (A.1.62)
then
β (λ (Rs − 1)− (1− λ) pr (Rr − Rs)) = $λ− ϕs + ψ
(A.1.63)
β (1− λ) (prRr − 1) = $ (1− λ) + ϕr − ψ (A.1.64)
ϕr = 0 (A.1.65)
ϕs = 0 (A.1.66)
$ = β ([λ+ (1− λ) pr] Rs − 1) (A.1.67)
ψ = (1− λ) β ([λ+ (1− λ) pr] Rs − prRr) (A.1.68)
A.1 general equilibrium model conditions 215
2. If
λ+ (1− λ) prRr < (λps + (1− λ) pr) Rs < prRr (A.1.69)
then
ψ = 0 (A.1.70)
ϕs = 0 (A.1.71)
$ = β
((
1+
1− λ
λ
pr
)
Rs − 1− λ
λ
prRr − 1
)
(A.1.72)
ϕr = β
1− λ
λ
[prRr − (λ+ (1− λ)pr) Rs] (A.1.73)
3. If
(λ+ (1− λ) pr) Rs < λ+ (1− λ) prRr (A.1.74)
then
$ = 0 (A.1.75)
ψ = 0 (A.1.76)
ϕs = β [λ+ (1− λ) prRr − (λ+ (1− λ) pr) Rs] (A.1.77)
ϕr = β (1− λ) (prRr − 1) (A.1.78)
4. If
(λ+ (1− λ) pr) Rs = prRr (A.1.79)
then
ψ = 0 (A.1.80)
ϕs = 0 (A.1.81)
ϕr = 0 (A.1.82)
$ = β (prRr − 1) (A.1.83)
The finance probabilities are undetermined so we choose xr = 1,
xs = γ+1−λλ .
5. If
(λ+ (1− λ) pr) Rs = λ+ (1− λ) prRr (A.1.84)
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then
$λ− ϕs + ψ = 0 (A.1.85)
β (1− λ) (prRr − 1) = $ (1− λ) + ϕr − ψ > 0 (A.1.86)
so
ψ = 0 (A.1.87)
ϕs = 0 (A.1.88)
$ = 0 (A.1.89)
ϕr = β (1− λ) (prRr − 1) (A.1.90)
xr = 1 (A.1.91)
and then using the condition for Rs above and the remaining
first order condition
Rs =
λ
λ− (1− λ) pr (ωr − 1) (A.1.92)
xs =
Rγ− γ+ (1− λ) xr − Rs (1− λ) prxrωr
(Rs − 1) λ− Rs (1− λ) pr(ωr − 1) (A.1.93)
(λ− (1− λ) pr(ωr − 1)) Rs − λ (A.1.94)
Rs =
Rγ− γ+ λxs + (1− λ) xr
λxs + (1− λ) (prxrωr − pr(ωr − 1)xs) (A.1.95)
(A.1.96)
a.1.2 First-best economy steady state
Use the parameters from the adverse selection economy, so no cali-
bration. γ = 1 and so xs = xr. It then follows then that K = kˆ. We can
write the deterministic steady state as follows.
Λ = β (A.1.97)
R =
1
β
(A.1.98)
Rs = R (A.1.99)
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K
hˆ
=
(
α
Rs − 1+ δ
) 1
1−α
(A.1.100)
W = (1− α)
(
kˆ
hˆ
)α
(A.1.101)
pi = eRs (A.1.102)
The labour supply condition is χ C1−H = W, substituting this into the
aggregate resource constraint gives
K
( hˆ
K
)1−α
− δ
 = 1
χ
W (1− H) (A.1.103)
Using H = (1− u), K = (κ + e)e, and hˆ = 1− e− u gives
K =
1
χW(
hˆ
K
)1−α − δ+ 1χW ( hˆK + 1κ+e) . (A.1.104)
We then write
hˆ =
hˆ
K
K (A.1.105)
Y = kˆαhˆ1−α (A.1.106)
e =
K
κ + e
(A.1.107)
H = e + hˆ (A.1.108)
C = Y− δK (A.1.109)
I = δK (A.1.110)
Rr = ωrRs (A.1.111)
τs = Rs (A.1.112)
τr = Rr (A.1.113)
xˆs =
1
γ
(A.1.114)
xˆr =
1
γ
(A.1.115)
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a.2 general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities
conditions
Equilibrium conditions for Kt, ut, et, xst , x
r
t . Rates Rt, R
p
t , R
s
t , R
r
t , τ
s
t and
τrt , plus profit rate pit in nominal terms, all stocks in real consumption
units.
1 = Et
[
Λt,t+1
Πt,t+1
Rt+1
]
(A.2.1)
1 = Et
[
Λt,t+1
Πt,t+1
]
Rpt (A.2.2)
χ
Ct
1− Ht = Wt (A.2.3)
Et
[
Λt,t+1
(
pit+1
Πt,t+1
−Wt+1 (λxst + (1− λ) xrt)
)
− eQt
]
= 0
(A.2.4)
Et
[
Λt,t+1
(
λ
(
Rsk,t+1
Πt,t+1
− 1
)
− (1− λ) prt+1
(
Rrk,t+1 − τst
)
1
Πt,t+1
)]
− $tλ+ ϕst − ψt = 0
(A.2.5)
Et
[
Λt,t+1 (1− λ)
(
prt+1
Rrk,t+1
Πt,t+1
− 1
)]
− $t (1− λ)− ϕrt + ψt = 0
(A.2.6)
Ω1,t ≡ σ
σ− 1Yt MCt + ξEt
[
Λt,t+1 (Πt,t+1)
σΩ1,t+1
]
(A.2.7)
Ω2,t ≡ Yt +Et
[
ξΛt,t+1 (Πt,t+1)
σ−1 Ω2,t+1
]
(A.2.8)
1 = ξ (Πt−1,t)σ−1 + (1− ξ)
(
P∗t
Pt
)1−σ
(A.2.9)
St = ξΠσt−1,tSt−1 + (1− ξ)
(
Ω1,t
Ω2,t
)−σ
(A.2.10)
RPt =
[
R¯P
(
Πt−1,t
Π∗
)ηpi (Yt
Y¯
)ηy]1−ηr (
Rpt−1
)ηr
exp(εM,t) (A.2.11)
It
[
1− φ
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2]
= Kt + δ (λxst−1 + (1− λ) xrt−1) (e+ κ) et−1 − Kt−1
(A.2.12)
where for Λt−1,t, Rt, kˆt, hˆt, Wt, Ht, Yt, It, Ctγt, xˆst , xˆrt , pit, Rst , Rrt , τst , τrt ,
$t, ψt, ϕst , ϕ
r
t
Λt−1,t = β
UC,t
UC,t−1
(A.2.13)
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Rt = Πt−1,t
Qt
Qt−1
+ λ
xst−1
γt−1
(
τst −Πt−1,t
Qt
Qt−1
)
+ (1− λ) x
r
t−1
γt−1
(
prtτ
r
t −Πt−1,t
Qt
Qt−1
)
(A.2.14)
kˆt = (λxst + (1− λ) xrt prtωrt ) (κ + e) et−1 (A.2.15)
hˆt = 1− et−1 − ut (A.2.16)
Wt = (1− α) At MCt
(
kˆt
hˆt
)α
(A.2.17)
Ht = (1− [1− (λxst−1 + (1− λ) xrt−1)] et−1 − ut) (A.2.18)
Yt = At kˆαt hˆ
1−α
t
1
St
(A.2.19)
Ct = Yt − It
[
1− φ
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2]
(A.2.20)
γt = (Kt − ete) 1etκ (A.2.21)
xˆst =
xst
γt
(A.2.22)
xˆrt =
xrt
γt
(A.2.23)
pit = (1− λ) prt xst−1 (Rrt − Rst)Qt−1κ
+ (λpst x
s
t−1R
s
t + (1− λ) prt xrt−1Rrt)Qt−1e
(A.2.24)
Rst =
αMCtZt( hˆt
kˆt
)1−α
+ (1− δ)Qt
 Πt−1,t
Qt−1
(A.2.25)
Rrt = ω
r
t R
s
t (A.2.26)
τst = R
s
t (A.2.27)
τrt = R
r
t − (Rrt − Rst)
xst−1
xrt−1
(A.2.28)
$t (γ− λxst − (1− λ) xrt) = 0 (A.2.29)
ψt (xrt − xst) = 0 (A.2.30)
ϕst x
s
t = 0 (A.2.31)
ϕrt (1− xrt) = 0 (A.2.32)
which are subject to the inequality constraints.
$t ≥ 0 (A.2.33)
ψt ≥ 0 (A.2.34)
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ϕst ≥ 0 (A.2.35)
ϕrt ≥ 0 (A.2.36)
γ ≥ λxst + (1− λ) xrt (A.2.37)
0 ≤ xst ≤ xrt ≤ 1 (A.2.38)
plus stationary AR(1) processes for ωrt , p
r
t and δt.
a.3 new-keynesian parametrisation
Parameter Description Value
ξ Calvo parameter 0.75
σ Elasticity of substitution between consumption varieties 7
ηpi Monetary policy rule weight on inflation 1.5
ηy Monetary policy rule weight on output gap 0.2
ηr Monetary policy rule persistence 0.9
φ Investment adjustment cost parameter 2
Table A.1: Additional parametrisation of the New Keynesian model.
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a.4 figures
Figure A.1: Steady state values of $ and ϕr against pr for a range of values
of λ (top panel) and γ (bottom panel).
a.4.1 Impulse Response Functions
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Figure A.2: Impulse response functions to a very large (+20%) positive tran-
sitory shock to total factor productivity At.
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Figure A.3: Impulse response functions to a large (+10%) positive transitory
shock to total factor productivity At.
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Figure A.4: Impulse response functions to a very large (+20%) negative tran-
sitory shock to total factor productivity At.
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Figure A.5: Impulse response functions to a large transitory risk shock
caused by a reduction in the probability of risky project success
prt of approximately 3 percentage points.
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Figure A.6: Impulse response functions to a transitory risk shock caused
by a reduction in the probability of risky project success prt of
approximately 2 percentage points.
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Figure A.7: Impulse response functions to a transitory risk shock caused
by a reduction in the probability of risky project success prt of
approximately 1 percentage point.
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Figure A.8: Impulse response functions to a negative transitory risk shock
caused by a increase in the probability of risky project success
prt of approximately 2 percentage points.
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Figure A.9: Impulse response functions to a transitory risk shock caused
by a reduction in the probability of risky project success prt of
approximately 2 percentage points. Alternative parametrisation
with λ = 0.85.
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Figure A.10: Impulse response functions to a transitory risk shock caused by
a reduction in the probability of risky project success prt of ap-
proximately 4 percentage points. Alternative parametrisation
with λ = 0.85.
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Figure A.11: Impulse response functions to a transitory efficiency shock
caused by a reduction in the productivity of risky projects ωrt
of 5%.
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Figure A.12: Impulse response functions to a transitory efficiency shock
caused by a reduction in the productivity of risky projects ωrt
of 2.5%.
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Figure A.13: Impulse response functions to a transitory efficiency shock
caused by a reduction in the productivity of risky projects ωrt
of 1.5%.
234 chapter 4 appendices
Figure A.14: Impulse response functions to a transitory efficiency shock
caused by a reduction in the productivity of risky projects ωrt
of 0.8%.
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Figure A.15: Impulse response functions to a positive transitory efficiency
shock caused by an increase in the productivity of risky
projects ωrt of 1.5%.
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Figure A.16: Impulse response functions to a positive transitory efficiency
shock caused by an increase in the productivity of risky
projects ωrt of 0.5%.
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Figure A.17: Impulse response functions to a transitory efficiency shock
caused by a reduction in the productivity of risky projects ωrt
of 1.5%. Alternative parametrisation with λ = 0.85.
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Figure A.18: Impulse response functions to a transitory efficiency shock
caused by a reduction in the productivity of risky projects
ωrt of approximately 2.5%. Alternative parametrisation with
λ = 0.85.
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Figure A.19: Impulse response functions to a transitory efficiency shock
caused by a reduction in the productivity of risky projects ωrt
of 5%. Alternative parametrisation with λ = 0.85.
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Figure A.20: Impulse response functions to a transitory efficiency shock
caused by a increase in the productivity of risky projects ωrt
of 1.5%. Alternative parametrisation with λ = 0.85.
B
C H A P T E R 5 A P P E N D I C E S
b.1 interbank credit contract solution
Dropping bank indexes for convenience, lending banks balance sheet
Nt + IBHt + IB
F
t + = CRt
Net worth evolves according to
Nt = ωRCRt CRt−1 − RIB,Ht−1 IBHt−1 − RIB,Ft−1 IBFt−1
where RCRt is the ex post return across all lending. Default threshold
ω¯t ≡
RIB,Ht−1 IB
H
t−1 + R
IB,F
t−1 IB
F
t−1
RCRt CRt−1
Banks face CES preference toward domestic and foreign interbank
borrowing, so choose IBHt and IB
F
t to maximise
IBt =
[
τ IB
1/θIB IB
θIB−1
θIB
t +
(
1− τ IB
)1/θIB
IBFt
θIB−1
θIB
] θIB
θIB−1
(B.1.1)
subject to
RIBt IBt = R
IB,H
t IB
H
t + R
IB,F
t IB
F
t . (B.1.2)
This leads to demand schedules
IBFt =
(
1− τ IB
)(RIB,Ft
RIBt
)−θIB
IBt (B.1.3)
IBHt = τ
IB
(
RIB,Ht
RIBt
)−θIB
IBt (B.1.4)
and interest rate
RIBt =
[
τ IBRIB,Ht
1−θIB
+
(
1− τ IB
)
RIB,Ft
1−θIB] 11−θIB (B.1.5)
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We also find
IBHt + IB
F
t = IBt
τ IBRIB,Ht
−θIB
+
(
1− τ IB) RIB,Ft −θIB
RIB,t−θIB
(B.1.6)
= IBtΥ
(
RIB,Ht , R
IB,F
t
)
(B.1.7)
Let
Gt+1 ≡ G(ω¯t+1, σω,t+1) ≡
∫ ω¯t
0
ωdF(ω, σt) (B.1.8)
Ft+1 ≡ F(ω¯t+1, σω,t+1) ≡
∫ ω¯
0
f
(
ω;
−σ2
2
, σ2
)
dω (B.1.9)
The ex post return on interbank lending for the savings banks can
then by given by
R˜IB,Ht = (1− Ft) RIB,Ht−1 + (1− µ)GtRCRt
CRt−1
IBHt−1 + IB
F
t−1
(B.1.10)
We assume there is a cost in lending internationally that depends on
the net foreign asset position of the destination country. The ex post
return on international lending (for foreign banks) is given by
R˜IB,Ft IB
F
t−1 =
[
1− Γ∗IB,t
]
(1− Ft) RIB,Ft−1 IBFt−1
+ (1− µ)GtRCRt+1CRt−1
IBFt−1
IBHt−1 + IB
F
t−1
(B.1.11)
Objective
max
CRt,ω¯t+1,R
IB,H
t ,
IBHt ,R
IB,F
t ,IB
F
t
Et
[(
(1− Gt+1) RCRt CRt − (1− Ft+1) RIBt IBt
) Λt,t+1
PCt+1
]
s.t. ω¯t+1 =
RIBt IBt
RCRt+1CRt
Et
[
Λt,t+1
PCt
R˜IB,Ht IB
H
t−1
]
= Et
[
Λt,t+1
PCt
RSt IB
H
t−1
]
Et
[
Λ∗t,t+1
PCt
∗ R˜IB,Ft IB
F
t−1
]
= Et
[
Λ∗t,t+1
PCt
∗ RSt
∗ IBFt−1
]
Nt + IBtΥ
(
RIB,Ht , R
IB,F
t
)
= CRt
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or, suppressing arguments of Gt+1, Ft+1, RIBt , Υt for convenience, CRt,ω¯t+1,R
IB,H
t ,R
IB,F
t
chosen to maximise Lagrangian
Lt = Et

Λt,t+1
PCt+1
(1− Gt+1 − (1− Ft+1) ω¯t+1) RCRt CRt
+$t
(
ω¯t+1RCRt+1CRt − (CRt − Nt) R
IB
t
Υt
)
+λIB,Ht

(1− Ft+1) RIB,Ht (CRt − Nt)
+(1− µ) [Gt+1RCRt+1CRt]
−RSt (CRt − Nt)
 Λt,t+1PCt+1
+λIB,Ft

(
1− Γ∗IB,t
)
(1− Ft+1) RIB,Ft (CRt − Nt)
+(1− µ) [Gt+1RCRt+1CRt]
−RSt ∗(CRt − Nt)
 Λ∗t,t+1PCt+1∗

So with
Υ
(
RIB,Ht , R
IB,F
t
)
=
τ IBRIB,Ht
−θIB
+
(
1− τ IB) RIB,Ft −θIB
RIB,t−θIB
(B.1.12)
RIBt =
[
τ IBRIB,Ht
1−θIB
+
(
1− τ IB
)
RIB,Ft
1−θIB] 11−θIB (B.1.13)
RIBt
Υ
(
RIB,Ht , R
IB,F
t
) =
(
τ IBRIB,Ht
1−θIB
+
(
1− τ IB) RIB,Ft 1−θIB)(
τ IBRIB,Ht
−θIB
+ (1− τ IB) RIB,Ft
−θIB)
(B.1.14)
∂
RIBt
Υ(RIB,Ht ,R
IB,F
t )
∂RIB,Ht
=
(
1−
[
1− θIB
(
RHIB
RIB,t
)−1 1
Υt
])
IBHt
IBHt + IBFt
≡ ΞIB,Ht
(B.1.15)
∂
RIBt
Υ(RIB,Ht ,R
IB,F
t )
∂RIB,Ft
=
1−
1− θIB
(
RIB,Ft
RIB,t
)−1
1
Υt
 IBFt
IBHt + IBFt
≡ ΞIB,Ft
(B.1.16)
we find
Et
[
−G′ (ω¯t+1) + F′ (ω¯t+1) ω¯t+1 − (1− F (ω¯t+1)) RCRt+1CRt
Λt,t+1
PCt+1
]
+ $t
(
RCRt+1CRt
)
+ λIB,Ht
Et
 −F′ (ω¯t+1) RIB,Ht (CRt − Nt)Λt,t+1PCt+1
+(1− µ) [G′ (ω¯t+1) RCRt+1CRt] Λt,t+1PCt+1


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+ λIB,Ft
Et
−
(
1− Γ∗IB,t
)
F′ (ω¯t+1) RIB,Ft (CRt − Nt)
Λ∗t,t+1
PCt+1
∗
+(1− µ) [G′ (ω¯t+1) RCRt+1CRt] Λ∗t,t+1PCt+1∗


= 0 (B.1.17)
Et
[
(1− Gt+1 − (1− Ft+1) ω¯t+1) RCRt+1
Λt,t+1
PCt+1
]
+ $t
(
ω¯tRCRt+1 −
R¯IBt
Υt
)
+ λIB,Ht
Et
 (1− Ft+1) RIB,Ht Λt,t+1PCt+1
+(1− µ)Gt+1RCRt+1Λt,t+1PCt+1
− RSt Λt,t+1PCt+1

+ λIB,Ft
Et

(
1− Γ∗IB,t
)
(1− Ft+1) RIB,Ft
Λ∗t,t+1
PCt+1
∗
+(1− µ)Gt+1RCRt+1
Λ∗t,t+1
PCt+1
∗
− RSt ∗Λ∗t,t+1PCt+1∗

= 0 (B.1.18)
$t
(
− (CRt − Nt)ΞIB,Ht
)
+ λIB,Ht
(
Et
[
(1− Ft+1) (CRt − Nt)Λt,t+1PCt+1
])
= 0 (B.1.19)
$t
(
− (CRt − Nt)ΞIB,Ft
)
+ λIB,Ft
(
Et
[(
1− Γ∗IB,t
)
(1− Ft+1) (CRt − Nt)Λ
∗
t,t+1
PCt+1
∗
])
= 0
(B.1.20)
Then
Et
[
RCRt+1
]
= Et


λIB,Ht R
IB,H
t
Λt,t+1
PCt+1
λIB,Ft
(
1− Γ∗IB,t
)
RIB,Ft Υt
Λ∗t,t+1
PCt+1
∗
−(1− µ)RIBt
(
λIB,Ht
Λt,t+1
PCt+1
+ λIB,Ft
Λ∗t,t+1
PCt+1
∗
)
+ (1− Ft+1) RCRt+1 CRtIBt
Λt,t+1
PCt+1

F′(ω¯t+1)
$t
IBt
CRt

where
$t
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=
λIB,Ht + λ
IB,F
t −Et


[1− Gt+1 − (1− Ft+1) ω¯t+1] Λt,t+1PCt+1
+λIB,Ht (1− µ)Gt+1Λt,t+1PCt+1
+λIB,Ft (1− µ)Gt+1
Λ∗t,t+1
PCt+1
∗
 RCRt+1

ω¯t+1RCRt+1 − R
IB
t
Υt
+ ΞIB,Ht R
IB,H
t + Ξ
IB,F
t R
IB,F
t
(B.1.21)
λIB,Ht =
$t
Et
[
(1− Ft+1) Λt,t+1PCt+1
]ΞIB,Ht
λIB,Ft =
$t
Et
[
(1− Ft+1) Λ
∗
t,t+1
PCt+1
∗
] ΞIB,Ft
1− Γ∗IB,t
There is no closed form expression for Et
[
RCRt
]
but these conditions
imply a value that depends on the rates and the leverage ratio IBtCRt .
Given that perfect capital markets imply Et
[
RCRt
]
will be the same
for all banks, ωt only depends on the leverage, and so the conditions
imply the same rates and leverage ratio for all banks of any Nt.
